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ABSTRACT
Despite the introduction of numerous strategies to improve medication safety, 
error rates over the last 5 years have not reduced. Moreover, some errors are 
being repeated. This suggests that staff may not learn from their errors or 
individual learning is not being shared across the PICU.
The aim of this study was to gain a more accurate understanding of medication 
error (ME) occurrence in one large Paediatric Intensive Care Unit (PICU) and to 
explore the paediatric intensive care (PIC) team’s perceptions of MEs and how 
they perceive that they learn from them. 
An exploratory study using a parallel convergent mixed methods approach was 
chosen using both qualitative and quantitative methods involving focus groups, 
interviews, content analysis of reflective learning tools and observations of 
nurses administering medication on the PICU.
The focus groups and interviews generated three overlapping core categories, 
which were linked by a meta-category, the reality of practice, which provides a 
means of synthesising the range of participants’ perceptions and practices. The 
three core categories were: perceived culture on PICU, factors affecting ME 
reporting and learning from MEs. Interruptions and distractions were observed 
to increase violations of policy and protocol. Three MEs were observed out of 
59 medication administration episodes; none of these errors were reported 
formally, suggesting that MEs remain underreported. The content analysis of 
the reflective learning tool highlighted a lack of detailed, self-analysis and 
reflection following an error to demonstrate learning.
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Since there is still underreporting of MEs, clearer definition and ongoing 
guidance of what constitutes a ME may have the potential to improve reporting 
practices. Individual learning and shared learning does not automatically take 
place following a ME on the PICU. The current reflective learning tool does not 
facilitate useful reflection on the error and is unlikely to promote learning across 
the unit.  More detail is needed about when to ask staff involved with a 
medication error to complete tools to aid learning from MEs. Staff engagement 
should be sought at all levels to promote learning. Staff need to see the 
relevance of any new safety processes that are implemented; this could be 
achieved through positive feedback.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background and significance
Patient safety by reducing error is a key priority for major health services around 
the world and continues to be a major challenge (Kohn et al., 1999; WHO, 
2005; NCCMERP, 2005, NHS England, 2014). In 2000, the UK government put 
forward a report called an “Organisation with a Memory” stating that in the past 
there had been little systematic learning form adverse events. The Chief 
Medical Officer identified three problems within the NHS that impeded learning 
from error: blame culture, which inhibits reporting; inattention to near misses; 
and insufficient individual self-appraisal when involved with an error. Whilst 
patient safety has always been at the forefront for health professionals, in the 
last decade MEs have become an increasing concern, having been identified as 
the single most ‘preventable’ cause of patient harm (NAO, 2005).
1.2 The scale of the problem
The National Patient Safety Agency (NPSA) have calculated that ME is 
estimated to cost the NHS more than 750 million pounds a year in preventable 
harm, from prolonged hospital stays, legal claims and readmissions to hospital, 
although the vast majority of MEs, result in no harm to patients (NPSA, 2007). 
However, research has shown that MEs are under estimated and remain 
underreported (Wilde and Bradley, 2005; Vincent, 2006; Sari et al., 2007; 
Armitage et al., 2010). 
1
1.3 Medication errors
MEs can occur at each stage of the cycle from prescribing, transcription, 
dispensing to administration. This means that all health care professionals, 
including doctors, nurses and pharmacists should be involved in an approach to 
preventing the problem of MEs (Williams, 2007).  Reason (1997) states that 
MEs stem from ‘human errors’ and ‘latent failures’ within the organisation and 
the administrative processes and systems. It is widely acknowledged now that 
MEs occur when human errors and system factors interact with this cycle, so 
rather than just focusing on the individual, the conditions within the organisation 
and clinical practice are important causes of error (Armitage et al., 2010). As 
these types of errors are deemed to be preventable, there is the opportunity to 
learn from any failures and respond in order to prevent them in the future 
(Chuang et al., 2007).
1.4 Definition 
MEs that are stopped before harm can occur are known as near misses, close 
calls or a potential adverse medication events (VHA, 2006). In order to 
understand MEs and to add context to the literature discussed in this review, it 
is necessary to define the term ME.  Definitions of MEs vary across the 
literature (Brady et al., 2009). A study by Yu et al. (2005) searched 160 
medication safety websites, finding 119 different definitions, using different 
terminology, with 33 of these sites giving reference to more than one definition 
per site. This plethora of definitions does not allow for a quick and easy 
classification of MEs (Allen and Barker, 1990; Franklin et al., 2005; Ghaleb and 
Wong, 2006; Valentin et al., 2009).
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Lisby et al. (2010) concluded from a systematic review of the literature that the 
wide ranges of error rates reflect the differing definitions of error and the 
methods of data collection used in different settings. As this study was based in 
an NHS hospital the most up to date definition of a ME and patient safety 
incident, currently adopted by the NHS England and the NRLS were used as  
reference points:
 ‘Medication errors are any Patient Safety Incident where there has been 
an error in the process of prescribing, preparing, dispensing, 
administering, monitoring or providing advice on medicines.’
A patient safety incident’ (PSI) is, ‘any unintended or unexpected incident, 
which could have or did lead to harm for one or more patients receiving 
NHS care.’ (NHS England, 2014:2)
In summary, the multiple definitions, terms and meanings can hamper the 
understanding and comparison of the literature around MEs. This leads to 
different approaches to interpreting or detecting MEs and as such requires 
close scrutiny when reviewing the literature. 
1.5 Critical care: The PICU environment, culture and perspective
In paediatrics the potential for errors to cause harm is three times more likely 
compared to adults, with children under four being at particular risk (Bates et al., 
1995; Kaushall et al., 2004; NPSA, 2007). Anderson and Ellis (1999) advise that 
there are numerous reasons that put children at higher risk of MEs. The majority  
of medication doses in paediatric intensive care (PICU) are calculated by a 
child’s age, individual body weight (kilograms) or body surface area as well as 
their clinical condition. There is a large variance in weight and body area within 
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the paediatric population. In PICU, the weights of paediatric patients may 
change dramatically over a short period of time requiring frequent recalculation 
of medication doses (Chua et al. 2009). Also, off-label usage [medication 
prescribed for other than their intended use] of medications leads to adult 
formulations being diluted or reformulated for children’s use (Budetti, 2003). 
Chua et al. (2009) advise that children have limited response capabilities and 
communication skills, to warn carers about the side effects they may experience 
from medication errors. On PICU there is also a reduced patient ability to 
communicate due to unconsciousness and these children, especially neonates, 
do not have the internal reserves to buffer MEs when compared to adults 
(Sullivan & Buchino, 2004; Dickinson et al., 2012.)
Critically ill patients are prescribed twice as many medications as patients 
outside the intensive care unit, putting them at a higher risk of a ME (Moyen et 
al., 2008). Studies on adult ICU’s have shown that on average, patients 
experience 1.7 errors per day (Donchin et al.,1995), whilst nearly all ICU 
patients suffer a potentially life threatening error at some point in their stay 
(Provonost et al., 2005). 
1.6 Reporting of medication errors
It has been suggested that 96% of the 1.7 errors per ICU patient day are never 
officially reported (Wild and Bradley, 2005). A further study has shown that 
routine incident-reporting systems may report as few as 5% of medication errors 
compared to those detected by case review notes (Sari et al., 2007). Barriers to 
reporting MEs include shame, fear of litigation, lengthy reporting systems, fear 
of punishment and an unsupportive culture on the ward or in the organisation 
(Wolf et al., 2000; Evans et al., 2006; Armitage et al., 2010). Armitage et al.
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(2010) expands on this further, advising that resourceful staff used to multi-
tasking, may normalise interruptions and organisational weakness, therefore not 
seeing the need to report critical incidents or near misses. Johnson (2007) 
advises that incident reporting does not always take into account the 
contributory factors, questioning whether frontline staff believes such factors are 
inescapable when working in demanding situations, or whether staff have a lack 
of knowledge on error causation. Armitage et al. (2010) concluded that incident 
reporting needs to capture a range of contributory factors to facilitate learning 
and put supportive actions in place.
1.7 Nurse perspective
As nurses administer the bulk of the medications on PICU, it is therefore vitally 
important that we understand how PICU nurses perceive MEs, look at the 
accuracy and quality of their report rates and their perceptions of learning from 
medication errors. 
1.8 Medical perspective
Prescribing errors account for 26% of errors in critical care (Thomas & 
Panchagnula, 2008), although Taylor et al. (2004) advise of the high level of 
underreporting of errors by doctors. Prescribing errors are frequently (75% of 
the time) detected by the pharmacist or nurse before administration to the 
patient (Sullivan and Bochino, 2004). 
1.9 Error prevention
The majority of literature up to now has focused on descriptive reports of 
incidence rates and identifying factors that promote and improve safety 
medication in health care organisations (Hoff et al., 2004; Chang and Mark, 
2011). An organisation with a memory (DH, 2000) concluded that there had 
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been insufficient research on how we learn from failure in health care in the UK.  
Similarly, Hoff et al. (2004) advised the need to gain further insight into the 
mechanisms for reducing errors and that there was a lack of theoretical 
foundation. More recent reports have concluded that healthcare still has a lot to 
learn, with regard to patient safety, implying that the last 10 years represents a 
“lost decade” (Wynia and Classen, 2011). The focus of research on identifying 
personal or organisational predictors of MEs, aimed at prevention of errors 
occurring, has led to a gap between awareness of MEs and the knowledge of 
how to manage and learn from errors when they do occur (Chang and Mark, 
2011). 
1.10 The study site
On the PICU, where this study took place, despite the introduction of numerous 
strategies to improve medication safety over the past five years, ME rates had 
not reduced; moreover the same errors continue to be repeated. In addition to 
this, the error reporting from both the medical and nursing staff does not contain 
enough detail to establish the causative factors relating to the medication error. 
This suggests that staff may not be learning from their errors or that individual 
learning experiences are not being shared cross the unit. It is hoped that by 
gaining an insight into the process and culture of MEs on this PICU, that 
problems specifically associated within this setting will be highlighted to enable 
meaningful feedback to be given to the management and staff so as to target 
interventions to improve safety and prevent errors. The following literature 
review will look to identify the relevant research around how doctors and nurses 
working on a PICU perceive MEs, the management of these errors and how 
they learn from them.
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CHAPTER 2: THE LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Introduction 
This literature review is based on the approach described by Polit and Hungler 
(1997). The research question underpinning this review is ‘how do doctors and 
nurses working on a PICU perceive MEs, the management of these errors and 
how they learn from them?’
2.2 Data sources
The databases searched were CINAHL, Medline, PychINFO and Pubmed and 
the search included articles from 1990 – 2015 so as to include the literature 10 
years pre and post publication of ‘An Organisation with a Memory’. The 
following key words were used; Medication error* (ME), perception*, 
understanding, critical thinking, attitude, learn*, management, pediatric, 
paediatric, neonatal, and critical care.
2.2.1 Inclusion criteria
Studies included in the review were those that identified how doctors or nurses 
perceived MEs in relation to the management of errors and learning from them. 
The aim was to obtain high quality evidence of the characteristics of how 
doctors and nurses actually learn from MEs, particularly in relation to the PICU. 
However, the search returned very few articles that were specific to PICU, with 
some generalisability to pediatrics, as opposed to just within the remits of PICU.  
Therefore the inclusion criteria were broadened to include studies which at least 
identified the learning and management of MEs, within a hospital setting.
2.2.2 Exclusion criteria
The following criteria were used to exclude studies from the review:
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· Studies or reviews not performed in a hospital setting.
· Studies involving the psychiatric setting
· Studies purely measuring incidence rates
· ME studies based on health technology improvements
· Studies involving only measurement of safety and quality indicators
· Studies measuring incidence rates pre and post intervention strategies 
that did not include learning or management of MEs.
In the papers identified, a general content analytic approach was used to review 
the abstracts and articles for pertinent information, according to the inclusion 
and exclusion criteria. Additionally, a manual search of the reference lists of the 
articles selected in the review was conducted. All duplicates between databases 
or papers that could not be obtained were excluded. Only original studies 
published in English were considered for inclusion as there was no facility for 
translation. The Critical Appraisal Skills Program (CASP) Tool relevant to the 
methodology used in the paper was used to critically appraise and assess the 
trustworthiness and relevance of the papers included in the review. A total of 21 
studies met the inclusion criteria, these form the basis of this literature review 
(see Diagram 1). 
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Diagram 1 Results of database search
2.3 Learning from medication errors
This review will be presented under learning from MEs from a medical 
perspective, from a nursing perspective and from an organisational perspective. 
Research has identified that a positive learning climate leads to reduced rates 
of error (Edmondson, 2004). Whilst studies advocate that the attributions of a 
learning climate include detecting and handling errors, communicating about 
errors and sharing knowledge (Chang and Mark, 2011). It is not always clear 
how these interventions should be absorbed into the everyday practices of a 
ward. Moreover, some studies have presumed that learning is something that 
just develops naturally and does not need nurturing (Vashdi et al., 2007). 
Popper and Lipshitz (2000) proposed that without the necessary practices in 
place, the learning potential of the team is lost. Hence their definition of learning 
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below is used as a guide, as whilst it has relevance to the context of learning 
from preventable adverse events in the healthcare setting it also considers the 
setting - the ‘ward’ and the ‘information relevant’ to the staff:
“Institutionalised structural and procedural arrangements, and informal 
systematic practices, which allow the ward systematically to collect, 
analyse, store, disseminate and use information relevant to its 
performance and its members” (Popper & Lipshitz, 2000)
Therefore, this review will critically analyse the literature on how doctors and 
nurses perceive learning and management from MEs. This will be done by 
examining their perceptions of the formal and informal practices that are in 
place on the wards in hospitals and their relevance to learning and 
management of MEs.
2.4 A medical perspective of medication errors
There still remains little research evidence demonstrating how doctors respond 
to errors and how they engage with the formal reporting of errors (Kroll et al., 
2008). Whilst prescribing mistakes are inevitable because of the complex nature 
of medicine, time pressures and clinical decision making, little is known of how 
doctors can learn better from their mistakes (Wu et al., 1991). Learning from 
errors can be complex. Many barriers to learning were identified in this literature 
review, these barriers include awareness of making a ME, reflection following a 
ME, taking responsibility for a ME and discussing MEs with senior medical staff. 
These will now be discussed in more detail.
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2.4.1 Awareness
Doctors first need to be made aware that they have made an error. A qualitative 
single site study based in an Australian teaching hospital by Nichols et al. 
(2008) interviewed 26 staff (15 doctors; six interns, four resident medical 
officers and five registrars) using semi structured interviews, to determine the 
contributory causes of MEs. They found that ten of the doctors interviewed, did 
not know they had caused a ME until approached by the research team; the 
doctors related this to being asked to see patients after hours by senior doctors 
who were not in their primary team. There seems to be some agreement about 
this lack of awareness in similar studies in the UK and the USA (Dean, 2002; 
Fischer et al., 2006; Kroll et al., 2008). This inherent lack of feedback inhibits 
learning, the exception being the most serious of errors, which are identified 
because of their outcome (Dean, 2002). The study by Nichols et al. (2008) 
aimed to address learning from error by looking at the contributory causes of 
ME. However, a weakness of the study is that the majority of doctors 
interviewed were junior, and the views of more senior doctors and consultants 
were not included. As communication barriers between doctors were clearly 
identified as an issue, the inclusion of senior doctor accounts could have 
provided a more in-depth perspective. Participants were recruited by 
convenience sampling, whereas purposive sampling may have increased the 
likelihood of gaining a more varied sample of the team. In addition, as 
previously discussed the medication process involves many different people 
and prescribing errors are often discovered by the pharmacist or nurse later in 
the process (Dornan et al., 2009). The actual interviews were between 1 and 60 
days following the error, as such, some of the interviews may have been 
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conducted with staff before senior doctors could speak to the more junior 
doctors regarding the error, due to shift patterns. Thus these 10 doctors who 
were not aware of having made an error, may have discovered this later on. 
However, previous research has suggested that interviews should be held as 
close to the error actually occurring to aid recall of what happened (Dean, 
2000).
The EQUIP study (Dornan et al., 2009) was an in-depth investigation into 
causes of prescribing errors by foundation year doctors (FY1) concentrating on 
the interplay between their educational backgrounds and factors in their 
practice environments. This mixed methods study in the UK, utilised a large 
empirical evaluation of prescribing errors, followed by in-depth qualitative 
interviews, exploring the causes of the errors using a critical incident approach. 
Following this, telephone interviews with leaders of the undergraduate 
program’s in which the FY1 trainees had been educated were conducted. The 
study included data collection from 19 trusts in the North West of England. In 
contrast to the Nichols et al. (2008) study, Dornan et al (2009) used purposeful 
sampling, which has been shown to be more robust (Wood and Ross-Kerr, 
2006) in ensuring maximum variability of doctors interviewed. Dornan et al. 
(2009) found doctors rely heavily on nursing and pharmacy staff to identify and 
correct their errors, and possibly do not take as much care, because of this 
perceived ‘safety net'. Whilst Dean (2002) emphasises this is one of the 
strengths of the system in picking up errors, it also inhibits the medical staff 
from learning. Indeed, doctors have reported that they would learn better from 
errors they have made themselves, although open discussion of other people’s 
errors is also conducive to learning (Fischer et al., 2006). These studies 
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highlight that the lack of communication, poor reporting of errors and poor 
feedback to those involved, does not facilitate doctors to learn from their own 
errors, because they are not made aware of them.
2.4.2 Reflection
A prospective qualitative single site study in the UK by Dean (2002) utilised 
pharmacists to identify and interview doctors about their perceptions of the 
causation of their prescribing errors, when involved in a potentially serious ME. 
This study found that the medical staff did not reflect upon prescribing errors 
unless prompted to do so. This conflicts with findings from Fischer et al.’s 
(2006) study in the US in which nearly all 58 trainee doctors reported using 
reflection as the normal learning process following being involved in an error. 
Whilst the UK study included consultants, specialist registrars, senior and junior 
house officers (a more varied selection of participants), comparison between 
the two studies suggests a different approach to learning styles. NHS trusts are 
expected to provide feedback following an error and to allow time for reflection 
and learning (DH, 2013). Indeed, reflection is now part of the new medical 
curriculum (DH, 2008). However, medical supervisors acknowledge there are 
limited opportunities for reflection and no protected time for one to one 
supervision (Brown et al., 2007). Ideally, some individuals will develop through 
experiencing an error, observing the consequences and considering how to do 
it better next time (Dean, 2002). Dean (2002) suggest that the cost of time 
required for reflection is small compared to the financial and personal costs of 
MEs.
Kroll et al. (2008) carried out a qualitative study, using semi-structured 
telephone interviews, to look at the experiences and perceptions of MEs 
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amongst junior doctors in the UK. These 38 doctors worked in 10 different UK 
hospitals, who had all graduated from the same medical school and therefore 
had similarities in training. Kroll et al. (2008) report that the learning 
opportunities from MEs amongst doctors are lost as a consequence of ‘informal 
reporting.’ This conflicts with an earlier study that found that discussing errors 
with colleagues informally facilitated effective learning and accountability (Wu et 
al., 1991). However, the methodological approaches used in these two studies 
were very different. Wu et al. (1991) undertook a quantitative study using 
internally validated questionnaires to learn how medical errors made by house 
officers relate to subsequent changes in practice. Participants were approached 
on three different internal medical training programs, but no further details of 
sampling were provided. Random selection is a critical element for this type of 
questionnaire research in that generalisation is a primary goal (Edmonds and 
Kennedy, 2013.) The Wu et al. (1991) study had a response rate of 45%, 
indicating some response bias. The study by Kroll et al. (2008) used a computer 
generated random sample, 38 doctors were approached from a pool of 317 
doctors and all consented to participate and be interviewed by telephone. The 
study by Wu et al. (1991) indicated that whilst only 54% of house officers 
discussed their mistakes with supervising physicians, 88% of house officers 
discussed their mistakes with colleagues. They advocate that learning could be 
improved by encouraging house officers to take responsibility and then discuss 
their mistakes with physicians in a supervisory role (Wu et al., 1991). Kroll et al 
(2008) attempted to identify the form in which supervisory feedback should be 
given. Interestingly, their study did not recommend supportive reassurance 
following an error, although they clearly indicated that blame is an inhibitor to 
learning as well. Instead, they recommended the need for specific, constructive 
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feedback, with training and protected time to do this. As previously discussed, 
NHS trusts are now expected to provide feedback and time for reflection and 
learning following a ME (DH, 2013). 
Formal reporting of MEs by doctors is selective, although doctors may be angry 
or indignant when their colleagues have made an error, they do not usually 
report their colleagues (Kroll et al., 2008). This is not new. A previous study has 
described this as a ‘conspiracy of tolerance’, where young doctors learn to be 
non-accountable for their mistakes starting in medical school (Lester and Tritter, 
2001). Fischer et al. (2006) report that doctors adopt this culture of not reporting 
colleagues in medical school, where their own individual ethic may have been 
superseded, changing how they would have responded before medical training. 
In addition, there is the fear of criticising senior colleagues (Wu et al., 1991). 
Historically, medical hierarchies have been shown to be integral to the way in 
which error is managed (Irvine, 1997; Tritter, 2001; Walton, 2006), but how this 
is actually played out on a daily basis in response to a ME and how doctors 
learn from errors is not clear. However, it does seem apparent from the 
literature that norms exist, such as discouraging the reporting of errors that 
inhibit learning. Kroll et al. (2008) propose the need to assess the impact of 
reflective learning, but no literature to date was found on how this had an 
impact on how doctors learn from MEs.
2.4.3 Responsibility
Fisher et al.’s (2006) qualitative study in the US used semi-structured telephone 
interviews to identify the major factors and areas of tension in doctors’ learning 
from MEs. The interview schedule of seven questions was developed following 
a literature review; to identify how doctors’ disclose and reflect as part of the 
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learner’s cognitive and behavioral response to MEs. This study also highlighted 
the need for the learner to take responsibility as this was shown to be an 
important step in learning from a ME; defending a mistake is a barrier to an 
individual learning from it. Other studies have reported that doctors who accept 
responsibility for an error report constructive changes in practice (Wu et al., 
1991; Kroll et al. 2008). Taking responsibility may be selective, as the majority 
of doctors have said that they learn best and take responsibility from errors that 
have a good outcome (Dean, 2002; Fisher et al., 2006; Kroll et al., 2008). In 
contrast, in cases of severe harm, the responsibility may have been denied and 
attributed to the patient’s condition (DH, 2000). However, the longevity of 
learning from errors with the worst outcomes is questionable, as people become 
lax and fall back into bad habits (Fischer et al., 2006). Kroll et al. (2008) 
highlight that further opportunities for taking responsibility can be missed within 
the team by an inappropriate response from senior colleagues such as, “it’s not 
a matter of life or death” (Kroll et al., 2008: p986). In this context it has been 
described as normalising as reassurance from senior colleagues impedes 
further discussion and therefore learning opportunities are missed (Brown et al., 
2007). 
2.4.4 Discussing with senior doctors
A senior doctor’s personality and response to a more junior doctor’s ME has 
been reported to affect the opportunity to learn, if chastisement has taken place 
(Fisher et al., 2006). Indeed, some doctors’ report being forced to handle 
difficult situations and receiving ineffective supervision from staff not trained to 
give it (National Survey of Trainee Doctors, 2006). However, the DH (2008) 
maintains that clinical supervision is key to learning from errors. Kroll et al. 
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(2008) advocate the need and usefulness of discussion with more senior 
doctors to obtain specific and constructive feedback. Wu et al. (1991) reported 
that when doctors seek advice from their senior colleagues and are encouraged 
to discuss their mistakes, 98% reported at least one constructive change in 
practice and only 18% reported one or more defensive changes. Furthermore, 
clinical supervision has led to the detection of near misses, which then allows 
further discussion and learning (Engel et al., 2006). 
Kroll et al. (2008) describe “the learning moment” when the most learning 
occurs, when the error was discussed, feedback was constructive and 
supportive, even if there was chastisement, as long as it was structured. This 
has long been a recommendation of the General Medical Council (GMC, 1993). 
In contrast, humiliation by a senior doctor can lead to doctors never 
understanding their own errors (Kroll et al., 2008). Burack et al. (1999) have 
previously suggested that the increased awareness of MEs, causes 
‘desensitisation’ preventing learning. In line with supervision, doctors have 
reported that formal teaching, involving small group discussions, focused on 
real errors, presented by senior doctors who have been involved with MEs 
provides important support and learning (Fischer et al., 2006). 
2.4.5 Conclusion
A lack of reporting and communication of MEs to the doctors involved in 
prescribing errors, does not allow doctors to learn from their own errors, 
because they are not made aware of them. Informal reporting of MEs amongst 
colleagues is common, but this may limit learning from errors, especially when 
doctors are not able to reflect and receive constructive feedback from senior 
colleagues and interpret this and make changes in practice to improve safety.
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2.5 Nurses’ perspectives on medication errors
Previous research has suggested that a ward with a positive learning climate 
can effectively use their safety information systems to evaluate and reduce MEs 
(Edmondson, 1996; Hoffman and Mark, 2006; DH, 2000; Chuang and Mark, 
2011). However, despite this, there has been little research around the learning 
climate in nursing and the mechanisms involved to improve safety around MEs 
(Chuang and Mark, 2011).
2.5.1 Learning climate in nursing
A quantitative cross sectional study by Chang and Mark (2011) looked at how 
the learning climate moderates the relationship between error producing 
conditions and MEs occurring. This study used unvalidated questionnaires to 
provide a snapshot of the frequency and characteristics of 279 nurses in 146 
hospitals across the United States. It partly focused on the learning climate in 
nursing in terms of willingness to reveal errors, degree of open communication 
around errors and the extent to which nurses actually identify the causation of 
errors. It also examined how the learning climate affected the skill mix within the 
team. It concluded that when the learning climate was good, the number of MEs 
was not dependent on the number of staff or the skill mix of the team. Argote et 
al. (2000) concluded that in a positive learning climate, where learning from 
errors is encouraged, nurses will share their learning experiences. However, 
learning will only occur if the nurse actually perceives this process of learning is 
effective in the first place, which then increases the likelihood of passing this 
learning onto other nurses. Additionally, nurses are often responsible for 
supervising other nurses to share their clinical skills, so over time knowledge of 
error management may be transferred across the unit, so that group learning 
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will take place (Chuang et al., 2007). Within nursing, informal linkages between 
staff (such as an individual’s personal relationship with colleagues) may also 
affect how nurses learn from errors, especially when needing advice regarding 
improving practice (Chang et al., 2007). A weakness in the design of this study 
by Chuang and Mark (2011) was that the data collection relied on medication 
administration error’s (MAEs) identified through incident reports alone, as such, 
the results may not be generalisable, as a true representation of the causative 
factors of all MEs (Flynn et al., 2002). Another limitation of this study is the lack 
of formal measurement around the role of leadership within the nursing context. 
From an organisation learning model context, leadership is key to successfully 
creating a positive learning climate (Edmondson, 2004). The role of leadership 
within this study was not measured and as such the study may rely too heavily 
on the accounts of more junior nurses. Future work could include the role of 
leadership, as it would be interesting to see how the nurse manager’s role 
influences the creation of a positive learning climate. 
2.5.2 Team learning and nursing
Research around adopting a team learning approach to reducing MAE’s is not 
new (Edmondson, 2004). Previous studies have shown that there are fewer 
errors, when the team engages in a cyclic learning process of data collection to 
discover errors, analyse, reflect and implement changes (Tucker and 
Edmondson, 2003). Whilst Edmondson (2004) advises that data collection is a 
prerequisite for team learning to take place and without it the reflective process 
would be incomplete and happen less often. West (1996) states that gathering 
information is not enough, advising that further reflection is needed in order for 
teams to learn. West (1996) attempted to define team learning, putting forward 
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that the way in which group members reflect and adapt to new processes, will 
be related to the environment in which an individual is working. However, 
Edmondson (2004) outlines that reflection alone may be insufficient; it does not 
provide evidence on how the team has actually learned and the team must also 
introduce changes in the way that they perform their job. Whilst Edmondson’s 
(2004) study favors the superiority of using the full cycle of learning, in reality, 
this practice may lead to ‘patchy learning’ where the steps of this cycle are used 
separately and unsystematically leading to a lack of shared knowledge and little 
change in practice (Drach-Zahavy and Pud, 2010). Research has shown that 
team structure, productivity and perceptions of power relations can shape 
collective learning (Edmondson, 2004).
2.5.3 Learning mechanisms
Drach-Zahavy and Pud (2010) conducted a cross-sectional sequential mixed 
method study using observations and interviews, to identify and test the 
effectiveness of learning mechanisms applied by nursing staff as a means of 
limiting MAE’s. This study was conducted in three large hospitals in Israel, 
across 33 wards, with 173 nurses participating. This study explores learning 
mechanisms from a descriptive and theoretical point of view with the aim to 
make a practical contribution to team learning. This is a novel approach, 
because how errors are discussed and reflected on and who is actually involved 
in this process - inside or outside of the team - has not previously been 
specified (Wilson et al., 2007). As previously discussed, if the appropriate 
learning mechanisms are not in place, the teams’ learning potential may be lost 
(Popper and Lipshitz , 2000). 
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Drach-Zahavy and Pud (2010) suggested that learning mechanisms are 
designed at team level, that these differ between teams and that, some of these 
mechanisms are ‘effective’ at promoting learning with in the team, whilst others 
are ‘ineffective.' They identified four types of learning mechanisms namely 
‘integrated', ‘nonintegrated’, ‘supervisory’ and ‘patchy'. Wilson et al. (2007) offer 
an explanation for this pointing out that the effectiveness of team learning 
mechanisms is dependent on who operates them. Drach-Zahavy and Pud 
(2010) concluded that effective mechanisms are those that facilitate systematic 
gathering of information, rather than concentrating on singular medication 
errors.  They also recommended that effective team learning mechanisms are 
those that engage and utilise all nurses on the ward with the learning process 
(integrated learning), rather than attributing learning to risk management or 
ward managers (nonintegrated learning). Whilst they observed bedside nurses 
to gain data on medication administration, they based their interviews solely on 
discussions with the head nurses. This would seem at odds with their findings, 
and not considering the bedside nurses’ voices and may have impacted on their 
findings.
2.5.4 Integrated or nonintegrated learning
Popper and Lipshitz (2000) had previously classified learning mechanisms as 
‘integrated’ and ‘nonintegrated’. Advocating that for a learning mechanism to be 
integrated, the same people will be responsible for generating and applying the 
lessons learned, that is, the inclusion of all staff involved in a ME in a team 
meeting. In contrast, when a risk management unit collects and analyses data 
and implements changes in practice, this would be classified as nonintegrated 
(Drach-Zahavy and Pud, 2010). Nurses administer the bulk of medications and 
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are therefore well placed to recognise problems within the medication process 
(Tucker et al., 2002). Evidence suggests that when staff participate in the 
learning process, there is less resistance to integrated learning mechanisms 
and better acceptance (Edmondson, 2004). Additionally, there is the need to 
develop a positive safety culture at unit level, because while system level 
mechanisms have shown to be effective in improving medication safety, in the 
face of a poor local safety culture, these may be ineffective (Abstoss et al., 
2011).
2.5.5 Supervisory learning
Drach-Zahavy and Pud (2010) propose ‘supervisory learning’ as a type of 
learning mechanism, that may develop in wards. This is more complex, in that it 
is integrated (it operates at ward level), but nonintegrated in that the ward 
manager has responsibility for the cycle of learning. They describe this as 
‘imposing’ learning on nurses. In contrast, a study by Karga et al (2011) 
conducted across five hospitals in Greece, used an externally modified 
questionnaire to investigate the emotional responses of nurses and the 
perceived senior staff response to errors and how these are associated with 
constructive or defensive changes in nursing practice. Karga et al (2011) 
highlighted the importance of senior staff responding positively to an error, 
where this correlated well with constructive changes in practice; advocating the 
need to support staff to overcome their initial negative feelings, by managing 
them in a constructive way that led them to focus on correcting error producing 
behaviors. Karga et al (2011) also reported that defensive changes were more 
likely if the nurse felt unfairly treated and that the nurse was then less likely to 
take responsibility for the error. There is some evidence to suggest that when 
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responsibility of learning is given to the ward manager, the nurses will shift 
attention to the actions being supervised, cutting corners elsewhere where they 
are not (Edmondson, 2004), therefore true learning and changes may not take 
place. Furthermore, supervisory learning can emphasise power differences and 
limit team learning (Edmondson, 2004). Whereas when team leaders 
encourage staff to speak openly and freely, learning rates increase (Pisano et 
al., 2001). 
2.5.6 Nurses’ emotional response to errors
Relatively few researchers have actually used nurse’s own voices to 
conceptualise the problem of MEs (Stetina et al., 2005). A qualitative study by 
Treiber and Jones (2010) investigated the perceived causes of MAE’s to better 
understand how nurses deal with them. They used nurses’ accounts of error to 
explain how they learnt from errors. They performed an interpretive analysis of 
written accounts made by 158 nurses who had been involved with a MAE. 
Embedded within these accounts was a ‘lessons learned’ theme which reflected 
how nurses developed their own personal rules as a result of an error. However, 
there were a number of processes that the nurse needed to pass through to 
reach the point of learning. Initially the accounts could be separated into either 
justifications or excuses. The concept of justifications and excuses stems from 
work carried out by Scott and Lyman (1968) in which they developed and used 
these statements to explain untoward behavior and bridge the gap between 
actions and expectations. They claimed that a justification in an account was 
where the person accepts responsibility for their action but denies the act was 
wrong. Whereas with an excuse, the person accepts the action was wrong but 
denies full responsibility. Treiber and Jones (2010) concluded that a ‘blame 
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effusion’ must take place in order to survive an error, more simply, nurses will 
make excuses and justifications to make sense of the events and allow them to 
continue to work after a mistake. This study reported that the lessons learned 
were individualistic in nature, thus adding to the understanding of personal 
behaviors following an error.
Similarly, Rassin et al. (2005) conducted a qualitative single site study in Israel 
using in-depth interviews with 20 nurses to examine the influence of MAEs on 
the mental state of the ‘erring’ nurse. They too identified from the participants 
the theme of ‘personal lessons’ learnt. However, more worryingly they found 
that errors can have a severe emotional effect on nurses, such as fear, guilt, 
shame and even mental ill health lasting for months, suggesting symptoms 
likened to post traumatic stress disorder. Previous studies have found similar 
findings of blame and guilt (Scott et al., 2009; Wolf, 2005; Wu et al., 1991), 
which can then lead to underreporting of errors. This study by Rassin et al. 
(2005) concluded that risk management relies solely on reporting, with the 
presumption that this is a form of error prevention that is linked to learning from 
errors. In reality this suggests that the first step of learning is reporting the error, 
but if nurses are not supported, feelings of guilt and shame that may develop 
will inhibit this. This highlights the importance of emotional support to aid 
learning individually and at the organisational level. 
2.5.7 Work environment and ward learning
Initially, research looked at the nurse’s perspective of MAEs, by concentrating 
on their personal characteristics such as experience or knowledge of 
medication (Chang and Mark, 2011). Further studies have also looked at 
nurses’ perceptions of how the work environment (e.g., such as interruptions, 
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distractions and workload) can contribute towards MAEs (Tucker et al., 2002, 
Donchin and Seagull, 2002). Whilst this research has highlighted the 
importance of the personal characteristics of nurses, and the environment that 
they work, in preventing errors, there is very little research on how the ward 
level learning is managed in relation to the learning practices used following an 
error (Drach-Zahavy and Pud, 2014). 
The US report ‘To err is human’ (Kohn, 1999:p94) highlighted that the work 
environment within health organisations is ‘anything but conducive to 
recognising and learning from errors’. Where organisation learning theory 
outlines that organisations do not seek to change things, unless there is an 
obvious ‘mismatch’ between the routines currently used and the environmental 
conditions on the ward (Levitt and March 1988). A weakness of organisational 
learning, is that early warning signs from ‘smaller failures’ are not always 
identified as worthy of analysis and learning, and it is only when catastrophic 
failures become known, that early weaknesses are noted (Cannon and 
Edmondson, 2005).
A mixed method study by Drach-Zahavy and Pud (2014) used surveys, 
observations and self-questionnaires in four hospitals, across 76 wards in 
Israel, including 360 nurses, to look at how ward level practices are used to 
learn from MAEs. This study tested the effectiveness of the four different 
learning types identified in their previous study (Drach-Zahavy and Pud, 2010). 
They found that ward-situated learning practices are important in reducing 
MAEs, the study highlighted that personal, organisational and technological 
factors will limit MAEs. However, the only learning practice associated with 
reducing MAEs was ‘supervisory learning.' This contrasts with their earlier 
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findings, which concluded that for MAEs to reduce, learning needed to be 
‘integrated,' rather than attributing learning to the head nurse. Whereas their 
later research found that integrated learning practices was associated with 
increased MAEs, their findings that ‘nonintegrated’ and ‘patchy’ learning were 
not associated with MAEs was found to be consistent with their earlier work. 
They concluded that head nurses can facilitate learning from errors, by 
‘management walk-arounds’, thereby imparting a clear message to nurses of 
the importance of medication safety and encouraging learning on the ward. 
However, the argument that demanding greater vigilance does not always result 
in greater safety improvements means there is the need to understand and 
improve human performance within the medication process (Moyen et al., 
2008).
2.5.8 Conclusion
A positive learning climate in nursing affects the willingness to reveal errors, 
communicate openly and identify causation of errors. Team learning goes 
beyond the traditional cycle of learning early evidence suggests that ward level 
learning requires senior nurses to respond positively, with constructive support 
to negate the feelings of guilt and shame that may inhibit nurses’ learning.
2.6 Organisational learning
The interest in organisational learning in relation to healthcare in the UK has 
increased since the DH’s ‘An organisation with a memory’ published in 2000 
(Chang et al., 2007) that followed the US key paper to ‘Err is Human’ (Kohn, 
1999). Most organisational learning theories stem from Argyris and Schon’s 
(1978) book on the process of organisational learning, which looks at how the 
cognitive and interpersonal factors of learning behavior lead to effective 
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organisational learning. Effective learning occurs when an organisation is able 
to retain and transfer its knowledge, ideally spreading it out within all the 
divisions of the organisation (Dutton and Thomas, 1984). Thus, ideally within 
healthcare, learning from MEs should be shared and retained across the 
different wards.
Tamuz et al. (2004) undertook a single site qualitative study in the US at one 
teaching hospital using semi-structured interviews with 86 staff, which included 
36 pharmacists, 36 nurses and physicians and 14 key hospital administrators to 
examine how the definition and classification of MEs affects a hospitals ability to 
learn from its experience. The effect of the definition of MEs and reporting of 
them has previously been discussed. However this study also found that the 
classification of MEs can enhance or impede organisational routines, when 
analysing data and learning from it. A classification scheme that is meaningful to 
managers and front line workers will highlight those events that need to be 
studied (Ginsburg et al., 2009). There appears to be a lack of research relating 
to how managers or staff categorise MEs with respect to learning from errors. 
Tamuz et al. (2004) indicated that without these formal classifications in place, 
MEs can be ‘defined away’ and as such reduce an organisation’s opportunity to 
learn from it. A weakness of the study by Tamuz et al. (2004) was that the 
findings were based on a preliminary analysis of the interview data and a 
systematic analysis of the data was not reported.
A qualitative study by Ginsburg et al. (2009) in the US based in five different 
hospitals aimed to clarify what types of errors should be the focus of learning by 
exploring how staff understand and categorise errors. This study used ten focus 
groups with 6-8 staff, with a total of 74 participants. They conducted two focus 
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groups in each organisation; one with patient safety officers, patient care 
managers and pharmacy managers and the second focus group with front-line 
nurses and allied health professionals. They identified that staff do not adhere 
to the standard definitions and classifications adopted by their healthcare 
organisation, but instead rely on the degree of harm, the rarity of an event and 
their own perceived judgment of an actual error having taken place. Ginsburg et 
al. (2009) advocated that organisations need to work hard to maximise learning 
from minor near misses that are defined away, highlighting that staff find current 
taxonomies of errors too wordy and complex. 
Chang et al. (2007) proposed a multilevel theoretical model of learning from 
failure, which aimed to address the gap between awareness of preventable 
adverse events and the knowledge that relates to how we respond and learn 
effectively. Using theories of organisational learning and organisational behavior 
they proposed that to improve patient safety in health care, organisations 
required consideration of the individual, group and organisation experience, in 
how they translate and transfer knowledge and learn to prevent errors in the 
future. Whilst individual learning can contribute to the group or organisational 
learning, institutionalised norms of the group and organisational level will also 
affect individuals’ attention, thinking and actions (Crossan et al., 1999). Crossan 
et al. (1999) describe this as a circular process, although they highlight that 
‘institutionalised’ practices will always be favored, unless there are unfavorable 
outcomes. Chang et al.’s (2007) model of learning led them to suggest that 
managers at group level need to encourage open communication and 
information sharing to create a positive culture of safety. Furthermore, 
organisations should ensure that team units have people supporting their 
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learning practices, with a diverse amount of knowledge and experience, such 
as full time pharmacists. Within this model they advocated the need for 
appointing formal safety leaders, within the organisation. In the UK, it has now 
become common practice within larger hospitals, including the hospital where 
this study took place, to have a ‘medication safety officer’ to maximise reporting 
and learning from errors.
2.6.1 Conclusion
Effective organisational learning aids the transfer and retention of knowledge 
gained from MEs, where there is a clear definition and guidance for reporting 
MEs. The literature suggests that organisational learning is complex and 
multilevel in nature, where individual, team, and organisational learning 
influence and affect each other. As such the importance of leadership in 
promoting open communication and information sharing has been highlighted.
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CHAPTER 3: METHODS
3.1 Introduction
An exploratory study using a parallel convergent mixed methods approach was 
chosen to answer the research questions and is illustrated in diagram 2. 
(Creswell et al., 2011). This method used both qualitative and quantitative 
methods involving focus groups, interviews, content analysis of reflective 
learning tools and observations of nurse administering medication on the PICU.
! !
Diagram 2 Exploratory convergent mixed methods study (Creswell et al. 2011.)
3.2 Aims and objectives of the study
The aim of this study was to gain a more accurate understanding of ME 
occurrence in one large Paediatric Intensive Care Unit (PICU) and to explore 
the paediatric intensive care (PIC) team’s perceptions of MEs and how they 
perceive that they learn from them. The intent of this study was to gain an 
insight into the processes and culture of MEs on this PICU, identify problems 
specifically associated within this PICU setting, enable meaningful feedback to 
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the management and staff and target interventions to improve safety and 
prevent errors.
The specific research objectives were to: 
1) Examine how self-reported MAE rates by PICU nurses compare to 
those observed in practice. 
2) Explore how doctors and nurses who work in the PICU perceive MEs, 
the management of errors and how they learn from them.
3) Examine the quality of the ME reflective learning tools submitted in the 
PICU.
Table 2 Relation of objectives to data collection methods
Research 
objective
Focus groups 
and interview
Observations Content analysis of 
reflective learning 
tools
1) ✔️X
2) X
3) X
3.3 The study setting
This study took place in a 23 bed paediatric intensive care unit, based in a large 
specialist children’s hospital in the North West of England. It cares for children 
up to 16 years old from all specialties including cardiac surgery, neurology and 
neurosurgery, burns, trauma, infections and oncology. The unit accepts over 
1000 admissions per year and is one of the largest PICUs in Europe. The unit 
provides all forms of therapy including haemofiltration, nitric oxide, high 
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frequency oscillation and cardiac extra corporeal membrane oxygenation 
(ECMO); providing care for level four intensive care children. The unit is 
predominantly open plan with eight single rooms, as illustrated in diagram 3 
below.
The nursing team consists of over 160 nurses including a ward manager, eight 
nurse managers, a nurse consultant, three advanced nurse practitioners, a 
senior nursing research fellow, a clinical educator, an audit nurse and a lecturer-
practitioner who runs the specialist PICU course. Other members of the PICU 
team include ten consultant intensivists, three specialist physiotherapists and 
PICU pharmacists. There is a team of 16-20 middle grade doctors; some of 
these are on six month rotation (paediatrics and anaesthetics) and some are 
training in the speciality work on PICU. The nurse to patient ratio on PICU is 1:1 
for invasively ventilated children, but can be 2:1 in children who are very ill.
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Diagram 3 Floor plan of PICU
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3.4 The study design and theoretical framework
It has long been acknowledged that there is a gap between awareness of MEs 
and the knowledge required about how to respond to them effectively (Chuang 
et al., 2007.) The literature review highlighted the gap in the literature in how 
learning takes place following a ME in PICU. Quantitative research alone does 
not always answer the complex questions about the facts, measurable 
behaviors and cause and effect (Holloway and Wheeler, 2002). Qualitative 
research methods were chosen to explore the behaviors, experiences, feelings 
and perspectives of the participants involved in the medication process on the 
PICU study site. The mixed method approach was chosen for this study as it 
allows a focus on real-life contextual understandings, with multilevel 
perspectives and cultural influences (Creswell et al., 2011).
Whilst it is the intention of mixed methods research to integrate and combine 
qualitative and quantitative research, this can often lead to diverse philosophical 
positions and tensions (Greene, 2007). However, mixed methods research also 
represents an opportunity to challenge those tensions, giving precedence to the 
importance of the problem and research question, whilst valuing the positivist 
and constructivist approach (Morgan, 2007). 
Whilst there is a growing acceptance of the use of mixed methods in research, 
there does not appear to be a set way of using a theoretical framework to guide 
inquiry (Evans et al., 2011). However, optimally all studies should draw upon 
one or more theoretical frameworks and mixed methods allow the opportunity 
for the integration of a variety of theoretical frameworks (Creswell et al., 2011). 
This study draws on the theoretical framework identified within the literature 
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review developed by Chuang et al.’s (2007) multi-model of learning from failure, 
which constitutes the theory of the research and will form the basis for the 
discussion. The framework was chosen as it aims to address how individuals, 
groups and organisations translate and transfer knowledge. The problem 
identified at the beginning of this study was that whilst individual learning may 
or may not take place following an error, errors were still being repeated and as 
such did not suggest shared learning was taking place. This theoretical 
framework was chosen as a best fit to explore this.
3.4.1 Focus groups
Focus groups (Kitzinger, 1984) were chosen as one of the methods, with the 
aim to use group interaction to explore doctors’ and nurses’ perceptions of MEs 
and how they learn from them on the PICU. The benefits of focus groups 
include the way they stimulate exchange of ideas, as individual opinions are 
formed and shaped through talking and arguing with colleagues about events 
and issues in everyday work life, focus groups tap into the ordinary social 
processes and everyday social interchange (Wilkinson, 1998). However, it 
would be naive to assume that focus groups produce data that are completely 
‘natural’ as focus groups artificially set up a situation for the purposes of the 
study (Kitzinger, 1994). The focus groups allowed me to set up an environment 
in which the participants could discuss their views, listen to the views of others 
and reflect on what others were saying. Holloway and Weaver (2002) describe 
this as empowering participants to more easily express their views. This 
opportunity for discussion meant that focus groups were my preferred method 
of collecting data. Kitzinger (1994) refers to focus groups as being more 
naturalistic compared to semi-structured interviews. However, despite their 
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strengths there are some drawbacks to using focus groups including the 
researcher having difficulty managing the debate and less control of the 
process than in one to one interviews (Holloway and Weaver, 2002). One or two 
individuals may dominate the discussions, which may lead to group conformity 
or convergent answers (Carey and Smith, 1994). As such it cannot be assumed 
that there is conformity or group consensus between the members of the group, 
even if it appears so (Holloway and Wheeler, 2002), as some people may not 
be comfortable at expressing their views in front of other people (Polit and 
Hungler, 1997). It was acknowledged that nurses, doctors, pharmacists and 
managers would differ in their experiences of MEs and that there could be 
different levels of power in play between different professions and individuals. 
Krueger and Casey (2000) advise that focus groups are not suitable where a 
hierarchical relationship exists; for this reason the researcher arranged to 
conduct separate focus groups; one focus group for the nurses and one for the 
doctors, consultants and managers. 
Focus groups require a topic guide (Kreuger, 1998). The topic guide was 
developed (Appendix 1) to guide discussion around MEs in general on the 
PICU, but not individual events that people had been involved with. The topic 
guide was designed to incorporate the main themes identified within Chang et 
al.’s (2007) theoretical framework of learning from failures. The questions were 
presented in a logical order to generate and guide discussion around the 
research aims and objectives. The researcher was aware that although the 
topic guide was a cue to guide my discussion with the participants, it was 
important to listen attentively, to determine the flow of the discussion and pick 
up areas of consensus or confrontation.
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As part of the moderating focus group training, the researcher learnt to avoid 
using closed questions and not to ask double questions. The researcher was 
aware that as a band 5 PICU nurse not to make assumptions based on prior 
experiences and as such not to agree or disagree with the participants, but to 
remain neutral. New topic areas were opened with a broad question and then 
focused open specific questions were used to probe and explore in greater 
detail. The researcher was conscious not to focus on just one participant, to use 
visual stimuli to those participants who were not speaking and verbally 
encourage a response from them to join the discussion. The researcher was 
aware of the need to allow some time for silent thought, to allow the participants 
to interpret the questions being asked. The researcher used probing questions 
such as ‘what do you mean by that?’ and ‘could you give me more detail?’ to 
clarify and gain more detail. It was important to have a second researcher 
present at each focus group to take notes and allow the moderator to focus fully 
on the discussion (Holloway and Wheeler, 2002). The researcher made notes 
straight after the focus groups to record how the participants had interacted and 
any nonverbal cues that had been observed.
The scenarios were introduced at the beginning of the focus group and 
interviews (apart from the consultants and managers focus group) to engage 
the participants and encourage them to interact with each other early on (two 
types of scenarios for doctors and nurses, based on prescribing and 
administration errors respectively, see Appendix 2) The scenarios were 
developed and based on a previous study (Saradikar et al. 2010), which 
examined the attitude to reporting ME among differing health professionals. The 
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medication errors used in the scenarios were representative of a similar 
medication error that had occurred on the PICU, giving the advantage of adding 
a ‘real life’ focus to the discussion from the onset between the participants to 
stimulate and prompt discussion.  A weakness of using the scenarios, may have 
been the over reliance of participants using memory, which may have limited 
the output and quality of data. Furthermore, it has been reported that there is 
often a difference between what people say they do and their actual practice 
(Langford and McDonagh, 2003). McCabe (2002) advises that focus groups 
cannot reflect real life scenarios, because they are conducted in places and 
times that are removed from where the actual experiences have occurred. 
Therefore, this may have impacted on the validity of the discussion. The 
scenarios facilitated data to be collected on participants opinions around actual 
reporting of MEs, participants were asked to complete a Likert scale on the 
likelihood of staff reporting an error based on four different types of MEs 
(Appendix 2). It allowed exploration of different views and highlighted any 
differences within the groups. The Likert scales were not ‘personalised’ to 
ascertain whether the actual participant would report it, but to gain an insight 
into the reporting culture on PICU as a whole.
Focus groups require a person to moderate them and a person to take notes. 
The role of the moderator should be flexibility, open-mindedness, skill in eliciting 
information and the ability to create an open and non-threatening environment 
(Holloway and Wheeler, 2002). The moderator should be able to stimulate and 
guide the discussion. However, Morgan (1997) advises in exploratory studies, to 
hold back on too much questioning, where perceptions are being examined, to 
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gain a true perspective and not allow the biases of the moderator to be 
expressed. 
The environment for the setting of the focus group is important in order to set 
the right atmosphere, in that it should be relatively spacious, comfortable and 
allow participants to sit in a circle around a table if possible, as the circle 
arrangement encourages direct eye contact and the table acts as a protective 
barrier to encourage discussion (Kreuger, 1998). A pilot focus group was 
arranged with volunteers from the PICU, to allow the researcher to practice the 
role as moderator and guiding a group discussion. The session was recorded, 
which allowed the researcher to identify where probing questions or indeed 
silence would elicit more information.
Morgan (1988) suggests a sample size of four to twelve participants. A sampling 
framework was not used due to the low response rate to participate within the 
focus groups. The focus groups were scheduled to last one hour, dictated by 
the participants’ own time and funding allocated for the nurses to attend. The 
researcher moderated the nurse focus group. One of the researchers academic 
supervisors (LT) took notes. (LT: a senior nurse on PICU) moderated the other 
focus group (nurse manager and consultants), where the researcher then took 
notes, because it was felt that this may have been problematic for the 
researcher in her role as a Band 5 nurse asking questions of her managers.
Before each focus group started, the topic was introduced, staff acknowledged 
reading the participant information sheets and then informed written consent 
was given. Ground rules were introduced as noted on the topic guide (Appendix 
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1), the tape recorder was introduced and turned on.  All participants and 
researchers were invited to the focus groups and interviews without uniform, to 
remove any distinction in seniority (Kreuger, 1998). 
3.4.2 Semi-structured interviews
Since it was expected that recruitment to the focus groups might be problematic 
because of time constraints, a fallback method was planned to collect data 
using semi-structured interviews. The focus group topic guide was used to 
introduce the scenarios and guide the interview discussion, but the sequence of 
questioning was not the same for each interview, as it depended on the 
participant and their responses. The benefit of semi-structured interviews may 
be that it gives more flexibility for the researcher to guide the questions 
(Holloway and Wheeler, 2002). However, the flexibility and consistency was 
balanced so that the accounts of the participants being interviewed could be 
compared (May, 1991). Double questions were avoided and interviewees were 
given time to answer and prompted when necessary to reduce anxiety (Sorrell 
and Redmond, 1995). Whilst the researcher was a colleague to those being 
interviewed and more likely to easily understand the cultural concepts of 
working on PICU, making assumptions was avoided, the researcher tried to act 
as the ‘naive’ interviewer to clarify meaning and avoid researcher relationship 
bias (Holloway and Wheeler, 2002). Another disadvantage of using interviews 
was the increased amount of data to transcribe and analyse.
3.4.3 Observation of nurses administering medication on PICU
Observation of the nurses administering medication on the PICU was 
undertaken to ascertain how reported medication administration rates by PICU 
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nurses compare to those observed in practice. As not all MEs are documented 
or reported, data were collected by observing nurses administering medication 
on the PICU, so as to establish a more accurate ME rate. Dean and Barber 
(2001) found that observational methods for studying MAE’s are the most valid 
and reliable method, compared to chart review and reporting. The researcher 
planned to carry out a series of observations, lasting two hours each, during the 
mornings at peak medication administration time.  
Observational methods are techniques to acquire direct data through 
observation of the phenomena and relate well to clinical practice (Polit and 
Hungler, 1998). Structured observations were chosen to record the structure of 
nurses’ behaviors and characteristics whilst administering medication. A 
checklist in the form of a template was developed (Appendix 3), which was 
based on evidence identified in multiple studies by Braun safe infusion therapy 
to highlight the risks that can lead to a ME during administration (Friedman et 
al., 2007 Ferner et al., 2001; Parashuran et al., 2008; Cousins et al. 2003; 
Cohen et al., 2003). As such the observation template was developed to 
minimise researcher subjectivity, and the evidence suggested it covered each 
step where an error in the administration of medication could occur and hence 
be recorded. Limitations of structured observations that may affect external 
validity include behaviors and activities happening simultaneously so not all 
MEs may be recorded; the position of the observer obstructing the observation 
range; some infrequent behaviors may be missed; and in a busy environment, 
such as PICU, the researcher maybe distracted (Parahoo, 1997). In addition the 
Hawthorne (observer) effect is an unnatural reaction when being observed or 
assessed that has been reported as a threat to construct validity (Edmonds and 
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Kennedy, 2001). The researcher was aware that participants’ awareness of 
being observed may have affected their practice and as such make the data 
collected artificial. However, it appeared that after a short time the participants 
forgot the researcher was there. This is line with research that identified that 
there is some Hawthorne effect in the initial stages, but this diminishes as the 
participants become used to being observed (Wood and Kerr, 2006).
During the observations it was also proposed that if any nurses were observed 
to have a near miss which was then corrected by the nurses, they would be 
asked to use the ‘Think Aloud’ method immediately afterwards (recorded into a 
hand held dictation machine) to describe how he or she detected the error and 
corrected it. Aiken et al. (2004) found that direct observations and the use of the 
‘Think Aloud’ method optimised the data collected during medication 
administration. Ericsson and Simon (1998) describe this method as a direct 
expression of thinking and verbalising those thoughts that are normally 
inhibited. Aitken et al. (2004) reported that nurses’ thinking processes extend 
beyond the rules and procedures, and the ‘think aloud’ method can be used to 
identify nurses’ thought processes of professional expertise inherent in 
medication administration which goes beyond the technical use of the five rights 
for safe medication administration, in order to capture the cognitive processes 
that allow nurses to detect and correct errors (near misses). However, a 
weakness of this study is that adults may alter the course of their spontaneous 
thinking, so this activity may not be able to be performed objectively (Aitken et 
al., 2004). 
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Before each observation period, all nurses on duty in one of the six-bedded 
areas (Diagram 3) being observed for that shift were approached for verbal 
consent to be observed. The six-bedded areas were chosen to make 
observations as the researcher felt these would be the most unobtrusive areas, 
as a researcher to observe. Including the cubicles in the observations would 
limit the amount of medication administrations and put the nurse in the cubicle 
under too much scrutiny, making the situation artificial. All the staff knew the 
researcher in her role as a Band 5 nurse on the PICU, but the researcher made 
it clear that she was working as a researcher collecting data that shift. Many 
medication administrations were observed within the period, of both oral and 
intravenous medications. As part of the observations a reflective diary was also 
kept, to record field notes and make sense of the reality of practice being 
observed, whilst the quantitative data was being collected.
3.5 Target population
This study engaged nurses, doctors, pharmacists, consultants and managers 
(all staff involved in the medication process) working on the PICU. MEs can 
occur at each stage of the cycle from prescription to administration, highlighting 
that all these health professionals should be involved in an approach to 
preventing the problem of MEs (Williams, 2007).
3.5.1 Inclusion criteria
• Nurses on Band 5, 6 and 7 and who had been working for a 
minimum of 3 months on the PICU (as this allowed for completion of 
induction) and who had a PICU based intravenous therapy certificate
• Doctors and consultants working on the PICU 
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• Pharmacists working on the PICU
3.5.2 Exclusion criteria
• Locum and agency staff
• Nurses who did not have a PICU based intravenous therapy 
certificate
3.6 Sampling
The sampling strategies were pragmatically determined due to the constraints 
of the resources, accessibility and availability of the staff on this very busy 
PICU. An advantage of probability sampling is that it reduces the possibility of 
bias and ensures a more representative sample from the population, whereas a 
weakness of non-probability sampling is it may or may not accurately represent 
the population (Wood and Ross-Kerr, 2006). Therefore, although convenience 
sampling and purposive sampling (non-probability sampling techniques) are not 
the most robust sampling methods, they were chosen due to their practicality.
Sampling for the observations, focus groups and interviews was undertaken 
using convenience sampling as it was acknowledged that this approach was a 
pragmatic way of inviting people to participate in the study during the sessions. 
(Edmonds and Kennedy, 2013.) The heterogeneity of the sampling for the focus 
groups and interviews was purposive to include nurses, doctors and 
pharmacists. Professionals who were available and willing to participate were 
recruited to the study. A weakness of convenience sampling is that there is no 
way of estimating the potential bias of the sample selected, the researcher 
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remained objective by avoiding deliberate selection (Wood and Ross-Kerr, 
2006). 
 
The sample of reflective learning tools that had been generated as part of the 
usual practice on the PICU in response to a ME were all selected over a 12 
month period of April 2012 to March 2013 [n=39], all the samples in this period 
were analysed in their entirety.
3.7 Recruitment
3.7.1 Recruitment of participants for focus groups and interviews
Recruitment for the focus groups and interviews was initially through posters 
placed around the PICU (Appendix 4). An emailed flyer was also sent to all staff 
on the unit (Appendix 4) and this email also included a Participation Information 
Sheet (Appendices 5,6,7 and 8). Participation was voluntary and relied on the 
willingness of participants with no coercion. Three possible dates for the focus 
groups were emailed to staff interested in taking part who met the inclusion 
criteria and the most convenient date was arranged. The interviews were 
arranged at the end of a shift, to suit the interviewee. All participants who 
attended the focus groups and interviews were asked to read through the 
participant information sheets, before giving informed consent (Appendix 9).
  
3.7.2 Recruitment of participants for observations of medication
administration
Recruitment for the observations was initially through posters placed around the 
PICU and an emailed flyer to all staff on the unit (Appendix 10). Participation 
Information Sheets were attached to the email (Appendix 11). The lead 
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researcher and nurse researcher gave contact details to answer any questions 
regarding the study. On each proposed shift that observations were to take 
place, the nurses at the start of that shift were approached and given 
information sheets. Informed written consent was taken from all the nurses who 
were likely to be administering and checking medication within that two hour 
period.
3.8 Data analysis 
3.8.1 Focus groups and semi-structured interviews
The researcher transcribed the focus groups and interviews, which helped in 
the familiarisation process with the data and allowed initial analysis to begin. All 
focus group recordings and study data were stored according to the UCLan and 
Alder hey NHS FT data protection requirements as per ethics approval.
The transcripts from the focus groups and interviews were subjected to a 
thematic content analysis using the guidelines proposed by Burnard (1991) to 
identify emerging themes. The method provided a step by step approach to 
coding and categorising the transcripts (Table 3). The researcher transcribed 
the audio-files and then made notes about general themes that were identified. 
The transcripts were imported into NVivo software computer program used for 
qualitative data analysis, as this software helped me to organise, sort and 
analyse the data. 
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Table 3 Burnard’s framework (1991) for analysis of focus groups and interviews
1. Transcription of taped interviews
2. Transcriptions read and notes made about general themes.
3. Open coding - re-read transcripts and develop descriptive categories
4. Grouping of categories from step 3 under higher order headings
5. Repetitious categories and headings removed from the list
6. Independent categorisation by two colleagues and comparison of three lists
7. Transcripts re-read alongside final list of headings and categories
8. Sections of transcript coded according to the list of category headings
9. ‘Cut or clip’ (manually or electronically) highlighted transcript sections
10. ‘Paste’ sections of transcripts under corresponding categories and headings
11. Categorisations returned to interviewees to check appropriateness
12. Filing of category system with copies of original transcripts
13. Systematic writing up of results including direct quotes from transcripts
14. Discussion of findings alongside relevant literature and research
Initially, the researcher open-coded the transcripts to develop descriptive 
categories (for example, good practice and bad practice). These categories 
were then regrouped under higher order headings (for example, experience of 
MEs and reporting of MEs). Repetitious categories and headings such as 
‘emails’ and ‘contributory factors’ were removed. The researcher then reviewed 
these categorisations with expert qualitative researchers (my supervisors). New 
categories such as barriers to reporting and culture on PICU were identified with 
the supervisors and a final list of headings and categories were made. The 
transcripts were then reread alongside these new headings and categories and 
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sections of the transcripts were then clipped electronically under the 
corresponding category to which they belonged. Appendix 12 shows the final 
audit trail on NVivo. Whilst NVivo was useful in sorting the data, the researcher 
found that the last stages of data synthesis, where she linked all the categories 
together to identify the mega category and core categories were easier to 
visualise by forming a table (Appendix 13) and drawing a large mind map. The 
researcher found that at this stage of synthesis her preference was to be more 
‘tactile’ in the way she handled the data. 
3.8.2 Content analysis of Reflective Learning Tools
Content analysis has been defined as a systematic, reproducible technique for 
condensing large amounts of text into fewer content categories using explicit 
rules of coding (Weber, 1990). Holsti’s (1969) framework employs systematic 
techniques (see below) for making inferences about the characteristics of 
Messages within text in an objective manner. Holsti’s framework was chosen as 
it allowed the researcher to sift through large volumes of data, which would 
have been too onerous to search out by other methods and too time consuming 
within the scopes of this study (Weber, 1990). The aim of the content analysis 
was to identify trends and patterns within the data (Table 4).
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Table 4 Questions to guide content analysis (Holsti, 1969)
Questions to guide content analysis with my answers 
1) Which data are analysed? The data to be analysed were the 
reflective learning tools
2) How are they defined? Brief’ entries or ‘detailed’ entries
3) What is the population from which 
they are drawn? 
PICU doctors and nurses
4) What is the context relative to which 
the data are analysed? 
The context was PICU
5) What are the boundaries of the 
analysis? 
A 12 month period (April 2012 to March 
2013)
6) What is the target of the inferences? Identifying how staff understand and 
learn from MEs.
 
First, the researcher defined the reflective learning tools as either being ‘brief’ 
entries or ‘detailed’ entries about the incident, which was dependent on the 
volume of words and level of reflection and self-analysis of the individual 
completing the tool. The researcher also took note of the words that were 
mentioned frequently. The researcher was aware that each word must be 
considered within its context as some words such as ‘distracted’ may have 
multiple meanings. Within this study a category was defined as a group of 
words, such as ‘emotional impact’ with similar meanings (Holsti, 1969). Once 
the researcher had been working closely with the data from the reflective 
learning tools, she was able to develop three core categories (emotional impact, 
rationalising and external excuses) that accommodated all the data. The results 
for this content analysis were incorporated within the results from the focus 
groups and interviews following the core category ‘Learning from MEs’ as 
supplementary evidence on learning styles within the PICU
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3.8.3 Data analysis of observations
The number and route of medications administered over a 24-hour period on 
PICU were recorded over ten nonconsecutive days to obtain the mean number 
of medications given per patient per day. Every morning, before patients were 
discharged from the PICU, the number of medications administered (oral, 
intravenous, continuous infusion and bolus) was counted over the previous 24-
hour period on a tally chart for each patient. The number of patients on PICU 
was also recorded. The mean number of medications administered over a 24-
hour period and the average number of patients on PICU was calculated 
(Appendix 14). This was then used as the denominator, to calculate an event 
rate with the MEs identified during the observations. The observation template 
used to record MEs and allowed the identification of areas for improving 
compliance with the medicine administration policy and protocols.
3.9 Ethical approval and issues
Ethical approval was obtained from the BuSH Ethics Committee at the 
University of Central Lancashire on 15 July 2013 (Reference number BuSH 
187). The study was also approved the Alder Hey Research Review Committee 
and Development Department and the Clinical Lead Director and Nurse 
Manager of the PICU where the study was based (Appendix 15). This study did 
not need NHS research ethics approval (HRA) because the research only 
involved NHS staff, not patients (HRA, 2011). The study was registered as an 
audit [audit number 2498] with the Alder Hey NHS Foundation Trust. 
It was decided that in the event of a near miss or possible ME, the nurse-
researcher would intervene before a medication error was about to occur. If this 
50
caused stress to the nurses involved, the researcher would stop observations at 
this point to support the nurse/ nurses to ensure patient safety. Any concerns 
would be reported to the nurse manager in charge for that shift. Similarly the 
observation would be stopped if following a near miss or ME the nurse was 
asked to use the Think Aloud technique, but was too distressed. On conclusion 
of each observation session, the researcher would make sure that all the nurses 
on that shift were comfortable with the observations before leaving the ward. 
Participants taking part in the focus groups and interviews were invited to put 
forward their perceptions and were advised against discussing any one 
particular individual’s experiences in detail that could offend or cause discomfort 
to themselves or other participants. At the end of each focus group, the 
researcher checked that none of the participants were distressed by any of the 
contents of the focus group, and offered to arrange further support if necessary.
As part of the interviews, pharmacists were invited to attend. Due to the small 
number of pharmacists who work on PICU regularly, no direct reference was 
made to highlight that the data had been drawn from any discussion undertaken 
with the pharmacists. This confidentiality was assured before commencement of 
any interviews with the pharmacists at their personal request. 
3.10 Maintaining confidentiality
As with any research or audit, the researcher had a duty to keep all data 
confidential and non-identifiable. Data were anonymised, all identifiers were 
removed and replaced by a code. No records of identifiers were retained. All 
audio recordings were destroyed following transcription. Manual data were 
stored in a locked file, in a locked office on the PICU at the NHS site. Electronic 
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data were stored on a secure drive of a password protected NHS computer  
only. Only an individual with a password could access the hospital’s encrypted 
files on the Alder Hey server. All participants were informed that no publications 
would identify any of the participants. All data will be held for five years as per 
NHS trust policy and then destroyed.
3.11 Consent
The principle of respect for autonomy includes choice and free decision to 
consent (Holloway and Wheeler, 2002). Particular care was taken as the 
researcher was a nurse on the PICU, not to influence or coerce anybody to take 
part. A full explanation of the study and participation information sheet was 
given to staff who expressed an interest, generated from the initial emails sent. 
Following this written and informed consent took place (Appendices 8 and14).
3.12 Reliability and validity of the observations
Reliability refers to the consistency of the research tool used and the 
reproducibility of the results, whereas validity in quantitative research refers to 
the extent to which a tool measures what it is supposed to measure (Wood and 
Ross-Kerr, 2006). A validated tool for measuring MAE rates was not found from 
a review of the literature. Therefore a tool was developed, based on current 
evidence, on where error in the medication administration process normally 
occurs. This would have affected the validity of the observations and is often 
known as face validity, where the tool appears an appropriate way to answer 
the research question (Wood and Ross-Kerr, 2006). External validity around 
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sampling and data collection have previously been discussed in the study 
design section. 
3.13 Trustworthiness - credibility, dependability, confirmability and 
transferability
Data quality is important in qualitative research, in that there should be 
confidence that the data represents the true phenomena under study. The 
criteria often used to assess the trustworthiness are credibility, dependability, 
confirmability and transferability (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). Various techniques 
may be employed to improve and document credibility, including prolonged 
engagement and persistent observation to achieve scope and depth. The 
constraints, costs and accessibility were limitations to the amount and time of 
each focus group and interview (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). Triangulation of the 
data, in this mixed methods design, aims to improve the credibility of the 
findings. Lincoln and Guba (1985) recommended peer debriefing, where the 
researcher is exposed to the searching questions of others who are 
experienced in qualitative research. Regular supervisory sessions allowed 
discussion of data interpretation issues and comments. The use of Burnard's 
(1991) framework acted as a guide to assist with credibility and dependability of 
the data. The confirmability or neutrality and objectivity of collecting data and 
analysing it has been mentioned within the study design, and the audit trail 
produced from using the NVivo data package (Appendix 12) serves as a tool of 
persuasion that the data is worthy of confidence (Polit and Hungler, 1997). 
In summary, the reliability of the data was established by comparing responses 
from two focus groups and six interviews, the trustworthiness of inferences was 
ensured by multiple coding, and audit trail and peer review. In Lincoln and 
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Guba’s (1985) framework, transferability relates to the sampling and design and 
as such, the researcher cannot specify the external validity, but should provide 
the contextual thick description necessary so that someone interested in making 
a transfer can contemplate the possibility.
3.14 Reflexivity
Researchers are the main tool of research and must reflect on their own 
actions, feelings and conflicts that are experienced during the research and as 
such it is ongoing throughout the data collection, analysis, interpretation and 
writing up (Holloway and Wheeler, 2002). Reference has been made throughout 
the study methods, where the researcher has taken a self-critical position to 
enhance the rigor of the research. As a Band 5 staff nurse on the PICU, the 
researcher continually reflected on her own values and preconceptions of 
working on PICU to minimise the effect on the research process, as prior 
knowledge cannot be separated from the mind (Steedman, 1991; Denzin, 
1994), reflexive research should take account of the researcher involvement. It 
is important here to distinguish between the methodological reflexivity and 
introspective reflexivity, where it is impossible for the researcher to remain 
outside and as such the presence of the researcher in whatever form will have 
some kind of effect ( Denzin, 1994). During the interviews and focus groups, 
normally the interviewers aim to establish a good relationship with the 
participants to gain a deeper insight into the subject matter. Within this study, 
the researcher already worked along side the participants in a professional 
PICU nurse role. As part of the research process the researcher wrote down her 
own preconceived ideas before undertaking the research. As such, the 
researcher was aware of her own pre-conceived ideas, in which she needed to 
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question continually how her interpretation of the data, led to the findings. The 
data analysis of the focus groups and interviews involved independent 
catagorisation by two colleagues (Supervisor and Director of Studies), one of 
whom, also worked on the PICU. This allowed a deeper questioning of the 
thought process of the researcher, during the analysis stage. The numerous 
quotes provided within the results section and the audit trail taken from the 
NVivo analysis, provided reassurance about the reproducibility of the findings. 
The researcher initially open coded all the data, the researcher utilised quotes 
from all the participants, ensuring that she did not quote from one participant 
more than the other, which could have lead to researcher bias. As part of the 
research process, the researcher kept a reflexive journal to record details, 
which included how the researcher may have influenced the results of each 
interview, focus group and the observations.[Such as using leading questions] 
Whilst the additional information recorded in this journal was used to enrich the 
findings of the study, it also was intended, to allow the reader of the study to 
assess any concerns regarding the interpretations of the findings (Roller and 
Lurkas, 2015). Reflexivity is an essential process when undertaking any study, 
however each study is unique, thus requiring the individual researcher to 
determine how best to proceed. As part of this study, there were times when the 
researcher identified areas of potential role conflict, that made her feel anxious, 
or even annoyed. By writing a reflective journal, the researcher was able to 
identify these areas, where there may be a lack of neutrality, which otherwise 
would have lead to further research bias.
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3.15 Conclusion
The methodology has attempted to address the issues and limitations identified 
within the literature review of previous research. Creswell et al.’s framework 
(2011) guided the methodology and the results  reported conform to GRAMMS 
guidelines for the reporting of mixed methods studies (O’Cathain et al., 2007).
This  guidance is designed to assess and improve quality in how researchers’ 
report research of this type.
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CHAPTER 4: FINDINGS
This chapter will present the results and has been structured into six sections 
(Table 5), corresponding to the different methods used for data collection for 
clarity. In total 17 staff participated in focus groups or interviews, 39 reflective 
learning tools were analysed and 59 medication administration episodes were 
observed over 12 hours (Table 5).
Table 5 Breakdown of participants and data collection
Findings Method of data 
collection
Data source
Section 4.1 Likert scale
following scenario’s
Nurse focus group and
Interviews
(participants detailed 
below)
Section 4.2 Observations (n=6)
(duration two hours each)
59 medication 
administration episodes in 
total
Section 4.3 Content analysis of reflective 
learning tools
39 completed reflective 
learning tools in total
Section 4.4
Section 4.5
Section 4.6
(Each section 
represents a core 
category)
Nurse focus group Junior staff nurse (n=2)
Senior staff nurse (n=2)
Nurse manager and 
consultant focus group
Nurse manager (n=2)
Consultant (n=4)
Interview 1 Registrar (n=1)
Interview 2 Registrar (n=1) ANP (n=1)
Interview 3 Registrar (n=1)
Interview 4 ANP (n=1)
Interview 5 Band 6 nurse (n=1)
Interview 6 Pharmacist (n=2)
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This chapter will first describe the findings from the scenarios that were used to 
commence the nurse focus group and interview discussions (section 4.1). This 
chapter will then present the results of the observations (section 4.2) and finally 
the content analysis of the reflective learning tools (section 4.3). The main part 
of this chapter (sections 4.4, 4.5, 4.6) presents the findings from the thematic 
analysis of the data within both the focus groups and interviews that generated 
the core categories. Three overlapping core categories are presented (Diagram 
4), which gives an overview of their relationships, to each other. The meta-
category - ‘reality of practice’ - is the central concept that provides a means of 
synthesising the range of participants’ perceptions and practices.
Diagram 4: Model of the ‘Reality of practice’ and its association with MEs
Diagram five further illustrates the structure of the core categories and sub 
categories to provide the reader with clarity about these categories (p.57.) 
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Direct anonymised quotes from the data have been used throughout the 
chapter. Where quotes have been used in the text to illustrate a particular point, 
an abbreviation is used to distinguish the setting and type of health professional 
speaking (Table 6). 
Table 6 Descriptor abbreviations for direct quotes in focus groups and 
interviews.
Abbreviation Descriptor
Reg Medical registrar
Cons Consultant Intensivist
JSN Band 5 Junior PICU staff nurse pre paediatric intensive 
care course
SSN Band 5 Senior PICU staff nurse post paediatric intensive 
care course
B6  Band 6 nurse PICU (sister or charge nurse)
AHP Allied health professional
P Participant
Int Interview 
MFG Manager and consultant focus group
NFG Nurse focus group
NM Nurse manager
ANP Advanced nurse practitioner
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4.1 Scenarios – staff perceptions of MEs and error reporting
Four different ME scenarios were presented to participants at the beginning of 
the interviews and focus groups (Appendix 2). As part of the scenarios staff 
were asked to talk through each scenario and discuss which scenarios would 
be reported (complete a critical incident form). Following the discussion 
participants were asked to grade the scenarios using a Likert scale, 1-5 (1, not 
report to 5, definitely report) in likelihood to report a medication error, based on 
the severity of the scenario. Likert scales were completed by 12 participants.
Table 7: Staff likelihood of reporting the ME
1 
Would not 
report
2 3 4 5
Definitely 
report
Scenario A 9/12 (75%) 1/12 (8%) 2/12 (16%) 0 0
Scenario B 0 0 0 3/12 (25%) 9/12 (75%)
Scenario C 0 0 0 0 12/12 
(100%)
Scenario D 0 0 0 0 12/12 
(100%)
The results (Table 7) indicated that if the ME was detected prior to 
administration to the patient (Scenario A) 75% (n=9) thought that the error 
would not be reported on the PICU. If the medication had been administered to 
the patient (Scenario B) 75% (n=9) thought that the error would have been 
reported. In Scenarios C and D, both of which resulted in harm to the patient, 
there was a clear indication that these MEs would be reported by all. Scenario 
61
B, where the ME resulted in no harm to the patient, led to the most discussion. 
Although 75% (n=9) of the participants said that in scenario B the ME would 
have been reported, three (doctors and advanced nurse practitioners [ANPs]) 
scored four (Likert scale) reflecting some doubt, of whether this type of 
medication error would be reported on this PICU.  One registrar explained: 
‘You would hope that it would be, but it is probably not’ (Int1,Reg).
Some participants felt that because the medication was heparin (classed as a 
high risk medication) the ME would be reported, whereas other medications, 
might be a ‘little further down the scale towards a two or a one [Likert 
scale]’ (Int2,Reg). A heparin error was talked of as a ‘never event’ making it: 
‘Far more likely to be reported. If you asked me the same question about 
morphine, then maybe not’ (Int2, ANP). 
All the nurses in the focus group agreed that in scenario B, the ME would be 
‘definitely’ reported because:
‘…It is a safety issue then isn’t it? The patient has actually received the 
medication’ (NFG, P3, SSN).
The scenarios were used to set the scene within the nurse focus group and the 
ANP, pharmacist and medical interviews to open the discussion around MEs. 
The findings that are presented in section 4.4 emerged from the content 
analysis of the transcripts of all the focus groups and interviews; they also draw 
on the discussion from the scenarios, where appropriate.
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4.2 Observations of medication administration on PICU
Observations of nurses administering medication were undertaken for a total of 
12 hours in January 2014, across six shifts including both day and night shifts. 
The number of patients on the PICU during each period of observation was 
recorded in Table 8 (Appendix 14). From this, the mean number of patients on 
the PICU during each observation period was calculated as 19 (so with 21 
funded beds that is a 90% occupancy rate). A mean of 30.6 oral/Intravenous 
(IV) medications were administered per patient per day.
 Any MEs, near misses, or violations observed were recorded on an observation 
template (Appendix 3). An event rate of actual MEs was calculated as shown 
below (Table 9). In total, 59 medication episodes were observed, consisting of 
oral medications, n=29, IV medications, n=33. 
Table 9 Incidence of MEs during observation period
Observations No of MEs
observed
No of 
medications 
administered 
Incidence of MEs
PICU 3 59 5.1 Per 100 
medication 
administered
Three errors were observed over 12 hours of observations during the month of 
January 2014. During this month 10 actual medication error were reported via 
the hospital reporting system (not including the three errors observed.). This 
equates to 10 errors reported over a 744 hour period. If the number of 
medication errors actually observed were extrapolated to give an estimation of 
the number of drugs which potentially could be observed over a month period 
63
this would result in a calculation of 186 medication errors in that monthly period. 
This would then give a guide of 5.4% of medcation errors are currently reported 
on the PICU. This is line with previous research mentioned in the literature 
review, that only 5% of medication errors are currently reported.
Three errors occurred during the observation periods. (Notes in italics are taken 
from reflective diary during observations, to give further insight):
Error 1: An IV morphine infusion was made up incorrectly, resulting in an under-
dose of medication. (The analgesia had been reviewed on the morning ward 
round at 0800hours and re-prescribed at a higher rate, 0.2mls/hr increased to 
0.3mls/hr, which equated to 4micrograms/kg/hr being changed to 6micrograms/
kg/hr. Shortly after the first staff nurse for this patient was reassigned to another 
patient. The analgesia increase was not handed over to the new member of 
staff, who was temporarily taking this patient until the late shift nurse (assistant 
nurse practitioner who do not administer medication) came on to take over. This 
patient was due to be discharged from the ward, having had three different staff 
nurses that shift).
The two staff nurses (this was not their patient) checking the morphine nurse 
controlled analgesia (NCA) did not notice the prescription change.  The error 
was picked up by the team leader, when the patient became increasingly 
unsettled with tachycardia, indicating pain. (This Band 6 nurse on duty, did not 
want to use the ‘think aloud’ method and record her thought process in finding 
the ME, but said she knew instinctively because she attended the doctors ward 
round and knew about the planned increase in analgesia. The Band 6 was 
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checking that the patient was ready for discharge, when she noticed the error. 
The two nurses who had changed the morphine NCA, also declined recording 
their thought process, through the ‘think aloud’ method. However, on review of 
the observation charts, the patient had been tachycardic for some time, 
indicating the need for increased analgesia.)
Errors 2 and 3: A transcription error on the medication chart the previous night 
resulted in an administration error (two errors). A new prescription booklet was 
transcribed over a night shift. Oral Potassium Chloride was prescribed instead 
of oral Potassium Citrate. The day nurse, during the observation period, noticed 
the error because she had looked after the patient the previous day. The wrong 
medication had been given once. Due to a low doctor: patient ratio that shift, a 
doctor was not able to review the patient immediately, leading to an additional 
omission error, as the medication was then administered late. (The staff nurse 
who noticed this error, was reluctant to report the ME officially. When I asked 
her why, she said the Band 6 team leader on that day, said it was ‘too much 
paper work’. The nurse also confided that she had been involved in a ME a few 
weeks earlier, she felt publicly blamed for it and was therefore, reluctant to 
report MEs in the future).
These three errors that occurred during the observation of nurses administering 
medication were not identified through the formal hospital electronic reporting 
system for MEs or the paper form additionally used on PICU. 
Across these 59 medication administration episodes, 19 interruptions were 
observed, but none during the three errors. Violations and deviation from 
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protocols for medication administrations were observed to increase with 
distractions and interruptions. (Some of these distractions could not be 
prevented, such as those encountered by the Haemofiltration (HF) nurses. 
During observations a patient on HF, was due to have their infusions changed. 
The HF system alarmed twice (fluid bag was changed and filter changed). 
Patients on HF normally have two nurses (HF nurse and a bedside nurse), 
however, due to low nurse numbers on the shift observed the second nurse was 
an unqualified assistant nurse practitioner (who cannot administer or check 
medication) as such the HF nurse had to change the patients infusions. It was 
observed during these distractions the infusion pumps were only 
reprogrammed, checked and started by one nurse, rather than two according to 
protocol. It is noted here, that there were many examples of nurses being 
interrupted by other staff and parents, who did control the interruptions, stating 
they were checking medications. However, during the observations, consultant 
intensivists, doctors and physiotherapists, freely interrupted nurses, where the 
researcher perceived that the nurses were clearly checking medications, or 
programming infusion pumps. In one particular observation, one nurse was 
interrupted four times, by three different members of staff and a parent of a 
different patient (two for social reasons and two for professional reasons). It was 
observed in this particular case that the bedside nurse did not check if the 
infusion pumps was programmed correctly whilst changing inotropes.
 
From the data collected using the observation templates during the 
observations a number of areas were identified for improving compliance with 
administration policy and protocols:
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• In 86% of occasions where medications were administered to patients - 
staff were not visibly seen to check identification bands or patient names 
on prescriptions booklets.
• In 7% of medications administered intravenously, staff did not check the 
correct route i.e. peripheral/central venous line 
• In 15% of medications administered intravenously, staff did not check 
compatibility with other medications in the IV line being used.
• In 16% of medications administered as a continuous infusion, staff did 
not check the correct infusion pump rate programed.
4.3 Results of the content analysis of reflective learning tools
The content analysis of the reflective learning tools reported here enhances the 
understanding around the ‘reality of practice’ in how the current process of 
‘learning from MEs’ takes place on PICU. The following six questions were 
asked to address the content of the reflective learning tools: 1) Which data are 
analysed? 2) How are they defined? 3) What is the population from which they 
are drawn? 4) What is the context relative to which the data are analysed? 5) 
What are the boundaries of the analysis? 
6) What is the target of the inferences? 
Thirty-nine tools were completed over a 12-month period (n=29 nurses; n=10 
doctors). The completed tools were classified into two groups; ‘brief’ reflections 
(n = 19, 51%) and ‘detailed’ reflections (n = 20, 48%); simply by the amount 
written and depth of self-analysis. Within the completed tools, ineligible 
handwriting hampered some of the analysis. Two themes were identified:
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4.3.1 Emotional impact of the error and coping 
Nurses were more likely to describe quite negative feelings, reporting feeling 
‘devastated,' ‘upset,' ‘physically sick,' ‘stupid,' ‘awful,' ‘mortified,' ‘deeply 
shocked’ and ‘disappointed.' The emotions expressed were similar regardless 
of whether the medication error was classed as minor or more serious to the 
patient.
Doctors more often described the error in an unemotional and objective 
manner, externalising their feelings, for example using the term ‘failure’ 
concerning an action which led to an error: ‘failure to know the correct dose,' 
and ‘failure to read notes’, and were aware that ‘this may have potentially 
affected patient safety.'
In trying to cope with the error staff often tried to rationalise their actions which 
had led to the ME, such as ‘high workload,' ‘new shift pattern,' ‘tired,' 
‘distracted,' ‘other staff may be able to shut out the noise,' ‘busy patient,' ‘[poor] 
staffing levels’.
4.3.2 Rationalising and external excuses
Staff often blamed themselves - ‘I failed to properly check the medication dose,' 
- and then appeared to look externally to find an excuse or rationalise the error 
such as ‘the prescription chart was unusual for PICU,' or ‘the patient had newly 
arrived and their gestational age may not have been known.'
Staff articulated how they had learned individually from the error and how they 
planned in the future to ‘personally be more thorough,' ’ensure I calculate 
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dosage independently’ and ‘remain focused.' Only one reflection referred to 
learning from the error as a team, suggesting sharing learning from the error 
across the unit as ‘changes need to be made, other staff not to interrupt when 
medications are being checked or administered.' 
4.4 Perceived culture on PICU
The category ‘Perceived culture on PICU’ focuses on the causative factors that 
were identified as contributing to medication errors on the PICU. The category 
is composed of five subcategories: ‘human error’; ‘external distractions’; 
‘communication’ of MEs across the PICU; the ‘operating theatre culture versus 
the PICU culture,’ ‘challenging senior nursing staff’ and ‘routinisation.’ The 
‘reality of practice’ is evident throughout the data and is representative of how 
the staff perceive the realities of working in PICU and how this may contribute to 
MEs.
4.4.1 Human error
This sub category refers to the participants’ acknowledgement of how lapses in 
concentration may contribute to MEs and their understanding of the factors 
involved. The doctors, ANPs and nurses acknowledged that whilst MEs are 
inevitable, learning needed to occur, one registrar explained:
‘So errors happen, there won’t be a unit where there are no errors, all 
humans error, so if error happens and you learn from it, which I think we 
have learned, that is a very good thing.’ (Int3,Reg.)
This acknowledgement was evident throughout the discussions about people 
making errors, and was used as an underpinning rationale for having several 
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levels of checking in place as a means of trying to mitigate MEs. One ANP 
summed this up by saying:
‘I think on the whole individuals recognise their place in that checking 
process, there is always times when it falls down’ (Int4, ANP).
Whilst the nurses recognised that all ‘all human beings can make mistakes’, the 
term ‘human error’ was used loosely and with little overt understanding of the 
factors involved, such as situational awareness about MEs. Issues such as 
being distracted, which then may have led to a slip, lapse in concentration or a 
mistake, were not always fully acknowledged; the tendency was to see errors 
as being inevitable:
‘That is how MEs work though, that is how it happens, when you go 
“50:50, yeah, yeah” and you just, its human error isn’t it? So I think you are 
always going to get the human error element.’ (NFG,P3,SSN.)
Participants recognised the need to be aware of their own potential for ‘human 
error’ and the potential for error in staff whom they relied on as a safety 
mechanism, as one of the JSN…. explained:
‘Pharmacy are brilliant, but there was one the other day and because 
pharmacy had checked it.[identified by green pen on the chart then people 
assumed it was correct]......it was wrong and pharmacy had checked it 
wrong, but it was like...pharmacy had checked it, but they are human as 
well!’ (NFG,P4,JSN.)
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‘Human error’ was used as a generic explanation for many errors and often 
used to shift the focus from an individual and to depersonalise the error as one 
consultant described:  
‘I think a thing people used to say, “I was tired because I worked the night, 
the unit is busy, I was distracted.” Is it not people reluctant to say, “oh dear 
I just made a mistake,” which I think is a really difficult thing to 
say’ (MFG,P1,Con).
This generic terminology ‘I was distracted, tired’ was something the managers 
described was often evident in the reflective medication error learning tools. It 
appeared to the managers that people were unable to think why they had made 
a mistake and felt the need to use an excuse, as the following excerpt shows:
‘That is what I was saying about the nurses [reflective learning] tools you 
can almost see they are trying to think of an excuse about why they made 
the mistake……. that they are trying to fill the page with.’ (MFG,P5,NM.)
The ‘reality of practice’ is that nurses complete the tools and may identify ‘I was 
tired’ as a causative factor, but the managers who see this terminology 
frequently used, frame it as an excuse. However, some participants explained 
that they had made mistakes and admitted they did not recognise why the 
mistake had happened, as one of the consultants explained:
‘I just don’t know what happened, you know it is obviously wrong, but I 
don’t know how I got it wrong’ (MFG,P3,Cons).
Some doctors distinguished between internal distractions, external distractions 
and the PICU environment:
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‘So that [the internal distraction] won’t go off if you just give them a quiet 
room. So I don’t know how we get about that distraction…… sometimes a 
distraction is a physical person coming and disturbing you [external 
distraction], but in some people and certainly I think this has happened 
with me, the distraction was because I was thinking of something else 
[internal distraction]’ (MFG,P3,Cons).
However, after involvement in a ME, some participants had a heightened 
awareness of the need to be ‘much more focused’ and reduce distractions, as 
one band 6 nurse recalled:
‘I remember I made a medication error very early in my career and I have 
never forgotten it.’ (Int5, B6N.)
4.4.2 External distractions
‘External distractions’ such as interruptions were part of the ‘realities of 
practice’ and were one of the main causes of MEs on PICU. External 
distractions were reported as causes of MEs by managers, doctors and nurses 
during prescribing and administration of medications. One of the consultants 
provided a typical response:
‘I don’t know why nurses make mistakes but when I have looked at why 
doctors make mistakes it is because of all the distractions around 
them’ (MFG,P3,Cons).
Doctors reported that nurses distracted them when they were prescribing:
‘When you are being chased around to prescribe something which actually 
needed time to think about one thing, rather than being distracted by 
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requests for non-urgent things like slightly low potassium which is not a 
medical emergency’ (Int2,P1,Reg).
The ANPs reported that no matter what you were doing, there was a culture 
within PICU of staff interrupting you, and this led to being distracted when you 
were prescribing. One of the ANPs explained:
‘There definitely isn’t a culture of not disturbing medical staff or ANP’s 
when they are prescribing, because people just come and disturb you, no 
matter what you are doing. It’s very unusual that somebody actually stops 
for a second and thinks, oh, you are prescribing.’ (Int4,ANP.)
The nurses also reported that interruption and distractions when they were 
preparing and administering medicines were common and came from doctors 
and families, for example:
‘Like the doctors interrupting you when they come to the bed space and 
being able to say “Hang on a minute, I am just checking medications” 
because quite often you are drawing up your infusions …….and you are 
talking and oh yes this is this ……and you are getting interrupted and you 
are getting distracted.’ (NFG,P3,SSN.)
The nurses noted that a ‘change in culture’ was needed to improve safety 
around MEs so that interruptions could be stopped. All participants said that 
distractions increased the likelihood of making a ME. However, the majority did 
not feel that they were able to change this aspect of the PICU culture, as on a 
busy PICU:
‘I don’t think you can eliminate every distraction’ (MFG,P5,NM)
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Only the more senior doctors and consultants thought that whilst it would be 
impossible to eliminate all distractions they could be controlled, rather than 
using distractions ‘as an excuse’ as the following quotation makes clear:
‘You can control distractions, so say when the parent are talking to you, 
you say “Okay just one second I just need to finish this and then you get 
my full attention” and ditto with the nurses, I quite often say to the nurses 
‘Do you need this medication now?’ and they will say, ‘Oh, no. 
Okay’ (MFG,P1,Cons).
The nursing staff appeared to find it more difficult to control distractions within 
the environment as they often multitasked as one of the nurses described:
‘Do your infusions and … support the family and do this and the doctor 
comes in, asks questions and everything else. You then focus on your 
patient or focus on the family, because families interrupt and it is difficult to 
say “Look, I will answer your questions, but I really need to do these 
medications first…’’'(NFG,P3,SSN).
Some senior nursing staff [clinical nurse managers], who did not regularly take 
patients, identified most distractions as being staff related and did not perceive 
interruptions from parents as a problem, as ‘parents don’t interrupt very 
often’ (Int5,B6).
Doctors identified that junior nurses were less confident with medication 
administration and were more likely to interrupt the doctors and request support. 
One doctor described how junior nurses may not have the situational 
awareness of what else is happening on PICU and are more likely to interrupt, 
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causing the doctor to become distracted when they should be focused on the 
patient they are with at the time. This problem of being interrupted was a 
common theme with the doctors. 
 ‘Unless it’s something life threatening, I just say to people, “Just let me 
finish this,” I think we have to stop people........ I think we have got to, 
reinforce the message that the safety isn’t just at the nursing side, it’s 
across the board.’ (Int4, ANP.) [ANP’s prescribe medication on PICU, as 
they work as a doctor on the medical rota]
This ANP felt that nurses should approach their team leaders rather than go 
directly to an ANP or a doctor, although this would be dependent on staffing 
levels and other factors. There were specific times that the doctors identified 
where interruptions and the increased likelihood of being distracted occurred 
such as when they were ‘admitting a patient.’ (Int3,Reg.) One of the registrars 
noted particular issues for new trainees [doctors] starting on PICU and who are 
inexperienced and under pressure, explaining that:
‘Somebody comes in for another medication [prescription for another 
patient] and thinks, “I’ll have to do it” and he is not actually thinking 
safely.’ (Int3, Reg.)
4.4.3 Communication
Nurses, doctors and pharmacists recognised that communication following a 
ME did not always follow a standardised procedure or include everybody 
involved. At the monthly critical incident meeting MEs are discussed, system 
improvements identified and, although free to attend, time pressures mean 
bedside nursing staff rarely attend, as one of the AHPs explained:
75
‘It is a very select group [senior PICU team] the critical incident meeting 
and I am not sure, I know the person who runs it does do some kind of 
summary, but does everyone see that?’ (Int5,P2, AHP.)
Other health professionals (e.g. pharmacists and doctors), noted the absence of 
bedside nurses at these meetings and identified the need for ‘better 
engagement’ and ‘empowerment’ to ‘understand the process’.
One doctor felt that there just was insufficient input by nurses on the unit and 
they thought the nurses should be encouraged to go if staffing was adequate. 
They noted that there was not sufficient investment in ‘nursing input’ which was 
‘wrong.' (Int3,Reg.)
Communication amongst staff about MEs took various forms. The managers 
talked about how communication channels may break down amongst the 
managers and that management following a ME was not always consistent or 
clear. In that there was no clear method of documentation about whether 
‘someone did something at the time’ (MFG,P1,Cons). The nurse managers 
acknowledged the need to have some form of documentation in place following 
a ME, so that they could see and record that some form of ‘conversation about 
the error has taken place’ (MFG,P5,NM) and the process to dealing with a ME 
had begun, by the manager on at the time of the error. It was acknowledged 
that due to PICU staff working shifts, they are usually spoken to when they next 
come into work after the ME; this could be up to a week later and by a different 
manager to the one on who had been on shift when the error had occurred. 
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Managers talked about the most important thing being ‘to tell the person 
directly’ and ‘put it into the system’ (MFG,P1,Cons).
There was a consensus amongst the medical consultants that verbal 
communication following a ME was an important part of the learning process, as 
one consultant described:
‘It is much more likely that it be something that stays in that persons head, 
one, because it has been done and two, because it has been told at the 
time, makes it much more personable.’ (MFG,P1,Cons.)
Doctors talked of reflecting verbally with their colleagues and discussing a ME 
with, for example, their supervisor so that it ‘becomes one of my objectives to 
focus on all the time’ (Int3,Reg). Whilst doctors articulated the importance of 
talking directly with colleagues following an error, the nurse managers described 
a more negative form of communication, ‘gossiping’ which they felt was 
embedded in the nursing culture where the focus was on ‘actually finding out 
who did it and not actually learning from it’ (MFG,P4,NM). 
Despite medication calculations and errors being a topic covered in mandatory 
training days, nurses discussed the importance of challenging other staff, such 
as ‘is that the right dose?’ and not being ‘frightened to challenge, even if 
someone senior,' but acknowledged this might lead to ‘people taking offense’ 
and noting that:
‘Nobody is going to learn about what I am thinking unless I have explained 
it adequately or they have understood what I have said.’ (Int5,ANP.)
77
Participants felt communication was an area that could be improved around 
MEs through improved reporting and documentation. Reporting with paper 
forms led to a delay in managers dealing with the ME a ‘few days after the 
incident.' (MFG,P5,NM.) Verbal communication and feedback to all staff was 
important, so that learning could take place and so that they could 
’communicate effectively… actually follow up as a result of the 
error.’ (Int6,P2,AHP.) There was general acknowledgement that the process of 
learning following an error would take place for the individuals involved, but this 
process did not automatically ‘share that learning.’ (MFG,P5,NM) across the 
unit.
4.4.4 Operating theatre culture versus PICU culture
Communication around patients being admitted from theatre to PICU was 
perceived as an increased risk. This risk was seen to arise as medication 
prescribing and administration is done mainly by the anaesthetist in the 
operating theatre. There were many situations where the participants perceived 
an increased risk of a ME such as when a patient is transferred from the 
operating theatre to PICU. In this PICU a large proportion (just under half) of 
patients are surgical (mainly cardiac surgical).
A large number of medications and dosing errors were attributed to patients 
coming back from theatre, with medications made up in specific operating 
theatre concentrations by the anaesthetists.  The doctors described these 
nonstandard prescriptions as ‘as a little bit risky’ (Int2P1,Reg) and sometimes 
they were ‘wrong,' as one consultant noted:
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‘The patient came from theatre with a different prescription than what we 
would use, it was completely wrong.’ (MFG,P3,Cons.)
The doctors talked of how their PICU experience and their situational 
awareness of increased risk of ME with patients coming from theatre made 
them more vigilant, especially between the times of 3pm and 8pm when most 
postoperative patients are admitted into PICU. The nurses also recognised that 
the ‘operating theatre culture’ meant that the set [PICU] protocols were not 
followed, as this band six nurse explained:
‘ You know they may turn up from theatre and they have got a tray full of 
syringes with liquid in ... no labels’ (Int5,B6).
This senior nurse had attempted to question the anaesthetist regarding 
following hospital protocol. The negative response he received demonstrated a 
power imbalance between the nurses and consultant anaesthetist, highlighting 
a traditional hierarchical attitude.
4.4.5 Challenging senior nursing staff
Whilst nurses generally felt supported by senior nursing staff to report a ME, 
they expressed concerns regarding the senior nurses’ support of new safety 
processes implemented on the unit to prevent MEs. One example was the ‘The 
infusion round’ which was brought in by the nurse consultant to stop infusions 
being made up at night when staff were potentially fatigued. This involved a 
nurse, usually the team leader, going round each patient in turn to check and 
change all the intravenous infusions for each patient, each morning, with the 
bedside nurse]. Initially when this process was introduced, it was intended to be 
done in the afternoon, but as this time on PICU was busy, especially with 
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patients returning from theatre, the process was moved to the morning. The 
plan was to start the infusion round following the medical morning handover 
(after 9.30 - 10am), so that any infusions, which were planned to stop, would 
not need replacing, therefore reduce waste and costs and supporting staff to 
change all infusions in daytime hours. The ‘reality of practice’ is that such 
processes when introduced, can take time to embed into practice and the 
nursing staff explained that new processes could cause additional problems:
 ‘You are expected to do it [make up your infusions] at a time that might 
not be convenient to you, [the time is] not always suitable, especially when 
you are in a cubicle and the trolley emerges from nowhere.......... I am 
doing my patient assessment......other medical teams are coming around, 
and you like to hear what is going on and then I am expected to do all my 
infusions’ (NFG,P2,JSN). 
Senior nursing staff, viewed this new intervention as a process that had to be 
completed before lunch time breaks began, which then led to it being done 
earlier and earlier in the shift, until it was starting just after nursing staff 
handover and before the doctors’ handover. Senior nursing staff felt that this 
was because of ‘inadequate nurse staffing,' which meant lunch breaks had to 
be started earlier, and therefore the infusion round had to be started earlier. 
Some nurses suggested that such safety interventions could affect their normal 
nursing routine around the care of the patient and could cause problems. In 
certain cases, some staff felt able to communicate this problem to senior 
nursing staff: ‘I said “no” and we did it afterwards [after the medical ward 
round]’ (NFG,P4,JSN).
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Junior nursing staff, especially when new to PICU, did not feel at ease 
challenging more senior staff and described feeling pressurised to do what the 
senior staff told them: 
‘When you are new, when you have got a senior person trying to rush you 
and hurry you, when you are just starting out doing IV’s...you are under 
that pressure and it is a nervous thing, I have got to get this done and they 
are quicker.... I think that is a culture thing on here [PICU]’ (NFG,P1,SSN).
4.4.6 Routinisation
Interventions such as the ‘infusion round’ introduced onto the PICU took time to 
embed into the PICU culture and it was noted by the nurse managers that staff 
‘do not like change’ (MFG,P5,NM). The reality of the busy PICU affected many 
interventions and meant they were often adapted. The reason and importance 
behind the introduction of this intervention was forgotten, the ‘routinisation’ of 
this intervention in the ‘reality of practice,' led to it being adapted and the 
relevance of the intervention fades. 
‘It worked really well for three months and we had no medication errors ... 
it was great and now it has all gone and you think, why?’ (Int6,B6.) 
Initially the infusion pump and programming errors had diminished.  When an 
intervention is introduced such as the infusion round, other unintended benefits 
may occur, such as discharging patients that overshadow the initial purpose of 
the intervention as mentioned by this manager:
‘We actually changed the time of it to the morning because we thought we 
are virtually following the ward round, you can get the medications that are 
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being crossed off, make sure the patients are ready for discharge and get 
all the medications done for discharge,' (MFG,P5,NM). 
The nurses perceived the pharmacists as a positive presence on the PICU. The 
nurses perceived that like everyone else on PICU, the pharmacists were human 
and subject to error. The nurses reported that checking by the pharmacists may, 
at times, have become routinised and the checks that the pharmacists made, 
were being used in place of other safety checks, with a possible over-reliance 
on these checks. 
‘People see green pen [check by pharmacist] and think it is okay and they 
don’t need to check the prescription.' (NFG,P1,SSN.)
The evidence around ‘routinisation’ in the discussions repeatedly came from the 
nurses, who talked about how they were at the end of the process with 
medication administration.
4.5 Factors affecting ME reporting
The second core category was generated from participants’ descriptions of 
reporting MEs and the barriers on PICU that they perceived inhibited them from 
reporting them. The doctors and nurses had different approaches to reporting. 
Reporting is an important step in the process of shared learning, the ‘realities of 
practice’ are represented here as ‘inconsistencies and misconceptions,’ ‘nurse 
compliance with and perceived barriers to reporting,’ doctors noncompliance 
and perceived barriers to reporting’ and ‘nurses noncompliance with protocols’.
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4.5.1 Inconsistencies and misconceptions 
This subcategory examines issues related to inconsistent reporting and 
misconceptions that arise due to the use of personal definitions of ‘ME’ and how 
this affects the decision process of reporting. This was particularly evident when 
looking at MEs classed as near misses, as reported in the scenarios. Doctors 
and nurses stated that errors detected before administration would not be 
reported as they would not be perceived as a ME. Furthermore, one of the 
consultants described how there was variation of what was defined as a ME 
and that it: 
‘Often varies between doctors, as what is regarded as serious, let alone 
between groups of colleagues’ (MFG,P2,Cons).
Participants perceived that staff did understand the relevance of a near miss, 
but it was a personal decision not to report. There was a general sense that 
MEs were more likely to be reported if there was a consequence to the patient, 
as one senior staff nurse explained:
‘People fill forms in when things actually happen, but if it is a near miss, it 
is still an incident, but people do not fill the forms’ (NFG,P1,SSN).
Nurses felt that the checking process ‘you know the five points prior to giving 
and administering medications’ (NFG,P3,SSN) was in place to pick up near 
misses and rectify them before reaching the patient. Similarly, if a doctor 
incorrectly prescribed a medication and the nurse picked it up during their 
checks, they would ask the doctor to change the prescription at the bedside, 
one of the registrars asked: ‘does it warrant being reported?’ (Int3,Reg.)
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4.5.2 Nurses’ compliance with and perceived barriers to reporting
 There was the perception amongst nursing staff, that ‘critical incident reporting 
is nurse led’ and that it was rare for a doctor to ‘instigate a 
report’ (NFG,P3,SSN). Pharmacists reported that ‘inherently nurses have a 
different way to reacting to finding out that they have made an error to doctors.’ 
Nursing staff appear ‘mortified’ and it ‘sits heavily on their shoulders’, whereas 
doctors appear to ‘shrug their shoulders’ (Int6,P2,AHP). The importance of 
reporting MEs was clear to nurses: 
‘People learn from it and you want to learn from it yourself and you can 
benefit from other people’s mistakes.’ (NFG,P2,JSN.)
Nurses felt there were many barriers which inhibit them from reporting which 
included issues relating to workload and time, on occasions when they are very 
busy in the shift they would have to stay at the end of the shift to complete an 
error report in their own time. Instead, nurses prioritised other tasks, such as 
‘documentation’ and ‘handover’ which were often completed in the nurses ‘own 
time.' too (NFG,P4,JSN). Pharmacists too, acknowledged that were barriers for 
pharmacists and nurses in physically finding the time to sit down and fill out a 
ME report, unless you were prepared to stay late, which not all people will do.
Nurses perceived that feeling like they were ‘being punished’ or ‘being 
blamed' (Int5,B6) would inhibit nurses from reporting MEs. Blame also had 
repercussions on how staff felt when they reported errors which involved other 
people, as one AHP explained:
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 ‘I felt really bad..... I know if I do an incident form, we will set it in motion 
for the nurse and follow it with the nurse and consequences of that, 
whereas the doctors, I don’t think they even know about it.’ (Int6,P2,AHP.)
The AHPs and the consultants talked about how nurses are dealt with very 
differently [perceived as more harshly] following a ME compared to doctors and 
that this could act as a barrier for nurses reporting MEs, in that ‘there are more 
repercussions for the nurse’ (Int6,P1,AHP). One of the medical consultants 
explained that: 
‘Nursing is so more hierarchical than medicine...because of the 
consequences for their career.’ (MFG,P2,Cons.)
These consequences refer to that the frequent outcome for the nurse involved 
in an error was to suspend their ability to administer IV medications. This then 
affects their work and the patients they get allocated. In contrast to the impact 
on a nurse’s career, only one doctor raised the issue of the possible 
consequences of a ME on their career. One consultant mentioned that he may 
caution a doctor involved with a ME and that the parents may report the doctor 
to the General Medical Council, which could have serious repercussions for that 
doctor.
4.5.3 Doctors’ noncompliance with and perceived barriers to reporting
Doctors perceived that nurses were responsible for reporting MEs. When a 
doctor did report a ME, it was because there was a real or potential 
consequence to the patient. There was the belief that it was the job of the 
nurses to report any MEs, including prescribing errors.
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‘I think we are looking after a lot more patients than the nurse by the 
bedside is... I perceive that the nurse has somewhat a little bit more time 
to put the form in than I do.’ (MFG,P6,Cons.)
Doctors reported that nurses are in the ‘best position to notice’ (MFG,P1,AHP) 
and report an error. Although doctors [and ANPs] independently prescribe 
medication, the analysis revealed that nurses are seen as a safety net.
‘The nurses are almost the prescriber’s second checker aren’t they? If 
they are the ones picking up the errors, that is why they’re reporting 
them.’ (MFG,P5,NM.)
Doctors talked of the time it takes time to report MEs and prioritised their 
patients’ care above this stating:
‘I think that the reporting system...creates more work.... It is not very easy 
to report. The current system....(MFG,P3,Cons).
The ‘endless paperwork’ was seen as a hindrance on top of their workload and 
not very ‘realistic’ as the form was ‘laborious’ (Int2,P1,Reg). The time burden of 
paperwork was compounded by the ‘logistics,’ 'Where is the form?’ ‘Where do I 
fill it out?’ You never hear about it’ (Int3,Reg).
This noncompliance with reporting may be instilled in doctors during hospital 
induction, as one participant revealed that their experience during their 
induction did not inspire them to report a ME:
‘ It was a brief session, it basically highlighted, it was quite complicated for 
you to report something on the internet.’ (Int1,Reg.)
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Doctors also perceived that reporting a ME would be seen as ‘a failure’ and this 
would ‘inhibit a lot of trainee’s and consultants from reporting’ (MFG,P2,Cons). 
Some doctors felt that even if they were peripheral to the error, there was a risk 
of being blamed. However one doctor talked about how it was not always about 
being blamed for a ME by managers, but rather about being made to 
acknowledge accountability and take responsibility that something had gone 
wrong, rather than just being blamed. Doctors also reported hesitation around 
reporting their colleagues for fear of the consequences: 
‘I think sometimes you hesitate to report almost in a way, afraid of getting 
your colleague into trouble’ (Int2,P2,ANP).
Some participants talked of how reporting a ME may be dependent on the 
consequence or harm to the patient. Certainly within the scenarios the 
likelihood of reporting was dependent on the ‘perceived’ harm to the patient, for 
example:
‘[If] it was discovered was the child was unresponsive or something and 
then in that situation the doctors probably would.’ (NFG,P4,JSN.)
However, the following account described an actual error where the patient did 
not come to any harm, but where a similar error [involving this medication] in the 
past, had led to the death of a child in this hospital:
‘I was in the middle of something and somebody came over and said “By 
the way your child over their just got roc’d [muscle relaxed with a 
Rocuronium bolus] on CPAP “ …. [ a ventilation mode where the child was 
spontaneously breathing and no machine breaths are delivered], so I put a 
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rate [breath rate and changed ventilation mode to give them breaths while 
the medication wore off]...I left the rate on, went and wrote it on the 
prescription, but I think..... I don’t know, honestly I don’t think it even 
crossed my mind to report it...’ (Int1,Reg.)
Due to the nature of this ME, it was reported by the nurse. However, during the 
interview the doctor gave no indication that she was aware of this error having 
been reported. Whilst the potential for harm to this patient as described in the 
account was high, this did not prompt the doctor to report the error, or check if 
safety processes would be put in place to prevent the error occurring again.
The core category of noncompliance and compliance concerning reporting of 
MEs has highlighted the difference and similarities between nurses and doctors. 
As part of the medication process and nurses administrating medication, there 
was also the different notion of nurses’ noncompliance of following protocols, 
which generated its own subcategory.
4.5.4 Nurses’ noncompliance with protocols
The nurse managers observed that nurses did not always follow hospital policy 
especially in relation to two nurses independently check medication during 
administration. One nurse manager explained:
‘From a nursing point of view, it is often just missing out a part of the 
policy, like two nurses checking the medications and dosing, it should be 
done, they know it should be done, yet they make that conscious decision, 
that they are not or, unconscious decision, whichever not to follow 
policy’ (MFG,P5,NM).
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Despite stating that it was ‘better if you do it independently’ (NFG,P1,SSN), 
some nurses talked about how rushing and time pressures meant that they did 
not always independently double check medications; this was especially so with 
medications administered at the beginning or the end of the shift because ‘that 
person wants to get home’. Nurses acknowledged that some nurses, felt that 
their shift ended when the next shift nurse arrived, often rushing hand over, to 
finish work early. Nurse managers also identified that the allocated (and paid 
for) half hour handover time should be used more effectively to increase patient 
safety.
4.6 Learning from MEs
It was clear that part of ‘learning from MEs’ on PICU was about the 
‘engagement of staff in the learning process’. Staff described ‘training about 
MEs,' either as part of their professional training or the general induction 
training to the hospital and the PICU. Further probing revealed that participants 
had differing perceptions of how learning experiences affected the ‘reality of 
practice’ on PICU which led to discussions of ‘learning styles’, ‘dissemination 
and fragmented learning,' ‘management of MEs’ and ‘changes in practice.’
4.6.1 The engagement of staff in the learning process
Initial engagement of staff around MEs on this PICU usually occurs within their 
training and mandatory study days although there are the other opportunities to 
engage staff in the learning process around MEs. The word ‘engage’ was used 
prolifically within the discussions.  Nurse managers perceived difficulties in 
everyday practice to actively engage staff and improve learning from errors 
saying: 
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‘All we can do is put things in place to allow people to learn from it, if they 
choose not to, then there is nothing you can do about it.’ (MFG,P5,NM.)
The nurse managers felt that staff who had been involved in numerous MEs, 
ideally should be involved in setting up and putting interventions in place, 
feeling that:
‘You learn most when you set up the process to prevent an error from 
happening.' (MFG,P5,NM.)
Doctors felt that the nurses should be more engaged in attending the weekly 
clinical multidisciplinary team meeting, not just those that discussed critical 
incidents. Explanations such as ‘not enough staff’ were deemed to be 
unacceptable and the doctors felt that more ‘nursing representation’ was 
needed (Int3,Reg). The doctors suggested that in an ‘ideal world’ staff would be 
rotating into these weekly meetings as often as possible although the ‘reality of 
practice’ means that nurse staffing levels rarely allow this to happen. The nurse 
managers wanted staff to become more engaged in the learning process, but it 
was not always clear to them how they could improve this. Lack of engagement 
was seen by some participants as the root of the problem in failure to learn from 
error. One AHP explained that: 
‘If we do, as a unit want to improve as a unit, then we have to engage with 
the staff.’ (Int6,P1,AHP.) 
The pharmacists perceived that ‘better engagement’ would improve reporting of 
errors and ‘empower people’ but that whilst ‘not allowing clinical time......it 
doesn’t mean anything to anybody.' There was the perception that this was a 
90
result of ‘the leadership [hospital management] not following through.’ There 
was concern that:
‘If MEs are one of our top priorities as a hospital, why are we not allocating 
any clinical nursing time for it?’ (Int6,P2, AHP)
4.6.2 Training about MEs
Staff discussed how they learned about medication safety. Doctors reported that 
learning about MEs during initial professional training was very vague and 
limited. ‘Medical school? Not really, Induction? Again not really.’ (Int2,P1,Reg.)
In contrast, the nurses explained that medication administration was embedded 
within their training:‘When I was going through my nursing training, medication 
administration is part of the training, rather than being an added skill 
afterwards.’ (Int2,P2,ANP.) There was the perception that the general hospital 
induction was ‘brief,' with information aimed at everybody, rather than 
individuals who were specialising in different areas, with ‘masses of useless 
information’ that ‘hinders us from holding onto the important useful 
bits.’ (Int1,Reg.) Doctors felt that the separate induction for staff starting on 
PICU was much more useful, However, this registrar did distinguish between 
the anaesthetic registrars starting and the general paediatricians; the former do 
not receive the PICU induction:‘The anaesthetists doesn’t get induction here, 
they get the trust induction and they get the anaesthetist induction, but when 
they put in here for a month, they don’t get anything which I think that is why 
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they find it hard...’ (Int1,Reg.) Doctors who had more experience on PICU, felt 
this was less important, it was more likely, however, that pediatrician trainee’s or 
A&E trainee’s starting on the PICU were more of a ‘danger.' The risks with 
anaesthetist trainees were more likely to be related to ‘big medication 
dosages....So the risk factors or error types would be different with the 
anaesthetist.’ (Int3,Reg.)
Doctors identified the differences in training amongst the nurses who come to 
the PICU with varied backgrounds and training, from being newly qualified, with 
general ward experience, to those with experience of working on other PICU’s. 
Nurses described training on medication safety as part of their professional 
training and training on mandatory study days regarding critical incident 
reporting. Nurses reported that they were not adequately trained to use the new 
trust computerised reporting system ‘Ulysses’ for reporting MEs. This may be, in 
part, because staff are still allowed to use the paper based reporting on PICU.
4.6.3 Learning styles
Participants gave accounts of the reflective learning tool used on the PICU. 
Within these discussions, participants characterised different ‘learning styles’ 
and described how the PICU culture and use of the reflective learning tool may 
nurture or prevent learning. 
Nurse managers perceived that there was ‘a clear difference’ in how nurses and 
doctors completed the current reflective learning tool (Appendix 16), where 
‘medics took complete responsibility’ and nurses made ‘excuse[s], with the 
wording used by nurses being too ‘generic’ (MFG,P1,NM). The consensus was 
following completion of the tool there was insufficient ‘forward focused’ 
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planning, so although this tool may be completed following a ME it may not 
contribute to the process of learning, as one AHP explained:
‘It is very poor in the follow up and what you know do after the 
incident.’ (Int6,P2,AHP.)
The tool was also not always being used as intended by the staff who had made 
a ME as ‘It is not actually a reflection... I think sometimes they are writing what 
they think you want them to say.’ It was being used ‘inconsistently’ by the 
managers (MFG,P5,NM). There was some degree of consensus between the 
doctors, nurses and managers that the tool was not achieving what it sets out to 
do, for example ‘we do it because we have to do it...not because we actually 
want to learn’ (Int2,P1,Reg). The tool was described as a ‘box ticking 
exercise...That doesn’t really achieve anything. (Int6,P2,AHP.) The timing of 
completion of the tool was also important as staff felt they initially needed 
support following an error, before they begin the learning process. One doctor 
explained that giving the reflection learning tool straight away just 
‘reinforces....How very bad you feel’ and what you need is time to think and 
reflect on the error, to gain more out of the process (Int3,Reg). 
The reflective learning tool, whilst aimed for the use of individuals, has the 
potential to share learning across the PICU team and the hospital. It appears 
that the process of shared learning may be inhibited at the beginning, if the 
current tool is not delivered effectively. However this ‘reflective style of learning’ 
was considered useful as ‘most people are very reflective’ and reflection was 
seen as the ‘most common learning experience’ with MEs. (Int2,P2,ANP.) One 
participant mentioned how the actual ‘style of learning’ such as a presentation, 
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may have more affect than a self-taught computer based course. This doctor 
felt that the training around MEs, delivered by the trust through an e-learning 
module on medication prescribing, did not have as much ‘impact’ as if it had 
been an actual ‘conversation’ (Int3,Reg). This doctor felt that learning was more 
‘effective’ when it was part of an engaged discussion around common MEs in 
PICU. This perception of verbally discussing MEs was a common theme 
amongst the doctors in their approach to learning where they ‘immediately 
share’ with other colleagues. When doctors talked about verbally reflecting and 
being ‘transparent’ about MEs, they also talked about the importance of 
‘support’ from their colleagues explaining:
‘We all talk to each other about it, which is a very useful way of reflecting, 
writing .... It doesn’t add anything at all...’ (Int1,Reg.)
This style of reflecting verbally and learning was not raised in the nurses’ 
discussions. Nurses implied that they learnt more on an individual basis, and 
the only ‘shared learning’ across the PICU (if there was any) was by an email 
indicating caution with a medication. However, nurses did understand the 
importance of shared learning, explaining:
‘I think it is because people learn from it and you want to learn from it 
yourself and you can benefit from other people’s mistakes.’ (NFG,P2,JSN.)
During the interviews and focus groups, all participants were shown a new 
intervention [learning tool to force reflection around particular areas] involving 
an anonymous [non-manager seen] short e-learning tool [questionnaire] to be 
completed by all staff involved in an error regardless of their role. (Appendix 
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17).There was strong evidence throughout the discussions that participants felt 
that this would be a useful tool, that they would want to complete. The doctors 
felt that this tool no longer felt like a tick box exercise, with spaces for free text 
which allowed you to fill it in, in your own words. 
‘You have got somewhere else to write....very frustrating when you don't’ 
want to tick one of the options...you can really think about it...they are all 
relevant points.’ (Int1,Reg.)
Comments on the new learning tool were generally positive, but there was 
some negative response around the length of the tool [32 questions over 9 
pages]. The ANP and doctors suggested ‘condensing’ the tool (Int4,ANP). The 
consultants suggested that there was too much ‘to read through,’ (MFG,P6, 
cons) to understand and answer the questions. Whereas the nurses felt that the 
time taken to complete the tool was about right.
‘You need to take it seriously, you’ve made an error’ (NFG,P3,SSN).
The tool takes approximately 20 minutes to complete and guides staff through 
the reflective learning process, helping the person completing the tool to identify  
contributory factors and increase situational awareness. The nurses did not 
show any preference to the tool being anonymous or manager-seen.  The 
nurses felt that discussions with the managers following an error were very 
helpful and felt that an additional date to sit down and talk about the error, 
possibly a week or two later would be helpful in supporting the nurse.
The nurse managers were concerned about the new learning tool being 
completed anonymously. It was felt that this new tool would have to be used 
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alongside the existing procedures following a ME. It became apparent that the 
completion of the current reflective learning tool is used as a formal 
documentation of management or record that a discussion has taken place with 
the member of staff involved with a ME
 ‘The medication error tool is about the only evidence that we have, that a 
discussion has taken place with someone after a ME...... It needs 
documenting.... So that we know what action has been 
taken’ (MFG,P5,NM).
The reflective learning tool had been instituted to aid individual learning from 
MEs, but the tool had become adapted and used as formal documentation in 
the management a ME on this PICU. The results of the content analysis of 
reflective learning tools has been incorporated into the ‘learning styles’ and 
allows the comparison of how doctors and nurses perceive the tool and the 
‘reality of practice’ in how effectively it is used.
4.6.4 Dissemination and fragmented learning
‘Dissemination and fragmented learning’ evolved from the discussions around 
how participants perceived they became aware of errors on the PICU and 
suggested that the majority of feedback on MEs to the PICU nurses was by 
emails. The consultants discussed the ‘reality of practice’ in disseminating 
information on MEs on the PICU in order for shared learning to take place and 
increase safety. A summary report is compiled after every critical incident 
meeting, where medications and therapeutics forms a large part of the 
discussion. This summary is emailed to the managers, consultants and 
intermittently the nurses on the unit. The consultant involved in preparing this 
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summary acknowledged that they pick out the most significant errors, but there 
was no way of knowing if people read this report: 
‘If they all read it......I am trying to pick out, the ones that I think that 
everybody should read.’ (MFG,P6,Cons.) 
This process of summarising the MEs on the unit and then disseminating them 
by email to the staff, assumes that staff will read and understand the importance 
of learning from others mistakes. The data suggested that the managers were 
not confident that this actual process worked.
‘I think that is what we always accept the person that makes the error, we 
think learns from it because they have made the error, but it is how we 
share that learning, so that everyone else doesn’t make that 
error’ (MFG,P5,NM).
The discussions suggested a mixture of perceptions around the idea of 
disseminating through emails and the reliance of using emails as a vehicle to 
share learning across the PICU.  Nurse managers felt that staff do not always 
learn from these emails if they did not feel directly involved with the ME noting a 
sense that if it did not involve them then ‘…they don’t bother reading the rest of 
it then’ (MFG,P5,NM). The overuse of emails was evident throughout the data. 
One AHP summarised some of the issues:
‘Emails are difficult, because it is a great way of communication, but I think 
it is use and abuse, because then people are copied into things too 
easily’ (Int5,P2,AHP). 
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 Emails were useful when used correctly as they provided ‘some feedback’ and 
gave an ‘incentive’ and ‘actually made you want to put incident forms in’ 
although otherwise it was felt that incident forms just: 
‘Disappeared off into the ether and you have no idea if anyone does 
anything about it and I find it takes away the incentive to do it’ (Int,Reg).
There was further evidence to suggest that providing feedback to staff would 
engage them and bring them ‘on board’ to report future MEs. Nurses felt that 
there was an increase in emails being circulated, so that they were being made 
more aware of certain types of MEs on the PICU, however there was a 
consensus of a ‘need to communicate a balance in the emails’ (NFG,P4,JSN). 
The nurses felt that when an intervention has been put in place to prevent MEs, 
there is no feedback to say if the intervention has been successful. The nurses 
described the current emails as a form of negative feedback and that staff 
would feel more encouraged if successful interventions were fed back so that 
they could see the point. 
During discussion around interventions and processes introduced onto the unit, 
participants talked about new processes being introduced which did not always 
embed themselves into the culture of PICU, for example: ‘We introduce new 
processes, but we don’t enforce it’ (MFG,P3,Cons). However, when processes 
were eventually embedded into the culture of PICU, staff described how 
‘routinisation’ may lead to these processes becoming adapted to fit into other 
‘routines’ of PICU or the ‘reality of the PICU.' This further highlights the meta-
theme of the reality of PICU practice.
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4.6.5 Management of MEs
Generally nurses and doctors perceived that the managers and consultants 
were approachable and that staff were looked after and managed well.  
However, there were ideas about how this could be improved and some 
suggestions where this process may fall down. Whilst the difficulties and 
‘inconsistencies’ around management of MEs has previously been reported in 
the ‘communication’ sub category, the nurse managers also felt that the different 
styles of management by nurse managers also led to some MEs being dealt 
with ‘straight away’ and others ‘you look back and nothing has been 
done’ (MFG,P5,NM).
The MEs are reported by way of Ulysses [computer reporting] or paper 
reporting [green forms located on the wards], the nurse managers perceived 
that reporting by paper forms, compounded the problem of MEs being dealt with 
by management, as there was often a delay in these forms being then entered 
onto Ulysses and then being flagged to management.
The nurse managers and consultants talked about how offering support to the 
staff involved with a ME was important once all the checks had been put in 
place to maintain the safety of the patient following a ME. The doctors talked of 
‘having a responsibility to do good with our prescription’ (MFG,P3,Cons), 
reflecting their understanding that a ME could have very serious consequences. 
The nurses talked of their perception of ‘a positive experience with 
management’ (NFG,P2,JSF), where staff felt they were given support just after 
a ME. 
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4.6.6 Changes in practice
Staff suggested ideas to improve the practice of administering medication from 
their experiences of being involved in MEs on the PICU. There was a strong 
theme of how simplification of the process when prescribing could improve 
safety. The consultants perceived the need for more simple guidelines, as at 
present guidelines are ‘precisely tailored to what is quite often inadequate 
pharmacological data for use in paediatrics’ (MFG,P1,Cons). Whilst the PICU 
has implemented a medications sheet [of the 20 most common medications 
used on the PICU, calculated per patient by their weight on admission to PICU], 
there was the perception that this could be extended to other medications in 
use on the PICU. Doctors highlighted that rounding up or down of doses and 
using fewer decimals were good safety measures to introduce. Amongst the 
consultants there was the perception that there were too many medications 
used altogether on the PICU and limiting the number of medications available 
would be something to review in the future. 
Participants had many ideas about improving medication safety on PICU 
through the data collection process. The following suggestions by different 
participants were identified as  ways of reducing MEs on PICU:
•institute protected medication administration time – a time where no 
interruptions or distractions were allowed; 
•institute ‘Smart’ electronic prescribing – to reduce handwriting errors and 
prescribing errors;
•have a designated ‘ Prescribing area’ – where all prescriptions (bar 
emergencies) were written where no interruptions or distractions were allowed;
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•institute regular team feedback – for example a monthly newsletter; 
•highlight an ‘Error of the week‘ - where staff were updated at handover each 
day, regarding an error that has recently happened on the unit, to increase 
awareness and team learning;
•move the current staff notice board with ME information, to a different location 
to make it more visible; and produce and use of more ‘cheat sheets’ of common 
MEs on PICU for doctors starting on rotation on the unit.
Whilst the participants perceived medication safety to be a priority, staff felt that 
the processes introduced in response to a ME may also make things ‘worse’ in 
that 
‘The more processes there are to follow the more likely you are to 
fail.' (MFG,P5,NM.)
Participants suggested that when a process is introduced it then needs to be 
evaluated, its effectiveness determined and this information fed back to the 
staff.
4.7 Conclusion and summary of results
In summary, three MEs occurred during the observation periods, none of these 
errors were identified through the formal hospital reporting system for MEs or 
the paper form used on PICU, indicating that some MEs are underreported on 
the PICU where this study took place. The use of personal definitions of what 
constitutes a ME appeared to inform the decision process of reporting an error, 
this definition also varied within and across different professions. ME reporting 
was nurse led, doctors perceived themselves too busy and not always aware or 
in a position to notice and report an error. Interruptions and distractions were 
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observed to be commonplace and led to violations and deviation from protocols 
for medication administrations. Similarly staff during the focus groups and 
interviews also highlighted that interruptions and distractions are part of the 
culture and ‘reality of practice’ on PICU. Nurses reported it was common for 
doctors and families to interrupt them administering medication, doctors 
reported nurses disturb them when they were prescribing. 
Overall staff felt that management of MEs was good, but the communication 
and documentation process following an error was not always consistently 
managed or disseminated effectively in order for shared learning to be 
maximised. New processes introduced took time to embed, required the senior 
nurses’ support and sometimes introduced new problems for nurses within their 
daily clinical practice and routines. It was acknowledged by the management 
that the day to day engagement of staff in learning from MEs is difficult, leading 
to a fragmented style of learning, where dissemination and shared learning is 
not always being achieved. The current practice on PICU of learning from MEs 
using the reflective learning tool does not always lead to the required detailed, 
self-analysis and reflection of an error to demonstrate individual leaning. More 
often the tool is used by nurses to express the emotional impact of the error, 
whereas doctors more often described the error in an unemotional and 
objective manner. Staff often blamed themselves and then looked externally to 
find an excuse and rationalise the error. The results in this chapter indicated 
that individual learning and shared learning does not automatically take place 
following a ME on this PICU. The next chapter, therefore, moves on to discuss 
these findings in more detail.
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CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION 
5.1 Introduction
This chapter will both discuss and summarise the main aspects of the thesis, 
addressing the research questions and aims of the study, the results and their 
relation to published literature and will conclude with recommendations for 
practice and for future research. Before commencing the discussion chapter it is 
worth revisiting the aim of the study. This study aimed to gain a more accurate 
understanding of ME occurrence in one large Paediatric Intensive Care Unit 
(PICU) and to explore the paediatric intensive care (PIC) team’s perceptions of 
MEs and how they perceive that they learn from them. The specific research 
questions asked and the answers generated are presented here first, before 
commencing the integrated discussion with the literature and looking at them in 
more detail; they are 
5.2.1 How do self-reported medication administrations error rates by PICU 
nurses compare to those observed in practice?
Underreporting of MEs was observed on the PICU. Three MEs were observed 
out of 59 medication administration episodes, and none of these errors were 
identified through either the formal reporting system or via the paper form used 
on PICU. This suggests that MEs remain underreported and that direct 
observations of practice provide a more accurate incidence of errors and in 
identifying true ME rates, rather than relying on reporting alone. An additional 
advantage of using the observation method was the identification of areas to 
improve medication safety administration on the PICU. Interruptions and 
distractions across the whole team on PICU were frequent and observed to 
increase the number of violations and deviation from protocols for medication 
administration. The aspect of not reporting and its link to blame and fear of 
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punishment, was noted during the observations, focus groups and interviews 
and was highlighted as a contributory factor in the lack of reporting of 
medication errors.
5.5.2 How do doctors and nurses who work in the PICU perceive MEs, the 
management of errors and how they learn from them?
Staff perceptions of the reality of practice and working on PICU gave an insight 
into how the culture of PICU may contribute to MEs. Nurses and doctors 
perceived that internal and external distractions were commonplace on PICU, 
affecting the whole PICU team. Nurses articulated how consultants, doctors and 
families interrupted them during medication administration, and nurses talked of 
how they could not always control these interruptions and distractions. 
However, the doctors and consultants perceived that nurses interrupted and 
distracted them whilst they were prescribing and they also stated that they 
thought this was sometimes the result of nurses’ lacking situational awareness. 
In contrast to the nurses, the consultants, senior doctors and ANPs stated they 
did have some control over these distractions. Another factor which the nurses 
and nurse managers perceived contributed to MEs on PICU, was the nurses 
noncompliance with protocols, specifically the protocol for two nurses to 
independently check IV medication during administration.
Communication problems around the management of MEs were highlighted, 
which were enhanced by shift working and inconsistencies in management. 
Managers did not always follow the standardised procedure and this was 
exacerbated by the absence of bedside nurses at the critical incident meetings. 
There was the perception amongst the doctors and pharmacists that better 
engagement of bedside nurses would lead to better understanding of the 
process following a ME to improve the learning process.
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Whilst staff perceived that reporting of MEs is an important first step in the 
process of learning, they highlighted many barriers. Nurses stated that clinical 
workload, time, blame, punishment and prioritising other tasks inhibited 
reporting. Interestingly, some doctors perceived that it was the nurses’ job to 
report MEs. Doctors perceived that their workload, time burden of paperwork, 
logistics, failure and blame would inhibit their reporting. From the scenarios 
introduced at the beginning of the nurse focus group and interviews, the 
likelihood of reporting was also dependent on the perceived harm and 
consequence to the patient of the error. Misconceptions and inconsistencies 
around reporting of MEs arose due to the use of personal definitions of what 
constituted an error, which was particularly evident with near misses.
The current reflective learning tool used by this unit, given to individuals 
following involvement in a ME, has the potential to share learning across the 
PICU team, but learning may be inhibited at the beginning if it is not handled 
effectively. Doctors reported that learning took place following a ME through 
informal discussions with their colleagues, with the added benefit of gaining 
support following an error. Nurses explained that feedback following a ME on 
the PICU was reliant on emails and the managers expressed frustration that 
staff did not always read and learn from. Both nurses and doctors highlighted 
the importance of feedback, which gave an incentive to report and learn from 
other errors. Nurses described how  emails were a form of negative feedback 
following a ME on PICU. By striking a balance of communication through emails 
that introduced additional positive feedback on areas such as the success of 
interventions introduced on the PICU, may increase the incentive to read these 
emails. 
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5.2.3 What is the quality of the ME reflective learning tools submitted in 
the PICU?
The content analysis of the learning tools highlighted that the current practice of 
learning from MEs using these tools does not always lead to the required self-
analysis and reflection on the error, nor demonstrates individual leaning. 
Overall, the quality of reflection and self-analysis was poor. Frequently, the tool 
seems to be used by nurses to express the emotional effects of the error and 
this suggests that the tool is used as a coping mechanism to deal emotionally 
with an error. In contrast, doctors more often described the error in an 
unemotional and objective manner. Staff often blamed themselves and then 
looked externally to find an excuse and rationalise the error. Where individual 
learning was identified, staff had a heightened awareness of the need to be 
more focused. However, the fact that these tools were given to their managers, 
may reflect people telling the managers what it is perceived they want to hear. 
The findings from the focus groups and interviews reinforced these findings that 
staff felt the reflective learning tool was a tick box exercise, that didn’t achieve 
the required learning outcomes and it was not being used effectively. 
Additionally, management perceived the reflective learning tool as a form of 
documentation or record of a discussion having taken place with staff following 
involvement with a ME, rather than a learning tool which it was intended to be.
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5.3 Integrated discussion and theoretical framework
This chapter now presents an integrated discussion of the key findings and their 
relationship with the existing published literature. The chapter is presented in 
five sections, organised under the following headings: observation of 
medication administration on PICU; perceived culture on PICU; factors affecting 
ME reporting; learning from MEs and content analysis of reflective learning 
tools.
Chuang et al’s. (2007) theoretical framework of learning from failure will guide 
the interpretation of the results. A summary of this theoretical model is shown 
below (Diagram 6) to aid clarity to the discussion.  Chuang et al. (2007) 
acknowledge that learning takes place at different levels amongst individuals, 
groups and organisations and they theorise that to improve safety, 
organisations must consider how the transfer and translation of knowledge 
takes place between these groups. The theoretical model draws upon learning 
theories and group behavior learning. It looks at how learning occurs over time 
and diffuses across levels, how best to translate individual learning into group 
learning and how individuals and groups determine which practices are effective 
and which are ineffective. This model was therefore chosen, to help highlight 
how the PICU may improve learning from failure and highlight the factors that 
might facilitate learning from failure and others that impede it. Within the 
discussion, analogies will be drawn where appropriate to the different 
propositions within the theoretical model. The model proposes 11 different 
propositions, which will be incorporated into the discussion where appropriate. 
They are listed in Appendix 18 to aid clarity and guide the discussion.
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Diagram 6 of Chuang et al. (2007) theoretical model of learning from 
preventable adverse events in health care
5.4 Observation of medication administration on PICU
Underreporting of errors was identified during the observations of nurses 
administering medication on PICU and three MEs were observed out of 59 
medication administrative episodes, giving an error incidence of 5.1 per 100 
medication administered. None of these errors were identified through the 
formal reporting system for MEs used on PICU. Previous studies have shown 
that MEs remain underreported (Wilde and Bradley, 2005; Vincent, 2006; Sari et 
al., 2007; Armitage, 2010). Due to the variability and severity of illness in 
patients on PICU, the variety of medications and the changing environment, 
these observations provided a snapshot of medications being administered and 
as such the 5.1 errors per 100 administered may not be a true reflection of the 
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ME rate. Barker (1980) highlighted that direct observation may be susceptible to 
biased observer inference and the ‘Hawthorne effect’. However, Dean and 
Barber (2001) in determining validity and reliability of observational methods, 
found this to have a limited effect over time.
Prior studies have noted the methodological difficulties in establishing the rates 
of MEs (Barker et al., 2002; Kopp, 2006). Ferner (2009) reports that there are 
many methods for counting errors, but none are entirely satisfactory. Studies 
that have investigated administration errors in the intensive care unit have 
historically involved the use of chart review and voluntary reporting systems 
(Kaushal et al., 2001; Flynn et al., 2002; Kopp et al., 2006). A study by Flynn et 
al. (2002) compared the use of direct observations to incident reporting and 
chart review in detecting MEs and reported that direct observations produce 
more accurate results in identifying actual numbers of MEs. 
Failure in communication during hand over to replacement staff, compounded 
by several staff changes, was identified as an issue during the observations. 
This has resonance with Armitage et al. (2010) who also reported that verbal 
communication contributed to 10.4% of errors reported. The failure to identify 
error, as seen with Error 1, was also observed, although Error 1 was picked up 
by the team leader before patient discharge. Edmondson, (1996) explains that 
effective teams, who work together, will often catch each other’s mistakes. 
Issues with transcription errors were noted (Errors 2 and 3) resulting in two 
errors. The transcription of medication charts during the night shift is 
discouraged on this PICU, as a result of previous errors (of which one was 
noted within the content analysis of the reflective learning tools). Fatigue on 
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night shifts remains a problem, and the prevalence of this type of error was 
identified by Armitage et al. (2010) who reported that written 
miscommunications contributed to 12% of error reported, when identifying 
contributory factors to MEs. 
5.5 Perceived culture on PICU
The predominant cause of increased risk of MEs, identified by staff on PICU, 
were distractions and interruptions. This was consistent with the observations of 
nurses administering medication and identified as a contributory factor to MEs 
within the reflective learning tools. The literature around causation has identified 
that excessive interruptions and distractions are common in hospitals during the 
medication administrations process (IOM, 2004; Pape et al., 2005; Hewitt, 2010; 
Westbrook et al., 2010; Dickson and Flynn, 2011; Clark et al., 2012). The 
‘culture’ of interrupting and distracting on this PICU, was described in varying 
degrees by nurses, doctors, consultants, managers and pharmacists, and as 
such, was noted to be embedded into the ‘reality of practice’. Previous research 
has shown that teamwork suffers, where the cultural norm is of becoming too 
informal (Moray, 1994). If safety is going to be a priority within a clinical setting, 
every member of the team must be involved as this means that people are more 
likely to listen and obey rules, where there are adequate grounds to do so 
(Geller, 2000). Furthermore, to promote safety and error prevention, the 
managers must be seen to follow the same standards and values that their staff 
are expected to follow (Moray, 1994; Helmreich & Merrit, 1998). Similarly, Pape 
et al. (2005) found that safety begins with strong leadership, as employees will 
emulate the attitude and behavior’s of those in leadership roles. Therefore, it 
may be an important factor that consultants, nurse managers and senior nurses 
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were all observed interrupting and causing distractions to nurses administering 
medication. This in turn is likely to influence the behavior of all staff working in 
the PICU, as it is seen as a ‘cultural norm’ and acceptable behavior. 
Intensive care units are noisy settings and nurses frequently multitask, are 
hurried and interrupted; this means that they may perceive this kind of working 
environment as the norm. It has been suggested that to decrease errors, there 
should be a basic understanding of factors affecting human learning and 
memory (Pape et al., 2005). On this PICU nurses recognised that ‘human error’ 
was inevitable and talked in general terms about how external distractions and 
interruptions during the process of administering medications increased the 
likelihood of a ME. Whilst they identified terms such as ‘workload,' ‘hurrying,' 
‘multitasking’ and ‘human error’ all coinciding with being interrupted and 
distracted, they showed little overt understanding of the human factors involved 
which may lead to a slip, lapse in concentration or a mistake. As such, the 
nurses did not appear to distinguish between the different concepts of internal 
and external distractions and faulty cognitive processes, involved when they 
were multitasking. It is important to consider the cognitive process, because 
nurses are considered to be ‘knowledge workers’ and Cooper (2006:59) 
describes knowledge workers as ‘people who think for a living,' highlighting that 
this cognitive processing activity is critically important for all health 
professionals. Other emerging studies have also looked at successful 
multitasking in humans, by focusing on brain chemistry and memory systems 
(Huff, 2007; Rock, 2009; Ofri, 2010). These studies suggest that the brain can 
only make one decision at a time as it does not process information 
simultaneously but switches back and forth, losing accuracy in the process. 
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Distractions therefore exhaust the brain and make it difficult to focus on the task 
at hand; this may also be exacerbated by nurse inexperience (Spira, 2012). An 
understanding of the cognitive theory around distractions would therefore seem 
beneficial in training staff on PICU about the importance of focusing on a single 
task. Such training has the potential to increase medication safety and help 
nurses to avoid or minimise unnecessary interruptions.
Research has demonstrated that interruptions and distractions increase the risk 
of MEs and procedural failures (Westbrook et al., 2010). This was demonstrated 
during the observation of nurses administering medications, as interruptions 
increased deviations from protocol. Removing external distractions entirely 
within a clinical environment may not be realistic. However, the consultants on 
the PICU talked about controlling distractions and this ability to exert control 
appeared to come with experience. The nursing staff appeared to find it more 
difficult to control distractions as is seen in another studies; Pape et al. (2005) 
examined different approaches to reducing distractions for nurses during the 
administrative process and noted the need for strong leadership and 
management to empower nurses to be assertive and speak up to discourage or 
control unwanted interruptions during medication administration. This resonates 
with Chuang et al.’s (2007) theoretical framework (diagram 6, P2d), that 
proposes that participative leadership, in which team leaders use coaching 
behaviors to encourage group members to speak freely and openly, will have a 
positive impact on how groups learn. 
Deliberate social interruptions were also identified, such as gossip about life 
outside work. The ability of the individual to say ‘no, not now’ may be due to 
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cultural norms within the PICU, where leaders – as seen in this and other 
studies - either model poor behavior or do not always actively discourage 
interruptions (Moray, 1994). It may also be due to individual’s lack of 
understanding of what increases the likelihood of a ME. The findings from this 
study resonate with those by Armitage et al. (2010) who explained that 
resourceful staff who are used to multitasking may normalise interruptions and 
organisational weakness, accepting them as part of the environment that they 
work in. Whilst the nurses noted that a ‘change in culture’ was needed so that 
interruptions could be stopped, it should be noted that health professionals, 
such as those on PICU constantly interact with each other as part of their daily 
routine. A study by Walji et al. (2004) looked at minimising interruptions in the 
health care environment and suggested that interruptions in multitasking 
environments act as cues to promote productivity. However, Walji et al. (2004) 
stipulated that for an interruption to be effective it must be at the right time, be 
absolutely necessary and not damage the task because of interrupting. The 
doctors identified interruptions as a common theme, and specified that more 
junior nurses may not have the situational awareness and may be more likely to 
interrupt. This implied that nurses did not take into account the timing of their 
interruption, how it may affect the doctor prescribing and how important and 
necessary it was to interrupt at that particular time. Leonard (2004) advised of 
the critical importance of teams working together and being able to speak 
openly to alert teams to unsafe behavior. Leonard advised all members of the 
team should be encouraged to see the ‘bigger picture’ suggesting that training 
and support should be given to junior nurses at the beginning of their career, so 
that they see the importance of having a situational awareness of the 
environment, as they start working on PICU. This again fits within  Chuang et 
113
al.’s (2007) theoretical framework (diagram 6, P2c) where the group (team) can 
identify and reflect upon the factors which contribute to errors and openly 
encourage the use of constructive conflict, to minimise factors like interruptions 
and have a positive impact on preventing MEs.
One of the norms identified within the nursing group, but not evident in the 
doctors’ group, was that gossip was prevalent following an error. The negative 
effect of gossip has been noted by Scott et al. (2009) who report that it 
intensifies self-doubt and lack of clinical confidence and is generally seen as 
non-supportive in relation to MEs. Scott et al. (2009) suggest that gossip is 
often well anchored within a department’s teamwork and culture and should be 
actively discouraged by all members, especially by the clinical leaders.
Communication and documentation following a ME did not always appear 
consistent and clear. Paper forms for reporting MEs were still in use and the 
managers highlighted how this often led to a delay in the error being dealt with. 
Lu et al. (2009) highlighted the inconveniences of paper form reporting, 
including paperwork going missing, handwriting being illegible and forms being 
only accessible to one person at a time. In the discussions by the managers it 
became clear that the documentation of the process of dealing with a ME 
needed to be more transparent and consistent. The managers identified the 
need for a robust process of dealing with a ME using a clear audit trail, across 
shift changes and between nurse managers . This further reinforces Chuang et 
al.’s (2007) theory (diagram 6, P2b) which suggests that intergroup linkages 
such as those between the nurse managers should be able to effectively 
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contribute and respond to nurses involved with a ME to have a positive impact 
on their learning.
There was a consensus amongst doctors and consultants that verbal 
communication following a ME was an important part of the learning process. 
Wu et al. (1991) reported that when doctors seek advice with their senior 
colleagues and are encouraged to discuss their mistakes, 98% of the doctors in 
their study reported at least one constructive change. Kroll et al. (2008) defines 
this as “the learning moment” when the most learning occurs, when the situation 
was discussed and feedback was constructive and supportive, even if there was 
some chastisement, as long as it was structured. This is an established 
recommendation of the General Medical Council (GMC, 1993) and fits within 
the theoretical framework of learning (Chuang et al., 2007) where group 
members receive constructive feedback allowing them to identify and reflect 
upon factors that contribute to MEs, so that they are able to learn from them.
Inexperienced and new nurses working in PICU did not feel sufficiently at ease 
to challenge more senior nursing staff and described feeling pressured to do 
what the senior nurses told them. Previous research that evaluated the 
contextual influence on the medication administration practice of paediatric 
nurses, reported how pressure from colleagues, not just senior nurses, 
influenced how closely they follow medication policy (Davis et al., 2005). 
Furthermore Philpin (1999) reported that when staff are socialised into powerful 
institutions such as hospitals, they must learn various formal and informal rules 
and regulations. This process of socialisation may rely on negative pressures 
from senior nurses to force compliance with ward culture. From a new nurse’s 
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point of view, Gray and Smith (1999) reported that nurses wishing to expel their 
status as an outsider, conform to the norms of the ward, such as those 
exhibited and encouraged by senior nurses. However, there is also the potential 
for new nurses to consult the more experienced colleagues, about medication 
practice, highlighting the opportunities that exist for senior nurses to enforce 
correct medication practice (Manias et al. 2004). The word ‘enforce’ could be 
misconstrued, and perhaps the terminology used within Chang et al’s. 
theoretical model (diagram 6, p2d) is more preferable where the emphasis is on 
team leaders using ‘coaching behaviors’ to encourage all group members to 
speak freely and openly. This has been found to promote learning in 
interpersonally threatening situations. Getting the balance of local leadership 
right, in valuing safety and staff actions is sometimes challenging (Firth-Cozens, 
2001). Whilst senior nurses may recognise the opportunities to offer peer 
support, their confident approach can often impede the confidence of junior 
nurses to challenge and question during the administration process (Dickinson 
et al., 2012). A study by Armitage and Knapman (2003)suggested that length of 
nursing experience and training have little effect on ME rates and as such, 
senior nurses are just as at risk of a ME, although they make may different 
types of errors. This suggests that having an open and free to challenge safety 
culture cannot be understated.
Although the study PICU had implemented processes to improve safety  as a 
result of MEs, there was evidence to suggest that these processes may 
generate a false sense of security amongst staff, who do not feel the need for 
their own safety checks. It was evident from the findings that the pharmacy 
checks were seen as sufficient to prevent errors resulting in nurses not feeling 
116
the need to always check the medication dosages. This suggests a poor 
perception of the risk and such risks have been studied under different 
frameworks such as risk compensation and unrealistic optimism (Ogden, 2012), 
which seem to have resonance with the findings of this study.
It was identified within the culture of PICU that the reasoning and intention 
behind new interventions introduced to reduce MEs, may become forgotten and 
‘routinisation’ of the intervention becomes a ‘reality of practice’ on PICU. 
Routinisation can be described as a cognitive bias known as risk compensation, 
a theory which suggests that people typically adjust their behavior in response 
to the perceived level of risk, becoming more careful where they sense greater 
risk and less careful if they feel more protected (Wilde, 1998; Ogden, 2012). 
Routinisation could explain how staff may use risky behaviors such as not 
checking medication dosages because pharmacy has already checked it, or 
relying on the second nurse to check the dosage, when independent checking 
of dosages should occur.
The findings suggested that colleagues rely on each other to pick up any errors 
during independent checking of medication on the PICU. Weinstein (1983) 
suggests that unrealistic optimism leads people to carry out ‘risky’ behaviors as 
they have an inaccurate perception of risk and susceptibility, due in part to lack 
of personal experience to the problem. This can create the sense that if error 
has not yet happened to them, it will not happen in the future and this promotes 
the belief that the problem of error is infrequent. Weinstein (1983) described this 
as selective focus. Unrealistic optimism could be used to explain a number of 
themes identified within the results, such as reporting of near misses, relying on 
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colleagues in independent checking of medication during the administration as 
well as learning from MEs on the PICU (if staff feel it has nothing to do with 
them).
5.6 Factors affecting medication error reporting
Inconsistencies around reporting and misconceptions between staff both within 
and across different disciplines arose due to the use of personal definitions of 
MEs. This is not surprising considering the lack of universally accepted 
definitions (Brady et al., 2009; Yu et al., 2005; Elder et al., 2006.) This lack of 
consistency in error identification hinders the systematic reporting of errors 
(Cook et al., 2004). Along with this, Tamuz et al. (2004) found that incentives 
and professional hierarchies also influenced definitions of MEs, which could 
lead to an error being defined away. Nurses in particular discussed that the ‘five 
rights’ within the checking process were in place to pick up near misses and 
rectify them before reaching the patient. Treiber and Jones (2010) described 
this as going back to the basics, but highlight that even though nurses agree 
that the five rights adequately reflect the way things should be done, nurses do 
not agree what actually constitutes a ME. Ulanimo et al. (2007) propose that if a 
strict five rights definition of MEs was applied the number of MEs reported 
would increase greatly. 
The findings show that ME reporting is mainly nurse led, as found in another 
research studies (Evans et al., 2006). The nurses identified barriers in place 
that inhibited them reporting MEs such as workload and time or being blamed 
and punished; these are well documented in the literature (Evans et al., 2006; 
Sarvadikar et al., 2010, Armitage et al., 2010). Similarly, other research has 
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suggested that the type and severity of the ME will influence the doctors’ and 
nurses’ priorities in reporting a ME, with nurses having a higher expectation of 
being blamed and criticised (Saravadikar et al., 2010). Both the nurses and 
consultants on the study PICU identified that punishment and disciplinary action 
was a likely barrier for nurses reporting an error. This is in keeping with Wolf et 
al. (2000) who suggested that nurses feel a greater responsibility for an error 
and experience greater fear for the consequences to the patient. This also 
resonates with the pharmacists’ comments that their responsibility  ‘sits heavily 
on their shoulders’. The observations highlighted, that the lack of reporting 
involved both junior and senior nursing, furthermore that the senior nurse may 
also influence the junior nurse in whether to report or not. Interestingly the “think 
aloud technique” was refused by both junior and senior nurses, where they 
indicated that they would not feel comfortable in recording an account of their 
actions, when involved in an ME. This may be suggestive of a culture on this 
PICU, where staff do not feel comfortable in discussing MEs and warrants  
further exploration.
The literature around doctors’ reporting MEs suggests a ‘norm of selective 
disclosure’ (Kroll et al., 2006) and this is likely to limit the systematic reporting or 
errors. This has some similarities with the findings in this study, the results of 
scenario B (Appendix 2) suggested that whilst all nurses would have definitely 
reported that particular ME, some of the doctors and ANPs, showed a small 
amount of doubt and in particular noted that the disclosure of this type of ME 
would be dependent on the medication involved. Heparin is classed as a high 
risk medication and listed as a ‘never event’. ‘Never events’ are incidents which 
are considered unacceptable and eminently preventable (NHS England, 2013). 
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Davis et al. (2005) discussed the issue, where staff had a strong perception of 
harm relating medication, such as with heparin, they are more likely to strictly 
adhere to policy and make a clinical judgment to report it, as they have a clearer 
understanding of the risks involved and the benefits of reporting.
The consultants identified the nurses as being in the best position to notice an 
error and that the nurses had more time to report a ME. The literature review 
identified that doctors are not always aware that they have made an error as 
prescribing errors are often discovered later on in the process by the pharmacist 
or nurse (Dean, 2002). Similarly, the idea of nurses and pharmacists acting as a 
‘safety net’ in detecting prescribing errors was noted by Dornan et al. (2009). In 
common with the findings about nurses, blame was identified as a barrier to 
reporting, research has identified that although the fear of blame is high in 
nurses, they are still likely to report an error, suggesting it may not be as strong 
a barrier to reporting as in doctors (Sarvadikar et al.,2010). 
It was clear from the scenarios that both doctors and nurses were more likely to 
report an error with worse outcome for the patient, and this is shown in other 
studies (Wolf et al., 2000; Evans et al., 2006; Alrwisan et al., 2009). Evans et al. 
(2006) suggests this is due to a lack of knowledge among doctors of the need 
to report less serious errors, or a perception of being too busy to have the time 
to report. In drawing analogies with Chuang et al.’s (2007) theoretical model 
(diagram 6, P1a) MEs that are more prominent are more likely to attract more 
attention and so individuals, groups and organisations are more likely to take 
action and therefore learn from these events. However, learning theories have 
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highlighted that near-misses can be valuable in triggering organisational 
learning (Miner et al. 1999).  
The findings highlighted that nurses may deviate from protocols at times. 
Reasons for this appeared comparable with the literature, in that environmental 
factors such as interruptions, multitasking and workload interfere with their 
ability to administer medications and that this in turn leads to deviation from 
protocols (Dickinson et al., 2010). Attitudinal influences such as complacency 
and approachability identified by Dickinson et al. (2010) resonated with the 
nurses’ discussions in the focus group. However, other influences such as 
trustworthiness and the availability of staff to double check that were  also 
reported by Dickinson et al. (2010) were not mentioned by the nurses in this 
study. The nurse managers reported that  some nurses just made the decision 
to not follow policy. Benner et al (1999), offers the explanation that nurse are 
encouraged to think critically about their practice and the decision to deviate 
from policy forms part of their clinical judgment. Noncompliance with protocols 
has been identified on this PICU and many others as a cause of MAEs and 
reported as a causative factor of MAEs (Armitage and Knapman, 2003). The 
observations identified that in 86% of the medication administrations observed, 
staff did not visibly check the identify bands or patients’ names on the 
prescription booklets, this inconsistency is well reported (Dickinson et al., 2010; 
Manias et al., 2005). This may be an ICU-related phenomena, as in ICU, nurses 
usually only have one patient. However, it transgresses both hospital protocol 
and nursing registration requirements. Dickinson et al. (2012) reported that 
compliance is influenced by the potential for harm. The nurses in the focus 
groups identified that independent double-checking during administration of 
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medication was often rushed and done incorrectly. Observations highlighted a 
complacency that the other nurse would pick up a mistake, which aligns with the 
previous discussion of risk compensation, where there is an unrealistic 
optimism that a ME will not happen. Davis et al. (2005) suggest that familiarity 
with colleagues also determined the adherence to protocols and checking 
administration. Recent research has shown there is insufficient evidence to 
support or refute if double checking reduces MEs (Alsulami et al., 2014a). The 
trust where this study took place has moved to a single checking policy with all 
oral medication apart from high risk ones such as warfarin or controlled 
medications. Furthermore Alsulami et al. (2014b) in a study looking at nurses’ 
knowledge about the double-checking process, found nurses do not always 
receive formal training in how to double-check correctly. This may suggest that 
further training on independent double-checking of medication by nurses may 
be warranted to encourage and assist adherence to protocol.
5.7 Learning from MEs
The findings suggested that the engagement of the bedside nurses within the 
process of learning from MEs on PICU was difficult. To learn from MEs, an 
organisation must first engage staff in local learning processes (Edmondson, 
2004). Nurse managers reported that in everyday practice there were difficulties 
in actively engaging staff on the PICU to learn from errors. Edmondson (2004) 
advocates that the collective engagement of staff to learn from errors stems 
from the dedicated understanding of frontline leaders with an awareness of a 
number of principles. Firstly, failures (MEs) present learning opportunities for 
sharing, highlighting that failures in hospitals are systematic in causation. As 
such, management of errors should be aimed at identifying the systematic 
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cause of an error, rather than blaming the individual. Secondly, there needs to 
be acknowledgment that ‘quick fixes’ allow the underlying causes to persist. 
Thirdly, there needs to be acknowledgement that employees need 
psychological safety in order to allow problem solving and learning. Edmondson 
(2004) advocates that leadership is essential in creating this learning climate, 
and advises that although learning may seem slow, constant effort is needed to 
engage people as active thinkers and learners. These principles could be useful 
in developing and standardising the management process following a ME in the 
study PICU, as this could remove blame where appropriate, address the 
systematic causation of error and provide further support to staff.
The pharmacists and doctors on the PICU perceived that nurses did not have 
adequate representation at the critical incident meetings. This then did not allow 
the frontline nurses to become engaged in the thinking process and to come up 
with solutions on improving safety. Tjosvold et al. (2004) discusses the 
challenges of teams learning from mistakes advising that in order for teams to 
engage in learning, open problem solving is required. Open problem solving 
allows staff to discuss errors together, understand them and make 
improvements without blame, although there must be a willingness to learn. 
Tjosvold et al. (2004) outlines that open problem solving generates positive 
team outcomes. Engaging more nurses in the critical incident meeting also fits 
with Chuang et al.’s (2007) theoretical framework in a number of ways, 
(diagram 6. Group diversity (P2a) which proposes the heterogeneity of group 
members knowledge and experience will have a positive impact on group 
learning from MEs. Additionally, intergroup linkages (P2c), proposes that group 
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norms of openness that encourage the use of constructive conflict will have a 
positive impact on learning from MEs. 
Alternatively, Arygris and Schon (1978) concluded that people in organisations 
may actually interact, unknowingly, in ways to block learning. Expanding on this 
they suggested that managers tend to avoid emotional discussions and 
exercise control in conflicts, this can often lead to a close mindedness and 
rigidity to stick to current practices. The pharmacists perceived that hospital 
management were not following through with one of the hospital’s ‘top 
priorities’ to reduce MEs, because nursing staff did not have clinical time to 
engage in critical incident meetings, as staffing levels rarely allowed this to 
happen on PICU. Ginsburg et al. (2009) identified that a true safety culture at 
organisational level understands the mechanisms that impact on safety at a 
departmental level. Firth and Cozens (2001) suggest that this safety culture can 
be created if individuals and teams are permitted to learn from errors. The 
findings on PICU suggest that front line nursing staff should be better engaged 
in discussions on MEs, so as to improve learning and bring a clearer 
perspective on causation of errors and to identify training issues. The work of 
Drach-Zahavey and Pud (2010) concluded that the effective team learning 
mechanisms are those that facilitate systematic gathering of information, rather 
than concentrating on singular medication errors. They highlight that effective 
team learning mechanisms engage and use all nurses on the ward via an 
‘integrated learning' approach, rather than just attributing learning to the nurse 
managers and risk management. Furthermore, Popper and Lipshitz (2000) 
advocated that for truly integrated learning, the same people involved in MEs 
should be included in generating and applying lessons learned. 
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Participants accounts of the reflective learning tool used on the PICU following 
a ME showed different perspectives. The nurse managers perceived that there 
was a clear difference in how nurses and doctors completed the tools, and they 
claimed that nurses made ‘excuses’ and doctors took ‘responsibility’. However, 
they also noted that, in general, the reflective accounts were too ‘generic.' 
Research shows that nurses pass through a number of processes to reach the 
point of learning (Treiber and Jones, 2010). An ‘excuse’ is where a person 
accepts the action was wrong but full responsibility is denied. Treiber and Jones 
(2010) concluded that ‘blame effusion’ must take place; this means that nurses 
will make excuses to make sense of an event and help them deal with the 
mistake effectively. In making sense of the event, the nurse looks at the context 
in which the error occurred, and then finds excuses. The reflective learning tool 
appears to offer a way of navigating the complex nature of medications errors, 
rather than necessarily offering ways to learn and change them. In this respect, 
it is aimed at the individual, rather than fixing the system level problem. On an 
individual level, accurate administration is deeply embedded within the principle 
of nursing and making a ME threatens the professional self and their own 
background expectations (Treiber and Jones, 2010). As such, nurses making 
‘excuses’ may actually know that the responsibility for safe medication 
administration was theirs, but use the excuse as a means of rationalizing and 
making sense of the error. Trieiber and Jones (2010) outline the need to 
understand how nurses make sense of errors and suggest that the positive and 
negative emotions expressed by the nurse should be taken into account to truly 
understand how nurses learn from MEs and as such, there is the need to dig 
beneath the surface of the excuse. 
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The idea that the reflective tool may just address the individual’s learning about 
a ME may give some explanation why shared learning does not always take 
place on the PICU. The Department of Health’s (2000) central idea in patient 
safety is that a focus on the individual makes it harder for systems to learn from 
their mistakes. Chuang et al.’s (2007) theoretical model is consistent with this, 
that MEs caused by heterogeneous factors will have a positive impact on group 
and organisational learning. However, there is also a drawback to this, 
attribution theory has shown that making causal external attributions, means the 
individual is less likely to take responsibility for the error and hence learn from it 
(De Jong et al., 1988). The findings from the content analysis of the reflective 
learning tools suggest that the nurses appear to make external attributions and 
do not take responsibility when reflecting on errors, this may explain why some 
individuals do not learn from completing the reflective learning tools. Chuang et 
al.’s (2007) model also proposes (P1c) that individuals who attribute negative 
outcomes to themselves will have greater individual learning compared  to 
those who attribute errors to systems within the organisation. This then offers a 
theoretical basis of why taking responsibility for an error is an important 
component for learning. In conclusion, individual learning and group learning 
are different and individual learning is more likely if the individual takes 
responsibility and attribute error to themselves. Group learning and 
organisational learning are more likely if errors are perceived to be caused by a 
complex interaction of multiple factors.
The nurse managers perceived that doctors took responsibility for the ME when 
completing the reflective learning tools. The literature shows that this is an 
important step in individuals learning from a ME as this is more likely tto lead to 
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constructive changes in practice, whereas defending an error may lead to a 
barriers in learning. Scott et al. (2009) looked at how nurses and doctors 
recover from being involved in a ME and their findings provide a deeper 
understanding of the emotions involved following an error. They outlined five 
stages: 1) the chaos and accident response; 2) intrusive reflections, where 
feelings of internal inadequacy develop; 3) restoring personal integrity; 4) 
enduring the inquisition and finally obtaining emotional first aid; and 5) moving 
on. They claim the first three stages may occur simultaneously. Taking the 
influence of these factors and stages into account and when the reflective 
learning is given to the staff member could greatly affect how the reflective 
learning tool is completed. One doctor’s account during an interview gave 
evidence to this effect as they noted that if you are given the tool to complete in 
the chaos of the aftermath of the incident, where feelings of internal inadequacy 
usually occur, the reflective learning tool may be too intrusive, At this time, the 
tool may not allow staff to restore their personal integrity and allow them to truly 
reflect and gain the most out of the process. However, guidelines for the 
management of MEs, suggest that the ME should be dealt with as soon as 
possible after the event; this timing warrants further research.
During the interviews and focus groups, all participants were shown a new 
intervention (short anonymous e-learning, focused reflective learning tool as a 
questionnaire) [Appendix 17]. The intention was this would be given to all staff 
involved with a ME regardless of their role. Feedback indicated that the tool 
would be more useful than the current tool in helping staff to learn from a ME. In 
comparison to the current reflective learning tool it could be emailed to the 
individual who could complete it at a time that felt mutually appropriate to them 
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and when it felt less intrusive. To gain more out of the reflection, the new tool 
could be completed after the manager’s initial meeting following an error and 
when the individual had received appropriate support. The new tool is 
structured to guide reflection, establish causation factors and gain insight into 
how the error could be prevented, this anonymised information could then be 
collated to promote shared learning across the team.
The notion of support and psychological safety through actively engaging staff 
in the learning process is important (Edmonsdon, 2004). Staff perceptions of 
management were generally positive and the managers noted the importance 
of supporting staff involved with a ME. However, some of the nurse managers 
talked about the inconsistencies between the different styles of management. 
Chuang et al.’s (2007) theoretical framework claims that different leadership 
styles may affect the learning and these depend on the coaching behaviors 
used and leadership approaches that value safety will have a positive impact on 
medication safety. 
Studies looking at how doctors’ engage and learn from errors, such as Kroll et 
al.’s (2008) work describe ‘the learning moment’ when the most learning occurs. 
This happens when the situation is discussed, the feedback is structured, 
constructive and supportive, even if there is chastisement. In contrast, 
humiliation by a senior doctor can lead to doctors never understanding their 
own errors (Kroll et al., 2008). Burack et al. (1999) suggest that the increased 
awareness of MEs may cause ‘desensitisation’ and hence prevent learning. 
Doctors in previous studies have reported that formal teaching, involving small 
group discussions, focusing on real errors and presented by senior doctors who 
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have been involved with MEs, provides important support and learning (Fischer 
et al., 2006).
As part of the learning process and the management of MEs on PICU, staff 
discussed the ‘reality of practice’ in disseminating information on MEs within the 
PICU in order for shared learning to take place and increase medication safety. 
There appeared to be three main methods of disseminating information: the 
summary of the critical incident meeting emailed to PICU staff;verbal 
discussions amongst the doctors; and further emails between the nursing staff 
and nurse managers. The adjustment of behaviour by means of feedback has 
been identified as an essential component of learning (Walshe, 2003). 
Edmondson (2002) points to the superiority of using the full cycle of learning, 
but in the ‘reality of practice’ this may lead to ‘patchy learning’ where the steps 
of this cycle are used separately and unsystematically leading to a lack of 
shared knowledge and little change in practice (Drach-Zahavy and Pud, 2010).
Findings from this study suggest that emails may lead to a ‘fragmented’ style of 
learning, similar to the ‘patchy learning’ described by Edmondson (2002) and 
Drach-Zahavy and Pud (2010). Firstly, examining the finding, this may be due to 
the type of error put on the critical incident summary being picked from a list of 
errors where not all errors were available on the summary. Secondly, because 
the process stopped following dissemination, no further evaluation of learning 
from a particular error took place, so some staff would read the email and have 
an awareness of MEs on the PICU, others may choose not to read the email. It 
appeared that some types of ME, were only reevaluated if the same error took 
place again, starting the whole process off of reporting an error. This suggests 
that the fully cycle of learning and re-evaluation does not always take place. 
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Edmondson (2002) demonstrated that actual learning occurs in the final stages 
of the cycle when changes are put in place and re-evaluation occurs.
When reporting of an error has occurred, lack of feedback can take away the 
incentive to report again, as one doctor explained it ‘disappeared off into the 
ether..... It takes away the incentive'. This is well documented in the literature 
that lack of feedback can form a motivational barrier to reporting medication 
errors (Walker and Lowe, 1998; Mcardle et al., 2003; Waring, 2005). In contrast, 
too much feedback may lead to desensitisation (Burack et al., 1999). The 
overuse of emails was evident in the findings of this study with the nurses, in 
particular, expressing the need for a balance of emails . So whilst staff should 
be made aware of MEs that occur on the PICU, there should also be more 
positive feedback on the success (e.g., the reduction in the number of MEs) of 
the interventions introduced; this would mean that staff could see the benefit.
5.8 Content analysis of reflective learning tools
The layout of the current reflective learning tools (Appendix 16) and the way in 
which they are introduced to staff following a ME allows for varying levels of 
self-analysis, which appears to be dependant on the individual who has 
completed the tool. Put simply, the tools were classified into two groups 
‘brief’ (n=19) and ‘detailed’ (n=20) reflections, indicating that just over half were 
too brief to ascertain whether any true reflection and evidence of learning had 
taken place. This is in line with some of the evidence gained from the focus 
groups and interviews in which staff talked of using the tool as a tick box 
exercise and that it was not achieving its goal of identifying areas for individuals 
to learn. Armitage (2011) identified that brief reports may arise when the nurse 
or doctor has no idea of causation and therefore are unable to identify the 
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learning and development required to put the ideal steps in place to prevent the 
ME reoccurring. The lack of text in the brief reports and illegible writing also 
hampered some of the analysis.
The differences between how nurses and doctors completed the reflective 
learning tools and the emotional impact following an error have already been 
discussed in section 5.2. However, it is noted here that the reflective learning 
tool generated evidence that was in concordance with data from the focus 
groups and interviews. although the content analysis did identify that some 
individuals had become more focused and more situationally aware following a 
ME. The response to these errors were individualistic in nature and scope, and 
the lessons learned reflect a doubling of efforts by staff, rather than fixing 
system level problems (Treiber and Jones, 2010). The impression is that staff 
are navigating their way through a complex system rather than actually trying to 
fix it. Attribution theory suggests that if individuals attribute negative outcomes 
to themselves, and take some responsibility, they are more likely to make 
constructive changes, but if they attribute blame to others or the organisation 
they are unlikely to do anything in response to the ME (Chuang et al., 2007).
5.9 Limitations of the study
The limitations of this study constrain its overall quality and generalisability. The 
study was small scale and undertaken in a single study centre and it relied on 
convenience sampling which is not the most robust sampling strategy, Also, 
there were recruitment issues due to a reliance on participants’ volunteering to 
take part in their own free time. However, the findings were broadly consistent 
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with the literature identified, suggesting that the findings may be representative 
of the perceptions of MEs by staff in other hospital settings. 
A weakness of the observations was the relatively small amount of 
administration episodes observed; this was limited by the availability of the sole 
field researcher. The limited duration of the observations therefore raises 
questions about whether the findings are a true reflection of the error rate, as it 
was likely that within a busy environment such as PICU to miss some errors, as 
medications were being given simultaneously. However, the underreporting of 
errors was clearly identified. 
The theoretical model chosen to propose how to facilitate learning, did not take 
into account near misses. The model was intended to apply to situations where 
MEs have been reported by those involved. As this is not always the case on 
this PICU, some of the propositions identified may not be applicable to learning 
from all forms of error. An area of the theoretical model, where analogies were 
not drawn was around organisational linked to the hospital’s risk management 
team. It maybe beneficial to include their perspective in future research.
5.10 Summary of findings
The reality of practice on PICU should be taken into account when addressing 
the prevalent contributory factors that increase the likelihood of a ME occurring, 
such as interruption and distractions. The findings in this study concur with the 
findings relating to the reporting and causation of MEs from other studies. The 
findings suggested that a lot of the problems that arose around learning from 
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MEs on PICU appeared to be the polar opposite of what Chuang et al (2007) 
model proposed in order to facilitate an environment conducive to learning.
5.10.1 Recommendations for practice 
The following recommendations for practice are proposed: 
1. Tackling the climate/culture of PICU
•Reducing blame and fear of punishment, by promoting constructive 
support from senior staff. This should include tackling the culture of gossip 
and the consequences to the nurses following involvement with a 
medication error.
•Interruptions/ distractions and hierarchy - Leaders should be encouraged 
to establish cultural norms where informal interruptions and distractions 
are actively discouraged across the whole PICU team, nurses also need to 
feel empowered to reject interruptions.
•Reporting- A clear and shared definition of what constitutes a ME should 
be made a priority to change attitudes of all staff regarding the purpose of 
reporting errors and near misses. Whilst it was identified within the study, 
that time and workload may inhibit reporting, there is a need to increase 
staff awareness that failing to learn from a mistake, could lead to another 
patient suffering harm. Therefore clarity across the PICU is required on 
who is responsible for reporting a medication error, where the triggers for 
reporting an error are clearly defined to all staff on the unit.
2.  Management of medication errors on PICU
•Better engagement of staff in medication safety, by providing clinical time 
for staff nurses to rotate into the PICU critical incident meetings. This 
should also include a better balance of emails sent to staff, where positive 
feedback is given to staff about successful medication safety interventions.
•Reduce inconsistencies in the management of MEs by introducing clearer 
guidelines, flowcharts and shared computer access to specific PICU 
documentation, so that information is up to date and accessible to all 
managers on all shifts.
•Increase support for staff involved in a ME prior to them completing a 
reflective learning tool so as to reduce blame and allow staff to express 
the emotional affect of the error.
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5.10.2 Recommendations for research
The following recommendations for future research are proposed: 
1. A process improvement study using rapid cycle testing to define, measure, 
analyse, improve and control interruptions and distractions on the PICU, 
using observations of nurses administering medication and doctors 
prescribing.
2. Further study is also warranted to evaluate the implementation of the new 
reflective learning tool on the PICU study to determine (1) the impact on 
individual and shared learning and (2) the best time for completing the tool 
(e.g., immediately after error as is current practice or at a less anxious 
time). 
3. Development of a tool for managers on PICU to improve consistency 
around management following a ME to ensure clearer communication and 
documentation. Future work could also include the role of leadership, as it 
would be interesting to see how the nurse manager’s role influences the 
creation of a positive learning climate. 
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION
The complex nature of the medication process provides a challenge in 
identifying how staff learn from medication within a busy environment of PICU. 
The study has taken the ‘reality of practice’ on PICU into consideration to 
improve the understanding of how learning may take place. Causative factors 
identified such as informal interruptions and distractions should be controlled, 
and improvements should be sought into how the PICU team’s situational 
awareness of the PICU environment can be improved.  A lot of problems that 
arose on PICU were identified as being in opposition to what the theoretical 
framework by Chuang et al., (2007) proposed in order to facilitate an 
environment conducive to learning. The framework guided the discussion and 
helped to identify possible areas where improvements could take place on 
PICU. Such as the importance of participative leadership, in establishing 
cultural norms, where informal interruptions and distractions are actively 
discouraged and coaching behaviors by management, encourage group 
members to speak freely and openly and encourage constructive conflict. 
 Staff engagement should be sought at all levels to promote learning. Staff need 
to see the relevance of new safety processes implemented, through positive 
feedback. MEs remain underreported on this PICU. A clearer definition and 
repeated guidance of what constitutes a ME may have the potential to improve 
reporting. Perceived barriers such as lack of clear definitions of what constitutes 
a ME, blame and punishment and time and workload, inhibit reporting across all 
professions. 
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Self reflection and analysis following involvement in a ME, does not always take 
place to identify learning opportunities. The current reflective learning tool does 
not facilitate a very useful reflection on the error and is unlikely to promote 
either individual or shared learning across the unit. The findings suggest that 
support and guidance is required to enhance reflection and learning and assist 
nurses to handle difficult situations emotionally. Further research is warranted to 
evaluate tools that guide reflection and enhance learning, to have greater affect 
on MEs, which in the most part are deemed ‘preventable'.
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APPENDICES
Appendix 1 Topic guide for focus groups and interviews
      
  
EXPLORING MEs AND DOCTORS AND NURSES PERCEPTIONS OF THEM IN 
THE PAEDIATRIC INTENSIVE CARE UNIT (PICU)
TOPIC GUIDE FOR FOCUS GROUPS
To examine:   How do doctors and nurses’ who work in the PICU perceive 
• MEs
• The management of MEs
• How they learn from MEs
INTRODUCTION
Introduce self
Explain nature of research and topics to be discussed
Stress confidentiality
Explain what happens to data collected – transcribed, reported and 
anonymity
Introduce tape recorder
Ground rules – one person to speak at a time, everyone’s views 
important so want to hear from everyone, no right or wrong answers, 
looking for range of views.
Mobile phones off 
Invite any questions.
PERCEPTIONS OF MEs –   hand outs given to participants
Discuss 4 scenarios: Which scenarios would likely result in an incident form 
being completed
Following discussion, ask the participants to actually grade the 
scenarios on a scale 1-5 in severity and likelihood to report as a 
medication error?
INCIDENT REPORTING OF MEs
Thinking about these scenario’s and the current incident reporting system for 
MEs - ‘Ulysses’
What do you feel are the 3 main barriers to reporting? 
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Views on difference between reporting near miss/ actual error.
CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS TO MEs ON THE PICU
View on groups understanding of causative factors that contribute to 
medication errors on this PICU 
• What do you think are the top 3 factors that contribute to MEs on this 
PICU?
• In order to reduce MEs on this PICU, what are the top 3 things you think 
could be implemented to reduce the number of MEs?
LEARNING FROM Medication ERRORS ON THIS PICU
Thinking about your experiences of learning from MEs and improving safety on 
this PICU – you don’t need to share any personal experiences – but how do you 
think doctors (or nurses) ‘learn’ from errors so they don’t make the same 
mistakes again?
o Does the culture in this PICU make it easy to learn from the errors 
made by others?
i.e. is it an individual process/team learning process
o Is it difficult to discuss medication errors on this PICU?
o What views do you have on the current reflective learning tool 
and the way it is used?
o Would you find this tool more effective/or ineffective if you didn’t 
have to give it back to the managers to see?
If this PICU introduced a new intervention which combined a number or 
processes involving:-
Show tool on presentation screen
o An anonymous (non-manager seen) short e-learning tool 
(questionnaire) to be completed by all staff involved in an error 
regardless of their role
o Monthly feedback of the results of this anonymous data 
collected, formally to the whole PICU team in a variety of formats
o Short focused training programme for staff on MEs.
What are your views on this as an idea to reduce errors?
How do you normally become aware of MEs on this PICU?
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In what other way could this PICU improve this?
Is there a ME or near miss experience on the unit which has led to a 
change in your practise.
MANAGEMENT OF MEs ON THIS PICU
In the last five minutes we will discuss how managers working within this PICU 
address medication errors/near miss
What one word would you use to explain management of medication errors on 
this unit?
Looking at how managers support staff involved with MEs on this PICU
What do you think could be the best process?
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Appendix 2 Scenario’s for focus groups and interviews
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Appendix 3 Observation template
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Appendix 4 Focus group and interview invitation to participate
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Appendix 5 Participation information sheet for Doctors and ANP’s
       
Exploring MEs and Doctors’ and Nurses’ Perceptions of them in the Paediatric 
Intensive Care Unit
Participant information sheet for DOCTORS/ANP
We would like to invite you to take part in our research study.  Before you 
decide, we would like to explain what the study is about, and what joining the 
study will involve.  The researcher, Jo Johnston, will go through the information 
sheet with you and answer any questions you have.
What is the purpose of the study?
The aim of the study is to gain a more accurate understanding of ME 
occurrence in this PICU and to explore the PIC team’s perceptions of MEs and 
how they perceive that they learn from them.  This study is the researcher’s 
MSc project. It also forms part of future research plans around MEs looking at 
(1) tools to improve learning from errors and (2) methods into improving PICU 
team shared learning from errors.
Why have you been chosen to participate?
You are a doctor or ANP working on the PICU at Alder Hey Hospital.
What will happen if I take part?
Three focus groups will be undertaken, with around 6 staff per group.  One 
focus group each, for nursing staff (Band 5 & 6), medical staff, and managers 
to generate discussion about MEs in general on PICU. They are not intended to 
discuss individual events that people have been involved with.  They will be 
conducted in a quiet and private room in the education centre on a date and 
time convenient to the participants. Each focus group will last approximately 1 
hour.  With your consent the focus groups will be audio recorded, this audio 
recording will then be transcribed and ALL identifying details (any names etc.) 
removed.  The audio tapes will then be destroyed. Should you not wish to be 
audio recorded, you will be unable to participate as part of the focus group.
Do you have to take part or can you change your mind?
You do not have to participate in this study; it is up to you to decide whether 
or not you wish to take part.  If you would like to take part, we would ask you 
to email the researcher directly.  Prior to the start of the focus group you will 
be asked to sign a consent form.  You will be completely free to withdraw from 
the study (i.e. leave the focus group) at any point.  You do not have to give a 
reason.  Once the focus group data are transcribed and anonymised, all 
identifying details will have been removed so we will not be able to remove 
your responses.
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What are the advantages and disadvantages to being in the study?  The 
information gained by the study may help to improve how MEs are perceived 
and managed on this PICU and help us to understand how PICU nurses and 
doctors ‘learn’ from them.  The focus group will take place at a mutually 
convenient time. The focus groups do not intend to cause anyone any distress, 
however asking questions may remind you of a past event which may be 
upsetting for you.  You do not have to answer any questions you do not want 
to and can leave the focus group at any time if you wish.
Will the information be kept confidential?
In order to allow us to remember everything that has been said in the focus 
group, the groups will be audio recorded.  These tapes will then be 
transcribed; with any names and identifiable references removed so that 
individuals participating in the focus groups (or any patients) cannot be 
identified.  Information will be stored on a secure password protected 
computer on the PICU at Alder Hey.  Only the lead researcher, Dr Lyvonne 
Tume and nurse-researcher, Joanne Johnston will be involved in moderating 
the focus groups and transcribing them.  It is anticipated that some direct 
quotes may be used, when the study is published, which again will not identify 
any individual participant.  Any discussions within the focus groups will be 
treated as confidential, unless any information is disclosed about poor clinical 
practice (as defined by  the GMC Code of Professional Conduct or the NMC 
Code of Professional Conduct), in which case this will be referred to your 
consultant supervisor.
What will happen to the results of this study?
The results of this study will be presented within the Children’s Nursing 
Research Unit at Alder Hey, PICU and Alder Hey Children’s Foundation Trust.  
This will be via Grand Rounds, PICU meetings, PICU mandatory training, staff 
induction and the Trust’s Safe Medication Committee. It is intended to submit 
this information for presentation at a PICS meeting and for publication in a 
peer reviewed journal.
How can I gain further information?
You can contact the lead researcher, Dr Lyvonne Tume, on email @ 
Lyvonne.tume@alderhey.nhs.uk or nurse-researcher and PIC nurse, Joanne 
Johnston, on email @ joanne.johnston@alderhey.nhs.uk . Should you have any 
concerns please contact: Clinical Lead, PICU, Alder Hey Children’s Hospital FT, 
Dr Steve Kerr @ steve.kerr@alderhey.nhs.uk.  Dean of School of Health, UCLan, 
Preston, Dr Nigel Harrison, on email @ NHarrison@uclan.ac.uk 
Who has reviewed this study?
Research in the NHS involving staff, which does not involve patients or 
families, does not need to be looked at by a Research Ethics Committee. 
Approval has been sought through UCLAN university ethics committee and 
through the senior PICU management team at Alder Hey NHS Foundation Trust
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Appendix 6 Participation information sheet for nurses
       
 
Exploring MEs and Doctors’ and Nurses’ Perceptions of them in the Paediatric 
Intensive Care Unit
Participant information sheet for NURSES
We would like to invite you to take part in our research study.  Before you 
decide, we would like to explain what the study is about, and what joining the 
study will involve.  The researcher, Jo Johnston, will go through the information 
sheet with you and answer any questions you have.
What is the purpose of the study?
The aim of the study is to gain a more accurate understanding of ME 
occurrence in this PICU and to explore the PIC team’s perceptions of MEs and 
how they perceive that they learn from them.  This study is the researcher’s 
MSc project. It also forms part of future research plans around MEs looking at 
(1) tools to improve learning from errors and (2) methods into improving PICU 
team shared learning from errors.
Why have you been chosen to participate?
You are a Band 5 or 6 Nurse working on the PICU at Alder Hey Hospital.
What will happen if I take part?
Three focus groups will be undertaken, with around 6 staff per group.  One 
focus group each, for nursing staff (Band 5 & 6), medical staff, and managers 
to generate discussion about MEs in general on PICU. They are not intended to 
discuss individual events that people have been involved with.  They will be 
conducted in a quiet and private room in the education centre on a date and 
time convenient to the participants. Each focus group will last approximately 1 
hour.  With your consent the focus groups will be audio recorded, this audio 
recording will then be transcribed and ALL identifying details (any names etc.) 
removed.  The audio tapes will then be destroyed. Should you not wish to be 
audio recorded, you will be unable to participate as part of the focus group.
Do you have to take part or can you change your mind?
You do not have to participate in this study; it is up to you to decide whether 
or not you wish to take part.  If you would like to take part, we would ask you 
to email the researcher directly.  Prior to the start of the focus group you will 
be asked to sign a consent form.  You will be completely free to withdraw from 
the study (i.e. leave the focus group) at any point.  You do not have to give a 
reason.  Once the focus group data are transcribed and anonymised, all 
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identifying details will have been removed so we will not be able to remove 
your responses.
What are the advantages and disadvantages to being in the study?
The information gained by the study may help to improve how MEs are 
perceived and managed on this PICU and help us to understand how PICU 
nurses and doctors ‘learn’ from them.  The focus group will take place outside 
of your clinical shift at a mutually convenient time. Staff will be paid 1.5hours 
(bank) for their hours’ time to attend this focus group.  The focus groups do 
not intend to cause anyone any distress, however asking questions may remind 
you of a past event which may be upsetting for you.  You do not have to 
answer any questions you do not want to and can leave the focus group at any 
time if you wish.
Will the information be kept confidential?
In order to allow us to remember everything that has been said in the focus 
group, the groups will be audio recorded.  These tapes will then be 
transcribed; with any names and identifiable references removed so that 
individuals participating in the focus groups (or any patients) cannot be 
identified.  Information will be stored on a secure password protected 
computer on the PICU at Alder Hey.  Only the lead researcher, Dr Lyvonne 
Tume and nurse-researcher, Joanne Johnston will be involved in moderating 
the focus groups and transcribing them.  It is anticipated that some direct 
quotes may be used, when the study is published, which again will not identify 
any individual participant.  Any discussions within the focus groups will be 
treated as confidential, unless any information is disclosed about poor clinical 
practice (as defined by  the NMC Code of Professional Conduct), in which case 
this will be referred to the unit manager.
What will happen to the results of this study?
The results of this study will be presented within the Children’s Nursing 
Research Unit at Alder Hey, PICU and Alder Hey Children’s Foundation Trust.  
This will be via Grand Rounds, PICU meetings, PICU mandatory training, staff 
induction and the Trust’s Safe Medication Committee. It is intended to submit 
this information for presentation at a PICS meeting and for publication in a 
peer reviewed journal.
How can I gain further information?
You can contact the lead researcher, Dr Lyvonne Tume, on email @ 
Lyvonne.tume@alderhey.nhs.uk or nurse-researcher and PIC nurse, Joanne 
Johnston, on email @ joanne.johnston@alderhey.nhs.uk. Contact details should 
you have any concern:  Clinical Lead, PICU, Alder Hey Children’s Hospital FT, Dr 
Steve Kerr @ steve.kerr@alderhey.nhs.uk. Dean of School of Health, UCLan, 
Preston, Dr Nigel Harrison, on email @ NHarrison@uclan.ac.uk
Who has reviewed this study?
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Research in the NHS involving staff, which does not involve patients or 
families, does not need to be looked at by a Research Ethics Committee. 
Approval has been sought through UCLAN university ethics committee and 
through the senior PICU management team at Alder Hey NHS Foundation Trust.
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Appendix 7 Participation information sheet for managers
       
Exploring MEs and Doctors’ and Nurses’ perceptions of them in the Paediatric 
Intensive Care Unit
Participant information sheet for Team Leaders/Managers
We would like to invite you to take part in our research study.  Before you 
decide, we would like to explain what the study is about, and what joining the 
study will involve.  The researcher, Jo Johnston, will go through the information 
sheet with you and answer any questions you have.
What is the purpose of the study?
The aim of the study is to gain a more accurate understanding of ME 
occurrence in this PICU and to explore the PIC team’s perceptions of MEs and 
how they perceive that they learn from them.  This study is the researcher’s 
MSc project. It also forms part of future research plans around MEs looking at 
(1) tools to improve learning from errors and (2) methods into improving PICU 
team shared learning from errors.
Why have you been chosen to participate?
You are a Clinical Nurse Manager currently working on PICU who encounters 
and has experience in managing MEs on this unit.
What will happen if I take part?
Three focus groups will be undertaken, with around 6 staff per group.  One 
focus group each, for nursing staff (Band 5 & 6), medical staff, and managers 
to generate discussion about MEs in general on PICU. They are not intended to 
discuss individual events that people have been involved with.  They will be 
conducted in a quiet and private room in the education centre on a date and 
time convenient to the participants. Each focus group will last approximately 1 
hour.  With your consent the focus groups will be audio recorded, this audio 
recording will then be transcribed and ALL identifying details (any names etc.) 
removed.  The audio tapes will then be destroyed. Should you not wish to be 
audio recorded, you will be unable to participate as part of the focus group.
Do you have to take part or can you change your mind?
You do not have to participate in this study; it is up to you to decide whether 
or not you wish to take part.  If you would like to take part, we would ask you 
to email the researcher directly.  Prior to the start of the focus group you will 
be asked to sign a consent form.  You will be completely free to withdraw from 
the study (i.e. leave the focus group) at any point.  You do not have to give a 
reason.  Once the focus group data are transcribed and anonymised, all 
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identifying details will have been removed so we will not be able to remove 
your responses.
What are the advantages and disadvantages to being in the study?
The information gained by the study may help to improve how MEs are 
perceived and managed on the PICU and help us to understand how PICU 
nurses and 
doctors ‘learn’ from them.  The focus group will take place at a mutually 
convenient time, probably after a nurse manager’s 
meeting. For staff that are not on shift that day, they will be paid 1.5 hours 
(bank) for their hours’ time to attend this focus group. The focus groups do 
not intend to cause anyone any distress, however asking questions may remind 
you of a past event which may be upsetting for you.  You do not have to 
answer any questions you do not want to and can leave the focus group at any 
time if you wish.
Will the information be kept confidential?
In order to allow us to remember everything that has been said in the focus 
groups, the groups will be audio recorded.  These tapes will then be 
transcribed; with any names and identifiable references removed so that 
individuals participating in the focus groups (or any patients) cannot be 
identified.  Information will be stored on a secure password protected 
computer on the PICU at Alder Hey.  Only the lead researcher, Dr Lyvonne 
Tume, and nurse-researcher, Joanne Johnston, will be involved in moderating 
the focus groups and transcribing them.  It is anticipated that some direct 
quotes may be used, when the study is published, which again will not identify 
any individual participant.  Any discussions within the focus groups will be 
treated as confidential, unless any information is disclosed about poor clinical 
practice (as defined by  the NMC  Code of Professional Conduct), in which case 
this will be referred to the unit manager.
What will happen to the results of this study?
The results of this study will be presented within the Children’s Nursing 
Research Unit, PICU and Alder Hey Children’s Foundation Trust.  This will be 
via Grand Rounds, PICU meetings, PICU mandatory training, staff induction and 
the Trust’s Safe Medication Committee. It is intended to submit this 
information for presentation at a PICS meeting and for publication in a peer 
reviewed journal.
How can I gain further information?
You can contact the lead researcher, Dr Lyvonne Tume, on email @ 
Lyvonne.tume@alderhey.nhs.uk or nurse-researcher and PIC nurse Joanne 
Johnston on email @ joanne.johnston@alderhey.nhs.uk 
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Who has reviewed this study?
Research in the NHS involving staff, which does not involve patients or 
families, does not need to be looked at by a Research Ethics Committee. 
Approval has been sought through UCLAN university ethics committee and 
through the senior PICU management team at Alder Hey NHS Foundation Trust.
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Appendix 8 Participation information sheet for consultant’s
       
Exploring MEs and Doctors’ and Nurses’ perceptions of them in the Paediatric 
Intensive Care Unit
Participant information sheet for Consultants
We would like to invite you to take part in our research study.  Before you 
decide, we would like to explain what the study is about, and what joining the 
study will involve.  The researcher, Jo Johnston, will go through the information 
sheet with you and answer any questions you have.
What is the purpose of the study?
The aim of the study is to gain a more accurate understanding of ME 
occurrence in this PICU and to explore the PIC team’s perceptions of MEs and 
how they perceive that they learn from them.  This study is the researcher’s 
MSc project. It also forms part of future research plans around MEs looking at 
(1) tools to improve learning from errors and (2) methods into improving PICU 
team shared learning from errors.
Why have you been chosen to participate?
You are a Consultant currently working on PICU who encounters and has 
experience in dealing with MEs on this unit.
What will happen if I take part?
Three focus groups will be undertaken, with around 6 staff per group.  One 
focus group each, for nursing staff (Band 5 & 6), medical staff, and managers 
to generate discussion about MEs in general on PICU. They are not intended to 
discuss individual events that people have been involved with.  They will be 
conducted in a quiet and private room in the education centre on a date and 
time convenient to the participants. Each focus group will last approximately 1 
hour.  With your consent the focus groups will be audio recorded, this audio 
recording will then be transcribed and ALL identifying details (any names etc.) 
removed.  The audio tapes will then be destroyed. Should you not wish to be 
audio recorded, you will be unable to participate as part of the focus group.
Do you have to take part or can you change your mind?
You do not have to participate in this study; it is up to you to decide whether 
or not you wish to take part.  If you would like to take part, we would ask you 
to email the researcher directly.  Prior to the start of the focus group you will 
be asked to sign a consent form.  You will be completely free to withdraw from 
the study (i.e. leave the focus group) at any point.  You do not have to give a 
reason.  Once the focus group data are transcribed and anonymised, all 
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identifying details will have been removed so we will not be able to remove 
your responses.
What are the advantages and disadvantages to being in the study?
 information gained by the study may help to improve how MEs are perceived 
and managed on the PICU and help us to understand how PICU nurses and 
doctors ‘learn’ from them.  The focus group will take place at a mutually 
convenient time for all attendee’s. The focus groups do 
not intend to cause anyone any distress, however asking questions may remind 
you of a past event which may be upsetting for you.  You do not have to 
answer any questions you do not want to and can leave the focus group at any 
time if you wish.
Will the information be kept confidential?
In order to allow us to remember everything that has been said in the focus 
groups, the groups will be audio recorded.  These tapes will then be 
transcribed; with any names and identifiable references removed so that 
individuals participating in the focus groups (or any patients) cannot be 
identified.  Information will be stored on a secure password protected 
computer on the PICU at Alder Hey.  Only the lead researcher Dr Lyvonne Tume 
and nurse-researcher Joanne Johnston, will be involved in moderating the 
focus groups and transcribing them.  It is anticipated that some direct quotes 
may be used, when the study is published, which again will not identify any 
individual participant.  Any discussions within the focus groups will be treated 
as confidential, unless any information is disclosed about poor clinical practice 
(as defined by the GMC Code of Professional Conduct), in which case this will 
be referred to the PICU Clinical Director.
What will happen to the results of this study?
The results of this study will be presented within the Children’s Nursing 
Research Unit at Alder Hey, PICU and Alder Hey Children’s Foundation Trust.  
This will be via Grand Rounds, PICU meetings, PICU mandatory training, staff 
induction and the Trusts Safe Medication Committee. It is intended to submit 
this information for presentation at a PICS meeting and for publication in a 
peer reviewed journal.
How can I gain further information?
You can contact the lead researcher, Dr Lyvonne Tume, on email @ 
Lyvonne.tume@alderhey.nhs.uk or nurse-researcher and PIC nurse, Joanne 
Johnston, on email @ joanne.johnston@alderhey.nhs.uk 
Who has reviewed this study?
Research in the NHS involving staff, which does not involve patients or 
families, does not need to be looked at by a Research Ethics Committee. 
Approval has been sought through UCLAN university ethics committee and 
through the senior PICU management team at Alder Hey NHS Foundation Trust.
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Appendix 9 Consent form for focus groups and interviews
      
                                             
CONSENT FORM
Project title:  Exploring MEs and doctors’ and nurses’ perceptions of 
them in the Paediatric Intensive Care Unit (PICU)
      Name of researchers: Dr L Tume and Mrs Joanne Johnston
       Please initial each box
I have read the participant information sheet and had the opportunity  
to ask questions and discuss this study           
I agree to keep any discussion within the focus group confidential  
I agree for this focus group to be audio recorded     
                     
I agree for non-identifiable quotes from the focus group to be published  
     
I understand that I am free to withdraw from the study 
at any time, without having to give a reason       
            
I understand that relevant sections of the data 
collected during the study may be looked at by responsible 
individuals from Alder Hey Children’s Hospital or from regulatory  
authorities, where it is relevant to their taking part in this research  
      
I agree to take part in this study      
     
_____________________________       ____________     ____________________
Name of participant   Date                     Signature
_____________________________        ____________     ____________________
Name of person taking consent          Date                     Signature
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Appendix 10 Invitation to participate in observations
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Appendix 11 Information sheet for observations for nurses
! ! ! ! ! ! !
! !! !
Exploring MEs and Doctors’ and Nurses’ Perceptions of them in the Paediatric 
Intensive Care Unit
Participant information sheet for NURSES- Observations of Medication 
Administration
We would like to invite you to take part in our research study.  Before you 
decide, we would like to explain what the study is about, and what joining the 
study will involve.  The researcher, Jo Johnston, will go through the information 
sheet with you and answer any questions you have.
What is the purpose of the study?
The aim of the study is to gain a more accurate understanding of ME 
occurrence in this PICU and to explore the PIC team’s perceptions of MEs and 
how they perceive that they learn from them.  This study is the researcher’s 
MSc project. It also forms part of future research plans around MEs looking at 
(1) tools to improve learning from errors and (2) methods into improving PICU 
team shared learning from errors.
Why have you been chosen to participate?
You are a Band 5, 6 or 7 Nurse working on the PICU at Alder Hey Hospital.
What will happen if I take part?
As part of the above study, we wish to observe medication administration on 
this PICU.  We are NOT recording nurses’ OR patients’ names, only observing 
the process of medication administration.  We are not trying to catch people 
out.  We will be collecting data at peak administration times (approx. 2 hour 
periods), to gain an insight into when and how a ME is likely to occur. If the 
observer (Jo Johnston) sees an error which you have not picked up and the 
patient is about to receive she will stop you and tell you. When she sees any 
near misses (which are really important) she will ask you soon after this if you 
would mind audio-recording your thoughts about what made you know 
something was wrong. Likewise if an error nearly occurs Jo will ask if you 
would mind recording your thoughts at the time about this. You do not have to 
do this; it is entirely up to you, but it will help us to understand what was 
going on at the time which is really important to be able to understand why 
errors occur and how we can put systems in place to try and make medication 
administration safer on PICU
Do you have to take part or can you change your mind?
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You do not have to participate in this study; it is up to you to decide whether 
or not you wish to take part. Prior to the planned observations, the researcher 
will go through this participant information sheet with you, if you volunteer to 
take part, you will be asked to sign a consent form.  You will be completely 
free to withdraw from the study (i.e. not be observed) at any point.  You do not 
have to give a reason.  
What are the advantages and disadvantages to being in the study?
The information gained by the study may help to improve how MEs are 
perceived and managed on this PICU and help us to understand how PICU 
nurses and doctors ‘learn’ from them.  
Will the information be kept confidential?
In order to allow us to remember everything that has been said, your thoughts 
at the time of any near miss ME will be recorded with your consent.  These 
tapes will then be transcribed; with any names and identifiable references 
removed so that individuals participating in the observations (or any patients) 
cannot be identified.  Information will be stored on a secure password 
protected computer on the PICU at Alder Hey.  Only the lead researcher, Dr 
Lyvonne Tume and nurse-researcher, Joanne Johnston will be involved in 
transcribing them.  It is anticipated that some direct quotes may be used, when 
the study is published, which again will not identify any individual participant.  
Any discussions within the observations will be treated as confidential, unless 
any information is disclosed about poor clinical practice (as defined by the 
NMC Code of Professional Conduct), in which case this will be referred to the 
unit manager.
What will happen to the results of this study?
The results of this study will be presented within the Children’s Nursing 
Research Unit at Alder Hey, PICU and Alder Hey Children’s Foundation Trust.  
This will be via Grand Rounds, PICU meetings, PICU mandatory training, staff 
induction and the Trust’s Safe Medication Committee. It is intended to submit 
this information for presentation at a PICS meeting and for publication in a 
peer reviewed journal.
How can I gain further information?
You can contact the lead researcher, Dr Lyvonne Tume, on email @ 
Lyvonne.tume@alderhey.nhs.uk or nurse-researcher and PIC nurse, Joanne 
Johnston, on email @ joanne.johnston@alderhey.nhs.uk 
Who has reviewed this study?
Research in the NHS involving staff, which does not involve patients or 
families, does not need to be looked at by a Research Ethics Committee. 
Approval has been sought through UCLAN university ethics committee and 
through the senior PICU management team at Alder Hey NHS Foundation Trust. 
Contact details should you have any concerns/issuesDirector of Studies Dr 
Lyvonne Tume, on email @ Lyvonne.tume@alderhey.nhs.uk.  Clinical Lead, 
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PICU, Alder Hey Children’s Hospital FT, Dr Steve Kerr @ 
steve.kerr@alderhey.nhs.uk. Dean of School of Health, UCLan, Preston, Dr 
Nigel Harrison, on email @ NHarrison@uclan.ac.uk 
        
       
   
CONSENT FORM
Project title:  Exploring MEs and doctors’ and nurses’ perceptions of 
them in the Paediatric Intensive Care Unit (PICU)
Observations of Nurses administering Medication on PICU
Name of researchers: Dr L Tume and Mrs Joanne Johnston
       Please initial each box
I have read the participant information sheet and had the opportunity  
to ask questions and discuss this study           
I agree to audio record my thoughts following a near miss medication  
error.
                     
I agree for non-identifiable quotes from the focus group to be published  
     
I understand that I am free to withdraw from the study 
at any time, without having to give a reason    
             
I understand that relevant sections of the data 
collected during the study may be looked at by responsible 
individuals from Alder Hey Children’s Hospital or from regulatory 
authorities, where it is relevant to their taking part in this research  
     
I agree to take part in this study      
_____________________________       ____________     ____________________
Name of participant   Date                     Signature
_____________________________        ____________     ____________________
Name of person taking consent          Date                     Signature
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Appendix 12 Final NVivo audit trail
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Appendix 13 Analysis of data from focus groups and interviews
Inconsistencies and Misconceptions
PICU Culture Non 
compliance/
compliance
Engagement 
and Learning
Evaluation and 
feedback
Inconsistent 
reporting
-Personal 
definitions of a 
ME used in the 
decision process 
of reporting a ME 
vary amongst 
colleagues.
Medics non-
compliance with 
Reporting
-few report
-expectation 
nurses will report
-acceptance that 
errors are normal
- more likely to 
report if 
consequence to 
the patient
-mistake 
rectifiable – do not 
report
-logistics
-medication 
dependable i.e. 
high risk 
medications
!Initially
-Paediatricians- 
general and ICU 
induction
-Anaesthetists – 
general induction
-Nurses –general 
induction and 
MSD
Dissemination
!Medical staff 
receive feedback by
-reflecting  verbally 
to colleagues, 
easier to 
disseminate
-supporting 
colleagues on shift
-emails
-handover
-critical incident 
meeting
-supervisory 
sessions
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 Contributory 
Factors     
Non – 
compliance 
-following 
protocol 
-2 nurses  
independently 
checking
                       
  Internal 
Environment
  -Multi-tasking
  -loose focus
  Slips, mistakes
!Nurses 
compliance with 
reporting
-nurse led
-nurses actively 
encouraged
-time constrained
-If trained use 
Ulysses
-still use paper 
form
!Current 
Reflection tool
-individual 
learning
-generic answers
-paper exercise
-lack of feedback
-done because 
you have to, not 
seen as a 
learning exercise
-used by 
management as 
record of action.
-written to 
please
-more 
clarification and 
detail needed
!Timing of 
reflection tool 
being given to 
staff
-time lapse – 
shift work
-Denial – need 
support initially 
and spoken to 
confidentially.
!Nursing staff 
receive feedback 
by
-emails
-handovers
-fragmented
-gossip – not 
always professional
-noticeboard – not 
well located
-would like to 
receive positive 
feedback to 
evaluate how an 
improvement 
process has gone
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External 
Environment
1. - Distractions 
during 
prescribing
2.  -Distractions 
during 
administration
3.  -Distractions 
are across the 
board
4.  
-Interruptions 
1.–by staff 
2.– by family
Lack of awareness 
of how the unit is 
functioning at a 
given time and 
prioritisation can 
lead to 
inappropriate 
interruptions due 
to 
-lack of 
communication
-time pressure/
perceived 
business
!Barriers to 
reporting
-training
-accessibility 
-time/workload
-awareness
-an error picked 
up is seen as part 
of the checking 
process
-blame
-failure - medics
-gossip
-reporting 
colleagues
-Ulysses – too 
long
-repercussions for 
career - nursing
!Improvements
-need to embed 
in practice – 
people don’t like 
change
if evaluated
-they are not 
fedback to staff 
if they have 
worked
-keep focus on
-otherwise – 
drifts, fades, 
errors return
!Feedback is an 
incentive to report
- But a balance 
is needed i.e.
1.The error
2.Process to 
address this
3.Feedback if 
worked
-Staff feel they 
don’t see the 
relevance to the 
new process 
implemented
!Non-standard 
dosing of 
medication with 
patients from 
theatre may be 
utilised for upto 
24 hours.
!Management of 
MEs are 
Inconsistently 
managed due to 
-documentation
-accessibility
-different 
managerial 
approaches
In addition to how 
they are reported
-Ulysses –emailed
-paper form – can 
be missed
!Engagement of  
staff
-nurse not 
represented at 
incident 
meetings
-nurses not 
given clinical 
time to attend
-select group 
attend critical 
incident meeting
-staff should 
rotate
-involve staff at 
all levels to 
engage them in 
the learning 
process.
Evaluation of how 
an improvement 
process has worked
-staffs views may 
differ from 
management views
-feedback needed 
both ways.
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Culture of:-
!Senior nursing – 
rush and 
pressurise junior 
staff
!Non-
professionalism 
of staff
1.Informal
2.Not focused 
3.Too busy 
socialising
Safety 
Mechanisms
-individual 
mechanisms 
used by staff to 
prevent errors
-The unit 
implement 
processes to 
stop errors 
however:-
-can lead to 
other errors eg
-pharmacy – 
green pen
-programmable 
pumps- still 
need to check 
manually
-check lists – 
medications not 
always 
independently 
checked
!Too many 
process
-not always 
enforced
Openness to 
parents about MEs 
-improves trust
!New registrars 
starting rotation 
different support 
for
-anaesthetist
-paediatrician
-should be able 
to challenge 
openly without 
offence
Locations outside 
of PICU
-disseminate by 
1.Lessons of 
the week
2.Rotation of 
staff in 
clinical 
incident 
meetings
-incident reporting 
forms are shorter 
and more user 
friendly – report 
everything
-
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Appendix 14 Table 8: Data collected for medication administration error 
episodes 
day 
1
day 
2
day 
3
day 
4
day 
5
day 
6
day 
7
day 
8
day 
9
day 
10
Total over 
10 day 
period
Mean 
Number 
of 
medicati
ons per 
day
Median 
number 
of 
medicati
ons per 
day
oral/
topical
407313 332 330447 398 364 445 361285 3682 368.2 362.5
IV/bolus
154117 191 14785 128 125 154 139116 1356 135.6 133.5
INFUSION
56 79 41 58 43 58 60 70 45 40 550 55 57
LEVEL 3/4
6 6 31 10 12 9 0 3 4 4 85 8.5 6
TOTAL
623515 596 545587 593 549 672 549445 5674 567.4 568
NO OF 
PATIENTS
20 18 20 21 19 19 18 19 17 15 186 18.6 19
average 
number 
of 
medicatio
ns per 
bed 
space
30.6 29.9
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Appendix 15 Approval letter from PICU
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Appendix 16 Current reflective learning tool
Reflective Learning Tool
Analysis of Errors
Description of incident
Problems identified
Analysis of Problems
Reflection
Learning / development required
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Appendix 17: New E-learning tool for learning from errors on PICU
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183
184
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187
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Appendix 18 List of propositions within Chuang et al. theoretical 
framework
Proposition 1a: Preventable adverse events perceived as being more salient 
will have positive impacts on individual, group and organisational learning from 
the events.
Proposition 1b: Preventable adverse events that are perceived to be caused by 
heterogeneous factors will have positive impacts on group and organisational 
learning from the events.
Proposition 1c: The extent to which individuals attribute preventable adverse 
events to their own error will trigger greater individual learning compared with 
when they attribute events to organisational or administrative factors.
Proposition 2a: Heterogeneity of group members’ knowledge and experience 
with preventable impact on group learning from preventable adverse events.
Proposition 2b: Intergroup linkages consisting of divers knowledge and 
resources specific to adverse events within an organisation will have a positive 
impact on group learning from preventable adverse events.
Proposition 2c: Group norms of openness and norms that encourage the use of 
constructive conflict will have positive impacts on group learning from 
preventable adverse events.
Proposition 2d: Participative leadership approaches that value safety will have a 
positive impact on group learning form preventable adverse events.
Proposition 3a: Effectively used safety management systems will have a 
positive impact on organisational learning from preventable adverse events.
Proposition 3b: Leadership for patient safety will have a positive impact on 
organisational learning from preventable adverse events.
Proposition 3c: Safety culture will have a positive impact or organisational 
learning from preventable adverse events.
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